Sounding Madness: The Ethics of Listening in Janet Frame's Faces in the Water by Foisy, Christina
SOUNDING MADNESS: THE ETHICS OF LISTENING IN JANET FRAME’S FACES 
IN THE WATER 
CHRISTINA FOISY 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN 
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF    
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 




© CHRISTINA FOISY, 2021
ii  
ABSTRACT 
Sounding Madness: The Ethics of Listening in Janet Frame’s Faces in the Water is a 
transdisciplinary sonic exploration of the historical, cultural, and theoretical concerns 
surrounding electroshock’s (AKA electroconvulsive therapy or ECT) impact on memory, its 
controversial accusations of erasure and its current revival as a “miracle” (Peck 2) treatment for 
complex trauma (PTSD). My project employs “sound as a verb” (Voegelin 17) for voicing 
claims of “memory erasure” (Andre 6) by women ECT survivors that have been named 
“groundless” (Fink 17) by psychiatrists. To do so, I propose a sonic interpretation of Janet 
Frame’s 1961 novel Faces in the Water, a fictional account of her twelve-year stay in New 
Zealand mental institutions and 200 electroshock treatments in the late 1940s-1950s, because it 
depicts a rich sonic landscape of shock (treatment as trauma) and “madness as a new kind of 
music” (77). Since Frame prioritizes sound as a literary device, I weave her voice within a larger 
historical sonic context, dating back to Victorian medical electricity, the soundscape of the 
asylum and the sounds of contemporary Mad activism. Utilizing sound art as a Research-
Creation method that employs and embodies diverse theories of listening (from psychoanalytic 
to phenomenological), I aim to create a sonic space for “listening otherwise” (Levinas, Lispari, 
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“(...) the violent orchestration of unreason that seemed like a new kind of music of 
curse and cry with the undertones of silence flowing through (...)” (Frame 77). 
 
 
The fragmented layers of memory that I retrace in this project are both personal and political. 
They are transgenerational and bring me back to a place where I have no words, only sounds that 
trigger a sense of déjà-vu, a dreamscape I cannot fully understand. This project began as a 
conversation with my aunt, a psychiatric survivor, who received electroconvulsive therapy 
(ECT) in the early 1990s and told me one day on the phone that the procedure did not erase the 
right memories. Her words made me think about the family history that had been erased from our 
collective memory: suicide, domestic violence, abuse, incarceration, psychiatric confinement. 
The list goes on. The stories we have hidden in boxes in the attic, in sentences we can’t finish. 
Listening to my aunt made me think about how I cannot remember my mother’s voice, her 
suicide always in the background like a distant murmur. I never met my grandmother, who died 
young from cancer and at the hands of a violent husband. Another story buried. I was curious 
about what my aunt meant by the right memories and how any treatment could erase the right 
memories with any precision or ethical clearance. How could erasure be the cure? Erasing 
memories sounded unethical, in fact, impossible. The promise of a miraculous new life without 
any burdens or weight from the past seemed unlikely, unscientific, and unsound. How could any 
psychiatric treatment erase memories of abuse, poverty, violence with an electric current passing 
through the brain? 
They didn’t erase the right memories lingered in the back of my mind like a ghost 
haunting, reminding of past injustice in need of reparation, in need of attention. This 
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conversation happened the same year I first read Michel Foucault’s poignant allusion that 
madness cannot speak1 which made me pause. Whether my aunt was exaggerating about 
memory erasure or not, her complaint was not taken seriously by the experts responsible for her 
care, and so I was confided in. It was her diagnosis, not her word choice, which prevented her 
from being genuinely listened to, believed, and validated. The truth is, she never consented to 
ECT, and she doesn’t remember signing any papers, reading any brochures, or watching any 
videos about the treatment. It was her brother who consented, and because she was a danger to 
herself and her family, she no longer had any agency in determining her future. This adds 
another layer about the ethics of listening in the psychiatric industrial complex2: Whose voices 
matter when it comes to deciding which treatment is best, which treatment will resolve the root 
cause? In my aunt’s case, ECT did not resolve her problems; it only gave her new ones to deal 
with. 
Searching for the right memories, I was eager to learn and listen to all of the stories I 
could find about the intersecting tensions of gender-based trauma, memory, and ECT by those 
who have survived the psychiatric industry. Building upon my previous sound-art based 
phenomenological research, A Sound Memoir: Sound Collage for Listening to Suicide Survival 
Narratives (2011) that developed theories of listening to soundscapes to restoratively work- 
 
1 Foucault, Michel. History of Madness. “In the midst of the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer 
communicates with the madman: on one hand he is the man of reason, who delegates madness to the doctor, thereby 
authorizing no relation other than to the abstract universality of illness; and on the other is the man of madness, who 
only communicates with the other through the intermediary of a reason that is no less abstract (…). There is no 
common language: or rather it no longer exists (…). My intention was not to write the history of that language, but 
rather draw up the archaeology of that silence.” (xxviii) 
2 The psychiatric industrial complex is “an industry that is involved in the creation of an “at-risk” population is also 
the creation of a market for technologies of classification, surveillance and intervention. Psy policing circulates to 
make citizens, delineate monsters, expel threats, project anxieties, do nation, and push profits all galvanized by the 
construction of “risk-factors” that are soaked in (bio)politics, statistically spun into populations, thrown into bodies 
and struck down with fear.” (Holmes et al. 5-6) 
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through the trauma of my mother’s suicide, I delved into memoirs and autobiographical accounts 
of ECT by women writers while working on a sound piece that could encapsulate my findings 
symbolically. 
This is when I found Janet Frame’s writing. I read her autobiographical trilogy An Angel 
at my Table and later her novels Faces in the Water and Towards Another Summer, and I found 
that her writing was sound-based and lyrically inflected, and that she was writing about her 
experience with ECT to re-member it (assembling information in a new, perhaps, shocking way) 
differently. Her voice was an electric current that ran through my body, connecting me to my 
past and possible futures in the present. She was my entry-point, teacher, and collaborator in this 
project. I worked to channel the energy in her novels that resonated with the generations of 
women in my family that had been psychiatrized against their will and whose voices were 
systemically silenced. She taught me how to listen to madness in a new way. As a sound artist 
and humanities scholar, I wonder, what can psychiatry learn from the arts when it comes to 
listening? How do sound artists relate to listening as a process: is it a core component of one’s 
ethical capacity to receive the other compassionately and humbly? Salome Voegelin discusses 
how sound artists often create a world of possible futures for their listeners (Voegelin 34), and 
this seems quite ambitious and noble. How is listening part of one’s artistic and ethical research 
process? Along this tangent, my work is grounded in a research-creation practice that finds itself 
listening and following questions that drive curiosity, passion and love. As Natalie Loveless 
eloquently says in her manifesto Making Art at the End of the World, we, as artist-researchers, 
must be guided by the “heartmind” (3) to expand the field of knowledge-making and world- 
making (39). We can no longer be solely guided by institutionally defined disciplines given the 
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existential quandaries and urgencies in equity we collectively face. At this time in history, our 
job is to allow: 
ourselves to be drawn by our loves, our intensive and extensive curiosities 
attentive to what and whom we are driven to explore and examine the complex 
web of relations that inherit thereby that we might inhabit research questions 
ethically. (39) 
My work is an act of love that is undisciplined and wild, it is research-creation guided by 
madness as methodology (Gale) and listening otherwise (Levinas, Lispari, Voegelin, Todd). I 
aim to create a space for audiences to explore their discomfort with what exists beyond the 
parameters of language and understanding, to engage with the discomfort of memory erasure and 
to imagine new ways of listening to distress. 
This project is not about whether ECT is an effective treatment; it’s about listening to 
madness when it cannot speak. It’s about what is at stake in ignoring the subjective, in forgetting 
experiential knowledge and relying solely on measurable data within the evidence-based 
hierarchical knowledge regimes. The accounts of thousands of ECT survivors3, of whom the 
majority are women (Read et al. 263), will not be heard, read, or taken seriously as credible 
accounts of trauma, nor will their experience be counted as evidence-based knowledge. The 
women that I am most interested in attending to within this debate are those who received ECT 
without proper informed consent: women whose husbands signed consent forms on their behalf, 
women who were told there was something wrong with their personalities after they were 




3 I refer to ECT-survivors as people who received ECT without proper consent and for whom it had a negative 
impact on their lives and cognitive functioning. 
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living without ECT. The woman I am particularly interested in is Janet Frame. Her book Faces 
in the Water was written in 1961 in the early days of the psychiatric survivor/ex-patient 
movement (the same year as Foucault’s seminal text Madness: the Invention of an Idea). Frame 
was willingly institutionalized for over twelve years in New Zealand. Her writing predates the 
concept of “recovery” (grassroots self-help or mainstream definitions alike), her account is well 
ahead of its time in its embrace of madness as artistic methodology, sound composition, and 
writing practice. She writes as a form of resistance, a way to reclaim and re-member her 
experiences of shock within the asylum and to advocate for psychiatric patients to be listened to 
outside of diagnostic listening or pathologization. Frame writes about how madness is “a new 
kind of music” (77) that transcends paternalistic false harmony towards a radically practicing 
community that listens otherwise. 
Madness as communicative limit-case echoes a deeper metaphorical wound: How is the 
Western psychiatric industrial complex meant to listen to the subjectivity of patients if it is 
based on biomedical and economic metrics that emphasize the “body-as-a-machine” (Loftus 
214)? In response to this question, I engage with Frame’s poetics of sound in Faces in the 
Water to explore the ethics of listening otherwise and to generate a way into madness as a new 
kind of music. My project is an interrogation of the power of sound, both intimate and public, 
asking how it can mobilize us to listen to voices that have been systematically ignored and 
erased from history. 
Wrapped up in ideals about productivity and progress, ECT becomes an attractive 
solution when the mind, conceptualized as a computer instead of as a universe, is no longer 
concerned with consciousness. Memory erasure becomes a cure and listening to what is beneath 
the diagnostic symptoms is incidental. Foucault’s provocation has more to do with listening than 
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speaking. Can psychiatrists listen to their patients ethically if they are searching for symptoms, 
trying to re-order a disordered narrative? Alternatively, do they listen more like a prosecutor 
looking for evidence to prove someone is guilty of a crime? Could they listen otherwise, from 
the place where madness speaks liberated? How can madness be a methodology for rethinking 
the ethics of listening versus the ethics of “curing” within psychiatry and the mental health 
industrial complex? 
I also work through the concept of listening otherwise (Levians, Lispari, Voegelin, Todd) 
as an ethical gesture for re-membering history in the present. Paul Ricoeur in Memory, History, 
and Forgetting saw the ethics of memory as a form of listening to an in-transmissible and 
traumatic past, as engagement with voices obscured by history’s master narratives. Similarly, 
Jacques Derrida in Specters of Marx developed the method of hauntology4 to think through the 
ways a wounded and marginalized past haunts the present as a silence that speaks. Both theorists 
centered listening to silence, or what has been silenced through dominant representations, as an 
ethical turn necessary for history to become praxis for re-authoring towards justice in the living 
present. Being heard, listened to, and ultimately understood is what the psychiatric 
 
 
4 Hauntology combines the words “haunt” with “ontology”. With this playful philosophical term, Derrida was 
referring to how we need to attend to the “ghosts” of unrecorded or erased histories, the stories of injustices that 
have been swept under the rug or denied by systems of institutional knowledge-power. We need to learn how to live 
with those stories through allowing ourselves to be haunted on an ontological level, and shift our actions accordingly 
towards justice. He says: “The time of ‘learning to live,’ a time without a tutelary present, would amount to this, to 
which this exordium is leading us: to learn to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the 
companionship, in the commerce without commerce of ghosts. To live otherwise and better. No, not better, but more 
justly. But with them.” (Derrida Specters of Marx xviii) In Specters of Marx, Derrida suggests that the present may 
not be able to teach us how to live ethically or justly with injustice. Instead, we must learn justice from the past as it 
is repeated in the present and towards the future, from the stuttering of those who came before and who are no longer 
—from welcoming ghosts and their possibility of living otherwise. The Derridian ghost is related to the Lévinasian 
Other, in that it cannot be assimilated or known by the subject, yet, ethically speaking, it must be listened to and 
attended to with respect to its alterity. Derrida urges that one must "speak to it" beyond the categories and empirical 
knowledge that assume to know it, to learn from the ghost how "justice carries life beyond present life or its actual 
being-there, its empirical or ontological actuality: not toward death but toward a living-on (sur-vie) a survival whose 
possibility in advance comes to dis-join or dis-adjust the identity of the living present as well as any 
effectivity" (Spectres of Marx xx). 
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survivor/service-user movement, geared towards validating a patient's experiences and analysis, 
seeks to accomplish (Burstow 16, Andre 6). While listening to patients’ history is central to 
psychiatric intervention, ECT’s “memory erasure” (Andre 6) contradicts that goal. The 
psychiatrist is meant to be a compassionate and skilled listener, who can guide patients through 
suffering towards articulation, however, ECT’s unrefined, indiscriminate erasure may not always 
help patients make sense of their lives. 
History matters, yet psychiatric survivor history and analysis is obscured or rendered 
illegitimate within mainstream psychiatric institutions, knowledge production and engagement 
practices. Their voices are not listened to as trustworthy testimonies despite the turn towards 
patient engagement in the mental health industry. When I was a volunteer archivist at the 
Psychiatric Survivor Archive of Toronto (PSAT), I genuinely felt for the first time in my life like 
I had found a language that made sense. I was able to resist psychiatric labelling and reclaim 
madness as a source of power and critique. I grew to love madness and to hear it as a new kind of 
music that challenged conventional harmony and made space for my rhythm. But madness 
cannot speak within institutions: it is regulated, pathologized, considered to be in need of cure or 
treatment. I am concerned about the co-optation, and subsequent depoliticizing of ideas and 
practices that emerged through the survivor/Mad Pride liberation movement by evidence-based 
psychiatry who use patient stories as fuel to justify their practice. ECT “recovery narratives” 
(Woods, Hart and Spandler) are deployed to erase the dissenting voices of critique who refuse to 
sell something that didn’t help them and who speak to the broader socio-economic structures that 
keep people down. 
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Today, patient engagement is gaining more and more momentum as it becomes enshrined 
in legislation, best practice and quality improvement healthcare guidelines5. Now patients’ lived 
experience and testimonies are brought in strategically, which might seem like progress, but it 
has a dark side, one that continues to obscure patient critique and analysis with agendas that are 
managed by institutions. These engagement efforts to legitimize the “voice of lived experience” 
operate under assumed transparency, neutrality, and compulsory positivity. This is a practice 
akin to the cure story of miracle erasure. It silences dissent: the voice that is angry, tired, and 
unwell that refuses to be managed by neutral benevolence, is slowly being drowned out in the 
false harmony of patient engagement and recovery narratives orchestrated by institutions. Could 
ethical engagement be a commitment to critique as an act of love, to honour all the knowledge 
that doesn’t make it into mainstream evidence, and to admit that representation fetishizes 
authenticity for the sake of reproducing the status quo? How can we listen without trying to 
know madness with certainty, but welcome it as a new kind of music? This new kind of music 
offers the possibility of a world that dissolves hierarchical systems of truth and meaning. 
My project seeks to dissolve hierarchies of knowledge-production and center madness as 
a language, methodology, and epistemology worth listening to. By co-creating a sonic landscape 
with Janet Frame’s novel Faces in the Water and the psychiatric survivor movement, this project 
illuminates the power of madness as a new kind of music. This new kind of music breaks 
harmonic form and convention to re-member (assembling information in a new, perhaps, 






We all see the faces in the water. We smother our memory of them, even our 
belief in their reality, and become calm people of the world; or we can neither 
forget nor help them. Sometimes by a trick of circumstance or dream or in a 
hostile neighbourhood of light, we see our own face. (Frame 150) 
 
 
Sounding Madness: The Ethics of Listening in Janet Frame’s Faces in the Water is a 
transdisciplinary sonic exploration of the historical, cultural, and theoretical concerns 
surrounding electroshock’s (AKA electroconvulsive therapy or ECT) impact on memory, its 
controversial accusations of erasure and its current revival as a “miracle” (Peck 2) treatment for 
trauma (PTSD). Working with Janet Frame’s 1961 autobiographical novel about her experience 
with over 200 coercive ECT treatments, Faces in the Water, I explore the ethics of listening 
otherwise and generate a way into madness as “a new kind of music” (Frame 77). Ultimately, 
this is a study on the ethics of listening to unsound sound, on welcoming madness as sound to be 
heard without the need to confine it to meaning or understanding. This is also a study on the 
contradictions of evidence-based psychiatry and whether such practices can be ethical (Gupta 2). 
The promise of erasing “bad” memories using invasive interventions such as ECT has gained 
prominence within popular scientific literature (Maguire et al; Griffiths and O’Neil Kerr; Rose et 
al.; Delistraty). But what are “bad” memories? Should they be erased? How, instead, could we 
care for our memories, honour them, and heal with them? 
Utilizing sound art as a research method that employs and embodies diverse theories of 
listening, I aim to create a sonic space where people can listen to silenced, disenfranchised 
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narratives related to ECT’s memories of erasure. I focus on women who received involuntary 
and coercive ECT and who wrote about their experiences of memory erasure in the form of 
memoirs and autobiographical fiction. Namely, my work engages with Janet Frame’s account of 
ECT in the novel Faces in the Water (1961) that re-members (assembles in a new way) her 
shock experience paying specific attention to sounds within the asylum and the voices of the 
patients around her, as well as the role of listening for survival. I weave Frame’s voice within a 
larger historical sonic context, dating back to Victorian medical electricity, the soundscape of the 
asylum and the sounds of contemporary Mad activism. 
My project employs “sound as a verb” (Voegelin 17) for voicing the psychiatric 
limitations of care and for legitimizing the trauma that has been named “groundless” (Fink 17) 
by ECT supporters and clinical administrators. To do so, I propose a sonic interpretation of Janet 
Frame’s 1961 novel Faces in the Water, a fictional account of her twelve-year stay in New 
Zealand mental institutions and 200 electroshock treatments in the late 1940s-1950s, because, 
through sound metaphors, it depicts a rich sonic landscape of shock (electroshock as treatment 
and as trauma) from a gendered perspective that resounds in a silent art form as an 
epistemological embodiment. Frame uses sound metaphors to illustrate the emotional extent of 
the shock experience and to provoke readers to “listen to” the disenfranchised, forgotten, and 
silenced mad women in her novel. My sound pieces are interpretations that I hope will 
illuminate the protagonist’s personal crisis, depicted by Frame as a sense of existential 
homelessness, into a new modality/interface whereby listening creates a world where madness 
can inhabit and speak. My dissertation and sound art are not advocating for art as therapy, but 
rather as a disruption of an epistemological hegemony and a reclamation of the acoustemology 




My work interrogates the intersections of voice, trauma and sound, and considers how Frame 
uses sound (and songs) to work through a type of suffering that no one can recognize or hear 
(both in the text and in society). Speaking to ECT’s clinical goal of “restructuring the brain” 
(Fink 23), I consider how to restructure recursive literary representations and metaphors of 
female “madness”, “otherness” and “homelessness” through the shock of sound collage to 
facilitate a critical, ethical and compassionate form of listening to engendered mental distress. 
Theories of listening span a wide range of disciplines, from phenomenology to 
psychiatry, as “listening has become an increasingly popular subject of study” (Carlyle and Lane 
9). As a sound artist, I think of listening as a practice that can reveal a parallel reality, one that 
lies below or inside of that which is immediately accessible. The immersive nature of listening 
can place the listener at the centre of a sound piece, creating an intimate space and connection to 
the invisible, to what haunts. David Toop calls sound: “a ghost, a presence whose location in 
space is ambiguous and whose existence in time is transitory” (xv). The intangibility of sound is 
uncanny—a phenomenal presence both in the head, at its point of source and all around—so 
never entirely distinct from auditory hallucinations. I conceptualize listening as a method of 
engagement with ephemeral, incoherent, and ungraspable traces of experience: a perfect vehicle 
for working with the limit-cases of “memory erasure,” madness, and trauma. 
Listening is closely tied to ethics and social justice, a practice of negotiation and 
disruption. I relate to Emmanuel Levinas’ concept of listening as a gesture toward the Other, as a 
way of attending to their incomprehensible difference without the need to contain their speech in 
“fixed” meaning (65). The fluidity of listening, according to Levinas, would afford a 
communicative exchange that resists hermeneutic dominance. Listening, in this sense, makes 
possible ethical engagements with marginalized individuals who are silenced within the confines
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of biomedical psychiatric institutions and language—it becomes a way to encourage their speech 
to resound in meaningful ways, toward building narrative community outside of psychiatric labels 
and management. 
To think through the “ethics of listening” (Todd, Levinas, Voegelin, Lispari) toward 
limit- cases such as: “memory erasure” (Andre 6), madness, and trauma—what it means to 
welcome speech that cannot be “understood” in a linear narrative fashion, I propose to listen to 
the stutters, murmurs and silent articulations of these experiences in a literary work on 
electroshock that has been forgotten by the canon: Janet Frame’s Faces in the Water.  She is the 
only writer in the ECT canon to prioritize sound as a literary device, and I wanted to experiment 
with envisioning her novel as a compositional score in my sound art. Thus my project employs 
“sound as a verb” (Voegelin 17) and “sounding” (Henrique) for voicing the psychiatric 
limitations that create the condition of what Michel Foucault suggest as, madness cannot speak 
(History of Madness xxviii) and moving beyond those limitations into the possibilities of 
listening otherwise (Levinas, Lispari, Voegelin, Todd). Madness cannot speak due to structural 
violence and epistemological hegemony that invalidates mad voices and knowledge production. 
Engaging with a hauntological silence that speaks, unlike most authors in the 
electroshock canon, Frame uses sound metaphors to situate the protagonist, ontologically and 
politically, within the anxious landscape of society and the asylum. The novel begins with Istina 
Mavet, the protagonist, describing an apocalyptic fantasy using soundscape. She listens to the 
city as an outsider, alienated and afraid. The protagonist imagines how social norms would 
dissolve into “hysteria” under the stress of a doomsday natural disaster. Citizens would become 
disoriented and confused—resembling how Istina feels panicked and unsure within the mundane 
everyday of city life: “the streets throng, resounding with people who panic, covering the 
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scissors, sucking the poison from a wound they can’t find (...). But the shop windows were 
speaking to me (…) I was not yet civilized, I traded my safety for the glass beads” (5). Although 
Frame is not overtly describing the chaotic sounds of the city, she infers a soundscape of anxiety 
and hallucination, one that questions the borders of real versus imaginary sounds. This scene 
foreshadows her later diagnosis of schizophrenia, which by the end of the novel turns out to be 
false. This misdiagnosis reflects a mishearing. The social world and the institutional world of the 
asylum do not hear Istina as a subject or agent. Instead, they hear symptoms of schizophrenia. 
They hear a psychiatric label when they should be hearing and attending to her distress. Frame’s 
soundscapes allude to the regulatory function of psychiatric language and listening: when the 
patient speaks, the doctor hears biological symptoms intertwined with a story. They hear the 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM), the categories of illness, embedded in the patient’s speech. 
But they do not hear the patient. By emphasizing sound, Frame calls attention to the lack of 
listening, as an ethical relationship, within psychiatric care.  
There are four major soundscapes depicted in Frame’s novel: cityscape, asylum, nature, 
and internal world/voice. Each represents a built or organic environment entrenched with 
memory and trauma. She attentively describes the sounds of each environment to create a space 
for madness to speak beyond the limits of psychiatric institutional language. My sound pieces are 
soundings that I hope will illuminate the protagonist’s crisis, depicted by Frame as a sense of 
existential homelessness, into a new modality/interface whereby listening creates a world where 
madness can inhabit and speak otherwise. 
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Overview and Structure of Chapters 
 
 
Chapter 1: Histories of Erasure: ECT Medical History and Survivor Narratives 
 
After a preliminary definition in chapter one, I reflect upon electroshock therapy’s genealogy as 
medical electricity, its modern manifestation as electroconvulsive therapy (or ECT), and its 
newly refined incarnation as transcranial magnetic brain stimulation or cognitive enhancement. 
From shock to stimulation, I outline the discourse of electricity as a regenerative source of life, 
charged dually with curative and destructive power, which fascinated ancient and modern natural 
philosophers, physicians, and scientists, as well as poets, writers, biopsychiatry and artists. The 
electrical “boom” in medicine reached its pinnacle during the Victorian era, which produced an 
increase in devices meant for channeling electricity in and through the body. My goal is to 
remember electroshock’s early therapeutic and experimental beginnings, which predate its 
present-day incarnation, to work through medical electricity’s promise to stimulate and 
invigorate “dead” energy within the human body and re-balance its flow. 
I juxtapose such promise with the modern discursive “miracle” of electroshock. 
Electroshock’s biomedical framing as a “miracle” is linked to Victorian imaginations of 
electricity’s power to revive the dead, cure the mute, and jolt the lethargic into productivity. A 
discursive analysis of ECT’s framing as a “miracle” reveals the ideological underpinnings of 
biopsychiatry technology, and “evangelized” claim to “cure” the mind of suffering, sometimes in 
unethical or harmful ways. However, concepts of “miracle” within biological psychiatry, a 
paradigm that stresses the scientifically verifiable and “objective,” seem contradictory. Religious 
language is heavily embedded within the biomedical promise of “miracle treatments,” and I 
question the ethical costs of such affirmations. Similar language is used by the activist 
community, who state “Memory is Sacred” (Weitz, Burstow) in response to ECT’s controversial 
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effects on memory. In the context of trauma, naming a medical procedure “miracle,” or elevating 
memory to a level of sacredness, poses questions about what recovery can mean, ethically, and 
about what the role of memory is in the recovery process. Many PTSD survivors, for example, 
desire to forget their memories (or rather how their memories are narrated) to work-through their 
distress and relearn how to trust (Freud 156). Thus, this chapter will end by weighing the ethical 
contours of memory and forgetting alongside ECT’s accusations of “memory erasure.” I will 
examine how the psychiatric survivor movement and the medical community have made their 
claims of miracle/erasure, and explore how the dichotomy manifests discursively in the context 
of narrating trauma in life writing (fiction/non-fiction) on ECT. I will engage with the theoretical 
work of Leigh Gilmore and Paul Ricoeur (among others) to tease out the affordances and 
contradictions of remembering a life under erasure through autobiographical practices, which I 
then expand upon in chapter three, where I spend more time analyzing Frame’s Faces in the 
Water. 
Chapter 2: Madness Cannot Speak and the Ethics of Listening Otherwise in Psychiatry 
In chapter two, I unpack the concept of listening within psychiatry from contrasting ethical and 
socio-political perspectives. I begin by centering madness as epistemology and methodology. I 
engage with mad studies theory and critical analysis of listening practices within psychiatry and 
patient engagement. Mad epistemology is grounded in the history of psychiatric survivor and 
service user analysis and research and intervenes on this new era of patient engagement6
1 Patient Engagement within the Mental Health and Addiction formally began in 2010 with the creation of the
Canadian Mental Health Commission in addition to the Excellent Care for All Act. In 2012, Changing Directions, 
Changing Lives: The Mental Health Strategy of Canada recommended the inclusion and active involvement of 
persons living with mental health or addictions in areas such as program design, planning, delivery, evaluation and 
monitoring, policy research, leadership and development. In Ontario, since 2010 we have seen legislation that 
mandates “patient engagement” in system-level work. In the 10 year Mental Health Strategy developed by the 
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initiatives that are, in fact, new forms of institutionalization (Johannesen, Voronka, Costa). I 
argue that these new forms of institutionalization operate under the guise of empowerment and 
system change but fundamentally sustain the asylum’s specter of madness cannot speak. 
Specifically, this brand of mandatory patient engagement has generated a new genre of life 
writing and storytelling, coined by Angela Woods, Akiko Hart, and Helen Spandler as “recovery 
narratives,” which are instigated and controlled by institutions to promote various treatments or 
programs. Another side to patient engagement is how engaged-patients are becoming leaders in 
the system without any knowledge or grounding in the history of psychiatric survivors or Mad 
activism (Voronka, Johannesen, Costa). Uncritical and opaquely positive, these narratives 
espouse the language of miracle and contribute to the systematic erasure of psychiatric 
survivor/service users and mad knowledge and critical analysis. I think we should critique the 
overemphasis on voice and speech, and consider what we might learn from listening. I suggest 
this phenomenon is rooted in psychiatry’s inability to listen beyond time-based, cost-effective 
diagnostics, and/or normative surveillance. To listen otherwise (Levinas, Lispari, Voegelin, 
Todd), beyond the conquest to know the patient via the psychiatric interview that defines by 
diagnosis and measures recovery by a checklist of alleviated symptoms, would mean to welcome 
the patient as ultimately, an unknowable subject, unmeasurable and undefinable. This seems 
contrary to the goals of psychiatry that seeks to “find” (Mohl 2) the patient, and solve their 
problems with the promise of biomedical science (same can be said for solution-based crisis 
intervention). Listening otherwise does not aim to locate the patient within a particular identity, 
Minister's Advisory Group entitled “Respect, Recovery, Resilience: Recommendations from Ontario’s Mental 
Health and Addiction Strategy” and in the Patients First: An Action Plan for Health Care there is a prioritization of 
patient experience in creating a system that will best serve them. However, these institutionalized mechanisms for 
bringing in the patient perspective in healthcare have its limitations and silences a lot of the critical analysis that the 
psychiatric and disability justice movements were centering back in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
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nor does it aim to fix what might appear broken, rather it welcomes the patient into a relationship 
of co-creation, where meaning-making is ongoing, horizontal, and process-based instead of goal- 
oriented, hierarchical and finite. This form of listening comes from dialogic philosophy (Levinas, 
Lispari, Voegelin, Todd) and it is the foundation of all ethical relationships. I end the chapter by 
tying these ideas back to ECT as a treatment that is cost-effective, yet hinders patients’ memory, 
and by extension, their creative self-expression, voice, and sense of self. If a patient's memories 
are erased, how can they articulate their stories of distress to make meaning out of their lives, or 
how can they participate in the world as creative and productive individuals? Listening in a 
solution-focused biomedical way is what motivates the prescription of ECT as the only way to 
solve depression that is treatment-resistant, and it hinders psychiatrists’ ability to hold space for 
the patient’s complex consciousness and the non-biomedical reasons for their distress. Listening 
otherwise may not be able to solve patients’ symptoms, but it is not meant to be positioned as a 
solution. This form of listening seeks only to hold space for “Otherness” (Levinas, Voegelin, 
Lispari Todd) to be received non-violently. 
Chapter 3: Janet Frame’s Life Writing and Faces in the Water 
In chapter 3, the heart of my dissertation, I focus on Janet Frame’s (1961) novel Faces in the 
Water that re-members her twelve-year stay in New Zealand asylums (1945-1957), where she 
received electroshock therapy (ECT) against her consent as forced treatment. Before I delve into 
the novel, I highlight some prominent themes from Frame’s life writing (1982, 1984, 1985) 
related to theories of listening, poetic identity, and the creation of selfhood for a woman of her 
generation and social class. Her life writing also outlines her creative process for writing Faces 
in the Water (1961) and the ethical role of listening to the voices of those she met during her 
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time in the asylum. Although Frame may not have publicly identified as a “psychiatric survivor” 
per se, she did view her writing as political. Her writing, including its phenomenological 
descriptions of sound, transmits what the asylum felt like and sounded-like from the inside—but 
it also resounds with psychiatric survivors’ voices (her own and those around her) and their need 
to be heard compassionately and legitimately within the world at large. 
The novel profiles electroshock as “a new way and fashionable way of quieting people” 
(9). Faces in the Water symbolizes psychiatric patients as lives under erasure, muted voices, and 
distorted faces—and, more profoundly, the social responsibility to attend to the patients, trapped 
in the monumental silence of asylums. With the text set in 1945, Frame’s experiences of mental 
health issues were at a time when there was no such thing as “recovery” or “wellness” for 
someone with a psychiatric label. As she writes, there was “no voluntary admission; we were all 
insane under the Mental Defectives Act, 1928” (36). As I discussed in chapter one, during the 
asylum era, people who were diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder (or in some cases, “defect”) 
were consequently stripped of their civic voice, freedoms, and/or rights. They were not allowed 
to have their own bank accounts, have jobs, or participate in society (36). Asylums functioned as 
prisons for the unwanted, the poor, and unproductive members of society, who were seen as a 
diseased population beyond hope. To relieve the burden they put on their families, state-run 
asylums were set up to be places of confinement, structure, and order, for them to spend the rest 
of their days, safely tucked away from view. The rationale was to lock the unwanted away to 
preserve moral hygiene (Foucault, Madness the Invention of an Idea 116-117). 
To navigate the silencing effects of institutionalization, Frame attempts to communicate 
through sound-metaphors and images the “unspeakable suffering” (Kadar 7) of fellow asylum 
inmates and the incredible responsibility to attend and listen. The incommunicability of madness, 
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wherein others cannot understand what one is experiencing, fosters feelings of profound isolation 
and alienation— one of the central themes of the book. Listening becomes an ethical gesture 
towards the alterity of the Other that is irrecoverable through language. Coincidentally, the novel 
was published the same year as Michel Foucault’s Madness the Invention of an Idea (1961) at 
the beginning of the psychiatric survivor movement, and in many ways, it embodies that concept, 
yet it also presents readers with a theory of listening to madness otherwise as it centers on 
“sound as a verb” (Voegelin 17). “Sound as a verb” denotes a call to action that suggests sound 
as the invisible layer of the world that shows its relationships, actions, and dynamics through an 
engagement with the ephemeral, a performativity, and responsibility of “doing” (Voegelin 17). 
Writing sound, as textual phonography, parallels field recording that captures the acoustic 
ecology of built and organic environments. Frame’s fiction urges readers to listen to the voices of 
the voiceless, forgotten behind institutional walls, and lost to treatments that robbed them of the 
ability to care for their memories. Her fiction prioritizes sound as a literary device, almost as a 
field recording of what it felt like to be institutionalized, given ECT as forced treatment and 
never listened to as a being but as a defective object to be fixed. 
I demonstrate how Janet Frame’s novel is an example of the tensions between dialogic 
and diagnostic listening. Ultimately, the way in which she depicts the various soundscapes 
inside/outside the asylum embodies the concept of listening otherwise—thus allowing madness 
to speak. I outline the context in which the novel was written to explore how the 1960s 
psychiatric survivor and later 1980-1990s mad movement unfolded during the time the novel 
was published. This was the first time in history that patients were speaking out against not being 
listened to and being mistreated by a system that saw them as hopeless burdens. They produced 
testimony in many different genres to reclaim madness as an integral part of their unique 
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contributions to the world, their creative self-expression, and their survival of trauma. Such 
activism has made the case for “lived experience” and “patient engagement” within the mental 
health system for quality improvement. However, as I outlined in Chapter 2 and the Postscript, 
these institutional gestures to include patient voices are co-opted and immersed in “ethical 
domination” (Voronka 33). 
I return again to supplementary life writing to better understand Frame's broader use of 
music and soundscapes beyond the novel. Frame’s fascination with music and soundscapes goes 
beyond her novel, as described in her autobiographical trilogy (1982, 1984, 1985) An Angel at 
my Table. Song is her introduction to poetry, symphony and orchestral music as a transcendental 
mechanism for her to experience and understand her inner emotions in a new way (to flow with 
her inner life, instead of trying to control it with strict goal-oriented voices). It is also a way for 
her to relax outside of the mundane anxiety of Teachers’ College—a place that did not feed her 
thirst for imagination and poetic conjecture. In the foreword to An Angel at my Table, New 
Zealand screenwriter and filmmaker Jane Campion, who adapted the book into a movie, says that 
Frame’s voice is so natural, that it is as if it resisted commonplace patriarchal notions that 
women were meant to be seen and not heard: “She has achieved that supremely difficult task of 
finding a voice so natural it feels as if it were not written but always was” (An Angel at my Table 
xi). Campion describes the healing effect of reading Frame as a young teenage girl, “her dark, 
eloquent song captured my heart” (x) which resulted in Campion finding her voice through 
Frame: “it was this inner world of gorgeously imagined riches that Janet Frame affirmed in 
Daphne, but also in me, and quite possibly in all sensitive teenage girls. We had been given a 
voice, poetic, powerful, and fated—a beautiful, mysterious song of the soul. I read the book at 
fourteen when my life felt like torture” (x). A transgenerational healing occurs through 
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autobiographical poetics and sharing one’s voice in artistic representations that preserve 
memories as they transform them. 
I explore the complex relationship between Frame’s development of voice and agency, 
her misdiagnosis of schizophrenia, and how her creative process of listening and writing leads 
towards the compassionate integration of madness within selfhood. I call this process, in Frame’s 
case as in the women who survived ECT’s memory erasure and chose to represent it through 
fragmented autobiography, “re-membering erasure”. Erasure is thus subverted from being a site 
of emptiness to being a site full of creative and radical potential for transformation. 
Chapter 4: Sounding Madness: My sound art in response to Faces in the Water 
In chapter four, I describe the sound pieces that I made in response to my dissertation research 
and the novel Faces in the Water. I focus on what I have learned from Janet Frame about 
listening as resistance within the asylum soundscape while engaging with the theory of sounding 
(sound as a verb) defined as a transitory embodiment in time that serves to draw attention to a 
different object of inquiry, beyond representation, towards process. I engage with the psychiatric 
survivor history of ECT and women’s memory erasure from an ethical and relational perspective. 
In this chapter, I discuss the components of the three sound art pieces I composed and their 
methodologies, which include “real-world music”, “soundscapes”, “sound collage” as well as 
“madness as methodology” (Gale). I also employ theoretical concepts such as “listening 
otherwise” (Levinas, Lispari, Voegelin, Todd) and “madness as a new kind of music” to guide 
my compositional methods. The three sound pieces that I made embody the theories of listening 
outlined in my dissertation. Each piece holds particular resonance with Janet Frame’s writing and 
the ethics of listening otherwise. 
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The first piece, “Faces in the Water”, deals with concepts of self-reflexivity within 
psychiatric listening and asks: What can psychiatric listening learn from sound-art? In this piece, 
I focus on the speaker’s reflection on the thin line between self/other. I recorded my voice 
reading passages of the novel. Conjuring Istina’s voice as it spoke to my own lived experience of 
the psychiatric system, I was hoping to reflect on how Istina’s voice resonates within my own 
and within generations of women who have undergone coercive ECT and have claimed 
“memory erasure”. Istina’s voice is a reflection of Frame’s voice and a reflection of my voice 
reflecting upon the voices of others. The act of recording defies erasure, subverts it. Yet the 
process remains unfinished and full of incomplete meaning; it requires an audience to engage 
with it and to reflect upon it. Such reflexive and inter-subjective techniques have been integrated 
into sound art practices where the “epistemological process in which interconnectivity is 
indeterminate and resistant to synergy” (Garoian 92). I am liberating sound from the musical 
score, just as I am liberating madness from psychiatric pathologization. 
One of the major features of the second piece, “Season of Peril”, is how it captures the 
many rallies and protests during my academic research thus far, where I had the chance to record 
various real-world soundscapes of psychiatric-survivor and Mad voices. Intersections between 
Mad studies/survivor epistemology and sound studies emerge to critique the biomedical 
psychiatric paradigm and regimes of truth. The way in which ECT survivors have used their 
voices to speak out and resist institutions that have claimed their experiences to be invalid, 
embody the principles of “sound as a verb” (Voegelin 17). I want to listen to the “music” that 
emerges from the everyday sounds of lived experience, mad studies, and the psychiatric survivor 
movement (that is now more of a subtle, insidious occupation of institutions, whereby people 
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with lived experience of mental health/addictions issues are working from within the walls of the 
institution). I seek to uncouple music from formal harmony, to foster listening otherwise. 
In the third piece, “Madness as a New Kind of Music” I collaborate with Mad-identified 
musicians to compose using madness as methodology (Gale). This piece reflects on power, 
voice, and memory, much like the other pieces, but in a more chaotic and symbolic way. I 
worked with two mad musicians to create an electrical soundscape that would bring to life the 
sonic metaphors in the novel: namely the ones where Istina is witnessing a surge in power in the 
patients around her, and how she stays “safe” by hiding and listening from a linen closet (Frame 
26). Sound as intimate power and sound as social power collide in this piece, which is a sort of 
accumulation of the two previous pieces I discussed: “Faces in the Water” and “Season of 
Peril”, “Madness as a New Kind of Music” creates a context for “sound as a verb” (Voegelin 
17) to subvert the epistemological underpinnings of madness cannot speak. I hope it can bring 
listeners closer to the symbolic abyss, to confront their fear and misunderstanding of madness. 
But more than that, I hope to create a context for questioning power on multiple layers, from the 
electrical, sonic, subjective, and social. Sounding sections of the novel where patients subvert the 
institutional power of the asylum through their bodies and voices in a new kind of music that 
speaks of transcendence and freedom, I want to showcase how these actions are productive and 
important for navigating this history of memory erasure. The goal is to restore madness as a 
viable mode of expression, as a way of knowing outside of psychiatric pathologizations and to 
re-member its erasure as epistemological power. 
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Conclusion 
Research-Creation offers transformative and innovative ways of responding to ethical questions 
that cannot be solved by one discipline alone (Loveless 3). I offer a sonic intervention to 
consider the role of listening in liberating madness and validating it as a resonant source of 
knowledge, experience, and critique. I further problematize the contemporary ECT-canon 
“recovery narratives” (Woods, Hart and Spandler) deployed by institutions because the “journey 
of recovery” in these narratives is plotted with the intent to erase madness as a viable and livable 
state of being. 
By sounding Frame’s autobiographical novel as a score for re-imagining what madness 
could sound like outside of the medical model, popular culture, and dominant historical 
narratives that frame it as lack, illness or danger in need of policing or containment; I am 
sounding hauntological connections between the psychiatric survivor history, Mad movement 
and our current “patient engagement” landscape to subvert overt/covert forms of memory 
erasure. 
I consider how the grain of Janet Frame’s voice be re-covered, excavated, historicized 
and incorporated into current ECT medical discursive practices and knowledge-production. I 
dissolve hierarchies of knowledge-production to trouble what counts as evidence in research 
praxis by centering madness as a language, methodology, and epistemology worth listening to. 
My sound-based analysis and creation provokes Health Humanities, Mad Studies, Sound Studies, 
Life Writing to doubt their borders, to cross-pollinate and generate new possibilities for 
knowledge-making outside of a hierarchical or institutional legacy. 
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CHAPTER1: Histories of Erasure: ECT Medical History and Survivor Narratives 
 
 
“Shock doesn’t make you forget things; it makes you never have known them. 
After shock, the memories no longer exist” (Andre 6). 
 
 
There is no longer any validity to the fear that electroshock will erase memory or 
make the patient unable to recall her life’s important events or recognize family 
members or return to work (…) that fear is groundless. (Fink 14) 
 
 
Electroshock therapy (AKA electroconvulsive therapy) has a long and complex history, 
obfuscated by its serious impact on memory, and thus has been stigmatized and silenced as a 
contradictory form of care that plagues psychiatry’s past. This silence obscures the contemporary 
usage of electroshock—a practice most people believe to be a relic of the asylum era. This 
treatment has been rebranded as brain stimulation on the cutting edge of cost-effective 
treatments, part of a neoliberal “recovery narrative,” (Woods, Hart and Spandler) which aims to 
destigmatize psychiatric treatments that have gained criticism from former patients, service- 
users, and mad people as well as human rights advocacy groups. While downplaying the first- 
person testimonies of memory erasure, as well as service-user and mad people’s research that 
spans over 60 years, the cultural amnesia surrounding electroshock mirrors central criticisms of 
its controversial “memory erasure” (Andre 6), non-consensual misuse, and traumatic side- 
effects. As this controversial treatment makes a “quiet comeback” (Dukakis and Tye 25) in 
psychiatric care, now reborn as “a wonderful treatment,” (Dukakis and Tye 15) its history as 
“memory erasure” (Andre 6) is forgotten or, worse, de-legitimized as exaggerated pulp, or gothic 
horror (Endler 65, Fink 14). In 1982, critical psychiatrist Morris Fraser described how the idea 
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that ECT was making a comeback was inaccurate: “ECT has never been ‘in’ fashion or ‘out.’” 
(Fraser 2). Yet since then, medical journalists (Tye 45) have made the claim ECT has resurged, 
newly revamped, as a “miracle cure” for severe “treatment-resistant” depression (Peck 20). In 
relation to patient testimony, either claiming the treatment saved them from the torments of 
suicidal-thoughts or damaged their cognition to the point where they can no longer function 
independently in society, Morris Fraser says that neither side of the debate is accurate: “The 
trouble is that these criticisms do only rely on part-truths” (2). 
The dichotomy between miracle/erasure is surely an artificial one, but the memories of all 
who undergo ECT need to be listened to, regardless of their position within this dichotomy. The 
“trouble,” to counter Morris Fraser, is with a search for accuracy within the autobiographical. 
This is especially troubling when the autobiographical is weighted by a biomedical promise of 
universal objectivity and truth. What weighs in as truth, what counts as legitimate knowledge 
within the biomedical, clinical “evidence-based” system, is often influenced by an industry and 
professional body of knowledge. Within the hierarchy of knowledge, “scientific purity,” 
untainted by subjectivity, is of the highest esteem. Michel Foucault’s concept of power- 
knowledge is useful in acknowledging how knowledge is never neutral and how it functions 
within an economy of power. Foucault claimed that “it is not possible for power to be exercised 
without knowledge, and it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power” (Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish 52). Knowledge is constructed through power and is thus biased with the 
intention to yield power. The search for authenticity and accuracy within “evidence-based” 
psychiatry is part of the problem; it does not align with ethical forms of listening otherwise 
which require us to doubt what we think we know about the Other. Knowing the Other is to have 
power over them, and it prevents us from listening with an open-ended perspective. As Daniel 
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Pettman says, “The very act of listening requires a different mind-set and practice from our usual 
design-related solutions to the world’s accelerating problems” (94). Being able to attend to the 
Other through gestures of listening is an act of ethical solidarity. 
One of the greatest gifts in Frame’s writing is a troubled authenticity, a subject that is 
unsure of what it knows beyond an embodied sense of being troubled without discernible reason. 
She communicates trauma with a sonic slant, with madness as a new kind of music that is 
capable of listening to centuries of unknowable pain. Trauma is always/already an impossible 
narrative to validate or verify in terms of “veracity”, as Leigh Gilmore states: 
(…) trauma cannot be spoken of or written about in any mode other than the 
literal. To do so risks negating it. In another view, trauma it is claimed, does not 
exist until it can be articulated and heard by a sympathetic listener. This view 
swings to the other extreme claim that without language experience is nothing. 
(…) Thus, the joint project of representing the self and representing trauma 
reveals their structural entanglement with law as a metaphor for authority and 
veracity, and as a framework within which testimonial speech is heard. (The 
Limits of Autobiography 7) 
The non-representational aspect of trauma counters evidence-based psychiatry that seeks to 
empirically diagnose, treat, and resolve a knowable “mental disorder.” Listening to trauma 
requires an openness that is counterintuitive to a psychiatrists’ epistemological training that 
names cause and effect without much room for transcendental wonder or alternate views of 
consciousness. As Mark Wolynn says about transgenerational trauma and memory: “A well- 
documented feature of trauma, one familiar to many, is our inability to articulate what happens to 
us. Not only do we lose our words, but something happens with our memory as well” (15). 
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Bessel van der Kolk, a Dutch psychiatrist, has acknowledged this gap between empirical and 
experiential knowledge in his studies on PTSD. When discussing how he works to treat trauma 
through theater and performing arts, he says, “it is surprising how little research exists on how 
collective ceremonies affect the mind and brain and how they might prevent or alleviate trauma” 
(336). Van der Kolk’s work unveils a plethora of non-invasive evidence-based treatments for 
trauma, from EMDR to Neurofeedback, acknowledging how chronic abuse and neglect in 
childhood interfere with the proper sensory-integration systems. In spite of the fact that many of 
these treatments have existed since the 1950s, they have only risen to relative prominence in the 
21st century (317). I explore the collision of trauma and ECT in chapter 3, when I discuss Janet 
Frame’s autobiographical accounts of early childhood abuse and neglect in addition to living in 
poverty. Poetry and music were essential for her to express the deep-seated trauma of her past, 
yet she was given forced-confinement in an asylum and ECT instead of other trauma-informed 
modalities. 
A trauma-informed approach to psychiatry would recognize the non-representational and 
experiential evidence of trauma—how it is a silence that speaks that haunts one’s subjectivity 
and context. Especially when it comes to gender-based violence and trauma, how does evidence- 
based psychiatry listen to trauma ethically and engage women-identified patients in its scope? 
Thinking through how women-identified patients are more likely to be diagnosed with complex 
trauma and given ECT against their will (Read et al. 263) and how is ECT now framed as a cure 
for PTSD? Denise E. Eliot defines trauma-informed services as able to integrate an intersectional 
lens of oppression and the social determinants of health (464). The training manual for Reduction 
of Seclusion and Restraint by the National Association of State Mental Health Program, reports 
that 90% of people who screened positive for severe mental illness (schizophrenia, psychotic 
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depression, bipolar depression, etc.) have experienced trauma. Therefore, having a trauma- 
informed approach is essential for working with the complexities of people’s mental health to 
ensure that their lived experience of victimization and powerlessness is heard and integrated into 
their psychiatric or mental health care plans. Denying trauma as an important factor in one’s 
mental health severely impairs not only the quality, but also the modalities of care offered. 
Invasive treatments, such as ECT, can be seen as intrinsically re-traumatizing and triggering for 
women who have suffered abuse, victimization and violence. As such, best practices for trauma- 
informed work consider how many common procedures (such as intake and discharge from 
hospitals) within service settings can be retriggering. Procedures must be growth-promoting, safe 
and relevant to the client’s needs. Most importantly, practitioners must assume that all clients 
they encounter have suffered from trauma at some point in their lives (Eliot 463). 
Psychiatrist and ECT-enthusiast Dr. Max Fink emphasizes in his book Electroshock: 
Restoring the Mind, patient stories of “memory erasure” are read as grossly exaggerated and 
“groundless” (Fink 17). When he says people’s fear of losing memory as a result of ECT is a 
“groundless” statement, he devalues decades of first-person testimonies that describe the trauma 
and experience of “memory erasure.” Fink’s argument stands because “memory” is a “slippery 
phenomenon” that is difficult to objectively measure. What can be objectively measured, 
however, are the physiological and neurological effects of ECT. The procedure is clinically 
documented as causing brain trauma, internal hemorrhaging, cell damage, and other serious 
physical impairments (Breggin, Toxic Psychiatry 8, Burstow, Psychiatry and the Business of 
Madness 16). These precarious side-effects occur in addition to memory problems.  He claims 
the anesthetics and/or the “mental illness” themselves are to blame for memory loss and 
disorientation, not ECT. He writes, “Sometimes, a patient fears that electroshock will impair the 
skills that are the basis of their livelihood. That fear is groundless. It 
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was the mental illness, not the treatment, that may have impaired their knowledge. The student 
who regains her normal mental state through treatment can return to her studies with the same 
skills she had earlier” (17). Fink goes on to say how depressive patients do not have “good” 
memories to begin with and “register the events of their lives poorly” (17). Fink’s statement 
silences, trivializes, and invalidates the very possibility of speaking about “memory erasure.” If 
patients’ voices are “groundless,” then psychiatric authority is reinforced as the only voice worth 
listening to within the ECT debate. A simple internet search regarding the history of 
electroconvulsive therapy reveals a plethora of revival articles announcing 80 years of success 
and very little attention to the voices of dissent or critique. As one medical historian puts it in the 
Psychiatric Times, ECT “is an important treatment suddenly disappearing for cultural reasons” 
(Shorter 3). This statement ultimately obscures the thesis of my dissertation. We need to listen to 
psychiatric survivors who have been speaking out for generations about their experiences with 
non-consensual or coercive ECT and its impact on their memory and cognition. Their reasons for 
being dissatisfied are lived and experienced in their everyday material reality, not in some 
abstract statistical frame. 
 
 
What is Electroconvulsive Therapy? 
 
Before delving into the history of ECT, I first want to explain how it is currently defined and 
understood within medical practice. Electroshock therapy, also known as Electroconvulsive 
Therapy or ECT, is a psychiatric procedure that involves passing 100 to 190 volts of electricity 
through the patient’s head in order to cause a convulsion or grand mal seizure (Breggin). The 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) wrote an official statement for Electroconvulsive 
therapy (ECT) that says it “is a safe and effective evidence-based medical treatment. ECT is 
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endorsed by the APA when administered by properly qualified psychiatrists for appropriately 
selected patients” (APA Board of Trustees 2015). 
Categorized by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) as an invasive treatment, at its 
most basic definition, electroconvulsive therapy is the clinical event of an electric current passed 
briefly through the brain, via electrodes applied to the scalp. The amount of current to induce a 
seizure (the seizure threshold) varies from anywhere between 0.75-0.9 amps and 70-450 volts. 
The voltage is adjusted for every individual who receives ECT, and most psychiatrists follow a 
risk/benefit analysis where they assess the patient’s diagnosis, symptoms, treatment history, 
medical risks, and anticipated speed of action/efficacy (Kaplan and Sadock 564). However, the 
most common voltage is 100-190. The patients’ answers determine the placement of the 
electrodes (unilaterally or bilaterally), as well as the amount of treatments they will receive. At 
the start of a treatment plan, psychiatrists usually recommend six to twelve sessions (Kaplan and 
Sadock 564) three times per week, which is then reduced to once a week. The total procedure 
takes anywhere between 30 minutes to an hour (oxygenation, anesthetics, convulsion, and 
recovery). Electrodes are placed either unilaterally or bilaterally on the patient’s scalp, and “the 
most common approach is to initiate treatment with unilateral ECT because of its more 
favourable adverse effect profile” (Kaplan and Sadock 564). 
Although ECT procedures are not formally standardized globally, in North America, 
patients are almost always put to sleep with anesthetics and given muscle relaxants to prevent 
injuries from convulsions. Informed-consent is now obligatory before a psychiatrist can 
administer ECT—however, there remains some controversy over what counts as informed- 
consent when dealing with patients who are severely incapacitated due to mental suffering. Quite 
simply, informed-consent means that the patient is given sufficient education materials to 
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warrant an “informed” decision. Generally, psychiatrists provide information sheets with a 
description of the procedure, potential risks/benefits, option to refuse treatment, immediate side- 
effects, long-term side-effects, and actions to take in case of an emergency (i.e. to call a 
physician immediately if they suffer a spontaneous seizure of any kind). Some psychiatrists will 
have patients view a short procedural film to demonstrate, visually, what to expect, and assuage 
fears. 
Despite renewed and rigorous informed-consent procedures, under the current Mental 
Health Act in Ontario (and in most of North America), a patient can receive court-ordered 
treatment (forced-treatment) regardless of whether they consent or not. “Forced-restraints” or 
“forced-treatments” are guided by policies meant as a “last resort to prevent self-harm or to 
others”. Under the “medical model” of psychiatric care, expert-knowledge (doctor, psychiatrist, 
nurse) dominates interpretation of “last-resort” and “harm” when weighing the pros/cons of 
forced treatment. A recent clinical audit in the UK demonstrates that most recipients are still 
women (66%) and over 60 (56%). More than a third (39%) is given without consent, with 30% 
of Trusts not adhering to mental health legislation concerning second opinions. At least 44% 
were not using validated measures of efficacy, and at least 33% failed to do so for adverse 
effects (Read et al. 263). Only four provided any actual data for positive outcomes or adverse 
effects. None provided any data on efficacy beyond the end of treatment. Thus, even attempting 
to define ECT objectively, as a clinical event, cannot escape the political economy in which it is 
administered. Many theories about “how” ECT works have been proposed, but none have been 
proven to date (Challiner and Griffiths, Breggin, Bustow, Weitz). The gender and age bias with 
ECT treatment is one that continues today and one that Janet Frame highlights in her account 
Faces in the Water. 
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Later in this chapter, I explore the historical underpinnings and feminist critical analysis of the 
gendered dynamic of psychiatric invasive treatments like ECT. 
Despite clinical efforts to ethically inform patients about ECT and its potential risks, 
several scientific studies on patient perceptions and experience of ECT discuss how “perceived 
coercion” and “fear” remain quite high (Chakrabarti et al. 529). Perceived coercion, which is 
predominantly what Janet Frame experienced as recounted in her book Faces in the Water, 
occurs when a patient believes that they have no choice but to accept the treatment as presented 
to them, even if they have not been ordered by law to do so. The problem lies in the fundamental 
power imbalance between patients and psychiatrists, most evidently when the latter refuses to 
take the former’s accounts of distress seriously. In a medical paradigm, patients are not 
considered the experts of their own care, despite the emancipatory language embedded in 
psychiatric care plans and “patient engagement” initiatives, which I discuss in further depth in 
my conclusion. Perceived coercion is coercion. Calling it “perceived” delegitimizes accounts of 
feeling pressured into saying “yes” to a treatment that might cause harm, whether it was intended 
or not. 
Systematic reviews by service-user researchers (Rose et al.) on coercion, estimate that 
one-third of patients consent to ECT under pressure. A study to determine why patients consent 
if coerced suggests that they trust their doctors partially because they are in a state of 
“desperation” and have no other option at their disposal (Johnstone, Froede and Baldwin; 
Koopwitz et al; Philpot et al; Rajkumar et al.). One of the most alarming findings described by 
researchers is that patients make these decisions based on “mistaken beliefs…that ECT would 
erase all of their unhappy memories” (Tang et al.; Rajagopal; Malekeian et al.), which again 
discredits actual cases of psychiatric survivor testimony about the adverse side effects of ECT 
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and memory loss. These testimonies are not “mistaken beliefs” or “perceived coercion”; they are 
testimonial evidence of impact and should not be used to minimize the validity of a patient’s 
voice, nor to impede the need for a second opinion. Nancy Fraser’s concept of “misrecognition” 
(108) is useful in this instance. According to misrecognition theory, patients will not be treated 
as equals if they display any negative emotion or critique; they will only be further pathologized. 
Fraser reframes identity politics through the concept of recognition and renders it more complex 
by bringing this into relation with economic and political distribution. Thereby she avoids a 
reductive and essentialist account with testimonial or how experiential knowledge often is 
accused of reproducing. I understand that it might seem contradictory to want to listen to 
someone’s testimony as truth while deconstructing truth as a socially and politically constructed 
discourse, but I think in this moment it is important to remember that what counts as knowledge 
is never neutral, even when it comes from the disenfranchised or from the ground up. Knowledge 
must always be historicized and put into context, or it risks reproducing the same power 
dynamics that hold its subversive potential hostage. My question throughout this dissertation is 
more about how we can honour the voices that counter the smooth “recovery narrative” (Woods, 
Hart and Spandler) of ECT by listening otherwise. 
 
 
Birth of Clinical Electroshock in Psychiatry: A History of Erasure 
 
Electric eels, Leyden jars, and shock machines: the potential of electricity’s curative powers has 
mesmerized natural philosophers, scientists, and physicians for centuries. In response, new 
technologies were developed for channeling electric currents to intervene in unsolvable health 
problems, namely disturbances of the mind (Bertucci, Kneeland). Ancient medical authorities, 
such as Galen, used the shock of electric fish for treating a number of ailments such as epilepsy, 
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melancholia, and depression (Kneeland xxiv). Centuries later, in 1600, William Gilbert in 
England published De Magnete, a treatise on properties of amber and other “electrics” (Kneeland 
xxiv) that provoked a new field of therapeutics called “medical electricity.” 
 
The historical canon of ECT is as contradictory as the treatment itself; however, the 
history that one might find in psychiatry textbooks is a linear, cathartic journey with a central 
hero: Ladislaus von Meduna. When medical students learn about the history of ECT, they are 
engaging with a refined narrative of forgetting, a coherent story that erodes the rough edges of 
criticism and discontent. Thus, the dominant biomedical story of ECT, written primarily by male 
psychiatrists: namely Mowbray (1959), Sandford (1966), Fink (1979-1984), Brandon (1981), 
Persad (1988), Endler (1988), Abrams (1988) and Shorter (2001)—praises Meduna as the sole 
creator and excludes voices of (primarily women) patients or ECT survivors. This history also 
discounts the long tradition of electrical experimentation on non-consenting women patients 
within psychiatry as well as natural philosophy, known as medical electricity, which predates 
modern-ECT by several centuries. Adjacently, the biomedical historicization of ECT performs 
the memory erasure it is accused of causing to former-patients. Therefore, applying a discursive 
analysis to the “great continuities of thought” (Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge 4) behind the 
representation of ECT will reveal more than its “origins”—but a history of ideas surrounding 
madness/sanity that interact with the concept of ECT as treatment. Although the biomedical 
community might want to name ECT’s singular origin as the brain-child of Ladislas Meduna, 
such an utterance erases the complexity and genealogy of the idea that electricity could cure 
madness. 
Diminished as being “besides the point” (Abrams 45), medical electricity has little (if 
any) valued mention within the ECT historical repertoire. According to historians such as 
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Richard Abrams, medical electricity should not even appear in the same chapter as ECT because 
it corrupts and confuses the story: “ (…) medical electricity has nothing to do with ECT, and is 
besides the point. ECT evolved solely as a result of Ladislaus von Meduna’s original 
investigations on the effects of camphor-induced convulsions in schizophrenic patients” (Abrams 
5). Words like “original” and “solely” are used by Abrams to suggest the deep ideological divide 
between the arts and sciences, ECT was the work of pure, scientific experimentation by a genius 
“original” thinker. Medical electricity, seen as a primordial, un-scientific entertainment unrelated 
to early bio-psychiatry, such as camphor and insulin shocks, is believed to have “nothing to do 
with ECT” (Abrams 5). Such admission would diminish ECT’s revival campaign funded by the 
American Psychological Association (APA) that markets it as “safe and effective” (Abrams 5). 
Thus, ECT is strategically disassociated from medical electricity, and even shock therapy, 
because such allegiance would damage the public attitude. As Norman Endler, psychologist and 
ECT-user, states “just because ECT has been misused or used carelessly and sometimes 
indiscriminately does not mean that it lacks a proper place in the treatment of affective 
disorders” (62). However, to exclude the critique made by psychiatric survivor micro- histories 
to the master narrative of ECT as an objective and scientific treatment suggests a deeper struggle 
for knowledge-power by the biomedical community. Abrams’ search for scientific origins and 
praise for “original” thinking assumes that ideas are born out of a singularity instead of from 
collective interacting singularities. The scientific paradigm suggests that somehow scientists are 
not situated within communities who share traditions and methods, and who relate to wider 
systems of knowledge production within the public sphere. As Foucault reminds us in The 
Archeology of Knowledge, the problem with historical representation and analysis is: 
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not how continuities are established, but how a single pattern is formed and 
preserved, how for so many different, successive minds there is a single horizon, 
what mode of action and what superstructure is implied by the interplay of 
transmissions, resumptions, disappearances and repetitions, how the origin may 
extend its sway well beyond itself to that conclusion that is never given—the 
problem is no longer one of tradition, of tracing a line, but one of division, of 
limits (…) History is the work expended on a document—it is not memory—it is 
one way in which a society recognizes and develops a mass of documentation 
with which it is inextricably linked. (4) 
Foucault theorizes away from a stable secure notion of historical origin that sets up artificial, 
narrative boundaries between the migratory circulations of ideas that transcend time/space. What 
Abrams is not transparent about is his biomedical investment at the expense of a broader 
humanistic perspective of ECT’s history. His angle is divisive, necessarily limited because it 
aims to conquer the ECT knowledge-economy. 
My research has shown that electricity and shock have a long history within 
biopsychiatry’s aim of curing the mind, while covertly pathologizing social inequities. As stated 
in Kaplan and Sadock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry: Behavioral Sciences and Clinical Psychiatry, 
early forms of shock treatments were performed by Paracelsus, a Swiss physician, in the 1500s. 
Paracelsus conducted experiments of inducing seizures by administering camphor to treat 
“insanity” or “lunacy” (unsoundness of mind influenced by the moon), which would be labelled 
as “psychiatric illness” by today’s medical system. He published his findings in Diseases Which 
Lead of a Loss of Reason (1520), revolutionizing perceptions of mental health issues by proving 
they were not caused by demonic possession, but rather from natural causes that could be cured 
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using alchemy or other physiological interventions (such as bleeding-out, hypothermic shocks 
using ice water, camphor-induced seizures). Although electrical interventions were used prior to 
Paracelsus’ experiments, his work legitimized them as “scientific” measures, meaning they 
adhered to reason and followed a deductible, observable method. Pushbutton Psychiatry: A 
Cultural History of Electroshock in America, traces ECT’s conceptual origins, the idea of 
passing an electric current through the body, to Ancient Rome, where electric eels were used to 
treat melancholia (Kneeland and Warren, 25). However, it was not until 1785, during the height 
of the Enlightenment (and what Foucault would call the categorical “ordering” of knowledge) 
(Foucault, 18), that the first medical report on the uses of camphor-induced seizures appeared in 
the London Medical Journal (Henry and Sackheim). 
Contrary to Abrams, I see a direct correlation between medical electricity and modern 
ECT, part of which is the common use of electricity/shock on the body in an attempt to “cure” 
illness, but most importantly, it resounds with ethical issues surrounding how recovery is framed 
within bio-psychiatry. Binaries such as health/illness, mad/sane, good/evil, objective/subjective 
all interconnect within this story of ECT. Thus, the healing “power” of electricity to restore the 
body’s equilibrium is not a new metaphor—it is just one that we have forgotten. 
From Frankenstein to Benjamin Franklin, the fantasy of restoring life via electricity is a 
cultural specter that still circulates and shapes how we understand the power of biomedicine 
today. Transcranial brain stimulation, a less invasive version of ECT, is a new science that builds 
upon old concepts of electrical miracles. Furthermore, early Victorian electrotherapeutic 
developments, such as medical electricity were anchors of psychiatric “professionalization” 
(Kadosh 29) and the impetus for a rise in bio-psychiatric knowledge-power (Foucault). As 
Kadosh explains: “doctors and psychiatrists who promoted it (electrotherapy) strove to 
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differentiate themselves from the numerous quacks, healers, and instrument makers active in the 
medical marketplace by various means, including claiming superior knowledge, education, and 
expertise” (Kadosh, 29). Thus, the dominant “story” that explains how ECT came to be, is one 
mainly written and legitimized by psychiatrists who endorse the treatment. 
The historicization of ECT as a once dangerous and experimental practice now 
modernized into a “safe and effective” treatment serves to dispel its negative reputation within 
popular consciousness, and to legitimize its current use. As Chakrabarti et al. state: “Primitive 
practices of the past, negative media representations, irrational fears of electricity, all contribute 
to this public disapproval” (525). The progressive narrative arc within this history, whereby ECT 
evolves from “bad” to “good,” reads almost as a bildungsroman, a coming-of-age story with a 
cathartic ending. ECT is “now” safe and effective, a “cure” for untreatable depression, and bio- 
psychiatrists are desperately trying to make the shameful traumatic events of its past usage 
disappear (Endler 6). This view of ECT’s history forgets major events, survivor testimony, and 
narrative accounts that contradict its smooth, seemingly “objective” progress as a treatment. 
Conversely, within popular consciousness, ECT is thought to be an archaic psychiatric 
practice that is no longer in use. As Shorter recounts: “ECT had changed from being a first-line 
treatment for depression in the 1940s and 1950s to merely an approach to treatment-resistant 
depression in the 1990s” (3). Most people, when I tell them I am writing about ECT, exclaim: 
“They still do that?” Their shock reflects a cultural amnesia surrounding the treatment, which 
fuels the medical marketing campaign to salvage ECT’s therapeutic image. Many people, when I 
tell them about my project, have also volunteered stories of lived-experience that usually begin 
with “my mother had ECT…or my aunt…or my grandmother,” all in-line with the gender-based 
statistics that render ECT the primary treatment for women who suffer from depression. 
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Therefore, to work-through these knots, I engage with a counter-history written mostly by self- 
identified women psychiatric survivors, critical psychiatrists, and allies who interrupt the 
narrative linearity of ECT’s “progress” or evolution into a “safe and effective” treatment. These 
testimonies also remind us that ECT never left the psychiatric tool-kit, but merely left the public 
eye, and continues to be administered behind institutional walls. To elucidate the complexities of 
ECT’s genealogy, I examine promotional materials from the 1930s to today: how have bio- 
psychiatrists sold ECT to the public, gathered informed-consent, and how they assuage fears 
using popular forms of communication (journalism, drama, brochures, videos). I work with ECT 
memoirs written by bio-psychiatrists who underwent the treatment, as well as patients who are 
pro-ECT, and psychiatric survivors who describe it as a form of “memory erasure” or 
punishment. These autobiographical narratives either assert or interrupt dominant ECT history. I 
work with major counter-cultural and political histories of ECT such as Pushbutton Psychiatry: 
The Cultural History of Electric Shock Therapy in America, Shrink Wrap, Doctors of Deception, 
amongst others. These texts counter the seeming naturalness of ECT history as a linear scientific 
account of “progress” and highlight the construction of madness as a socio-political device to 
control deviant bodies and yield significant psych-industry profits. 
The medical autobiography or “recovery narrative” (Woods, Hart and Spandler) is always 
a story conditioned by the clinical, and it is a version of selfhood framed by the doctor’s gaze 
(and more often than not, articulated with the doctor’s language). Namely, as Leigh Gilmore 
asserts, there is always already the struggle of how to represent oneself within ambits of power 
that govern, discipline and code the “self”. Strict and deterministic identity categories such as 
gender, race, class, ability, sanity etc. are produced and reproduced by national ideologies, social 
constructs, governmentality (Foucault) and subjective performativity (Butler). Although 
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performativity (the art of playing with one’s codified identity, of subverting scripts and 
interrupting dominant representations) troubles the facile, easy-to-read assumptions we attach to 
bodies and how they identify. However, Gilmore is referencing something a bit less forgiving 
and hopeful. She uses Foucault’s notion of “technologies of self” produced by power-knowledge 
and applies it to the inquiry of autobiography as a genre that either reflects or interrupts dominant 
narratives of “what a person is” (Gilmore, Autobiograhics 17). She writes, “In autobiography, 
identification entails reproducing the complex ideology of ‘identity,’ variously inflected in the 
categories of ‘personhood,’ ‘citizenship,’ ‘women,’ and so on” (Gilmore, Autobiographics 23). 
For instance, in a medical setting, the patient rarely authors their story of subjective illness; it is 
the doctor who frames what is said and translates it into a universal medical language for 
interpreting the symptoms and drafting a treatment plan. The person, as a complex ecosystem of 
perception, memory, and subjectivity, is eclipsed by the term “patient”. Thus, nuanced and 
ambivalent aspects of selfhood are given up immediately. As Foucault reminds us, “a self cannot 
reform the power-knowledge relationships we find ourselves in'' (45). As soon as someone 
admits to being “ill” and relays their story of distress to a doctor, they give up sole authorship 
and enter a dialogical form of writing “I”. Case studies, as a medical genre, frame and construct 
“the patient” as a character in a story of illness, thus it becomes challenging for the person 
beneath the patient to speak. The illness and the person become intrinsic to one another; they co- 
exist. Selfhood, just like identity, is not static or stable, it shifts and twists as our bodies move 
through time/space. 
At the root of Michel Foucault’s genealogical project on madness, and his ethical critique 
of psychiatric methods, is a desire to tear down the socio-historic walls built between the 
mad/sane. His goal is to question commonly held assumptions regarding “madness” as an 
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organic process with a definite, locatable, biological origin. Instead, he wants us to see madness 
as a socially-constructed, historically incurable idea that can imprison, restrain, and limit one’s 
subjectivity. Thus madness, according to Foucault, becomes a limit-case. Although psychiatric 
authorities throughout history would argue that all interventions, no matter how risky, were done 
to help people overcome hopeless suffering, Foucault exposes the power dynamics of such 
treatments, which in some cases impeded patients’ subjectivity and agency (i.e. lobotomy, ECT). 
His genealogy proves how the walls that were once the brick and mortar of asylum-era care are 
now transposed into new techniques of restraint (chemical, somatic) that perpetuate unquestioned 
faith in the discursive binary between psychological “normality” and “abnormality”. In Madness 
and Civilization: the Invention of an Idea, Foucault says: 
(…) the more one regards the unity of the human being as a whole, the more the 
reality of an illness as a specific unity disappears and the more the description of 
the individual reacting to her situation in a pathological way replaces the analysis 
of the natural forms of illness. (16) 
Denaturalizing madness, taking it out of the medical case study frame, may allow it to speak on 
its own terms. Madness as communicative limit-case echoes a deeper metaphorical wound: How 
is the Western psy industrial complex meant to care for the experimental subjectivity of patients 
if it is based on a biomedical and economic model that emphasizes the “body-as-a-machine” 
(Loftus 214) wrapped up in ideals about productivity and progress? ECT becomes an attractive 
solution when the mind is conceptualized as a computer that can be rebooted instead of as 
phenomenological consciousness that cannot be reduced to an object. 
The narrative straitjacket that the psychiatric case study places on the individual relates to 
how ECT survivor testimony is excluded from dominant medical history, and it ironically 
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mimics the memory erasure that survivors experience. Jonathan A. Lieberman in Shrink: The 
Untold Story of Psychiatry (2015) writes the history of psychiatry from a psychiatrist’s 
perspective—as if it were a subversive feat. His claim that this expert perspective is marginalized 
and “untold” serves to distract from his position of power and investment in purely biomedical 
understandings of mental health. In the chapter on ECT, entitled “Electrified Brains” he writes, 
“For the first time in its long and notorious history, psychiatry can offer scientific, humane, and 
effective treatments to those suffering from mental illness” (10). He also credits L. Meduna as 
the “sole” creator of ECT saying that “Amazingly, Meduna discovered that psychotic symptoms 
really diminish after a metrazol seizure” (166). He later says that ECT might sound absurd to lay 
persons, but that at that time (1934) “there was still no effective treatment for severe mental 
illness beside insulin coma (…) 100 volts of electricity through a person’s skull was worth the 
risk (…) it was truly a miracle treatment” (167). 
Lieberman ends the chapter with a case study from his own clinical practice. He tells the 
story of Genevieve, the wife of a famous restaurateur in New York City. He begins by describing 
her physical appearance, using qualifying adjectives that conform with normative ideals of 
femininity: “She was a beautiful middle-aged woman” (170). Although her beauty has nothing to 
do with her mental health, his mention of it suggests inherent sexism regarding the ways a 
woman’s body should age—and how it somehow mirrors her internal, mental “symmetry”. If she 
were unattractive, would that somehow aggravate her mental suffering or his judgement of her 
body? The onset of her mental breakdown is described as: “her usually impeccably mannered 
and charming demeanor would devolve into moaning and rocking (…) Genevieve would break 
into loud baleful songs in her native French, sounding like a wounded Edith Piaf” (170). 
Demonizing her voice, her use of a language that she identifies with from childhood symbolizes 
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his disdain of her emotional world—her nostalgia and pain. We never hear from Genevieve; her 
“madness” (and surely her anger) is contained within Dr. Lieberman’s frame. She is no longer 
“impeccable” and “well-mannered” but a raging “monster” (170). After ECT, Lieberman 
describes Genevieve as “calmer”, returning to her “usual courteous self” and he notes how her 
husband “could not thank me enough” (171). 
Regimes of gendered embodiment and codes of sanism are woven within Liberman’s 
case study, even though his book seeks to dispel personal bias from the field of psychiatry—his 
case study reflects his personal judgements and opinions about the ways in which Genevieve 
should act as a woman. There is nothing “objective” about it. His case study is narrative 
construction, where he reads the patient and interprets her behaviour through a lens of commonly 
held assumptions and judgements about “normalcy” and “sanity” that are highly fashioned 
within a “heteronormative matrix” (Butler, Gender Trouble 206). Butler challenges gender 
identity as a static category because our experiences of gender cannot be captured by the 
boundaries of identity. Gender is a fluid concept that is not necessarily coherent or aligned with 
sex—thus our gender subjectivity is a floating signifier with various meanings injected into it— 
there is no essence. The “heterosexual matrix” is a discursive system where one’s subject 
 
position is rendered coherent if it consists of a “stable expressed through a stable gender…that is 
oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the compulsory practice of heterosexuality” 
(Butler, Gender Trouble, 206). Even though Lieberman may appear to root his argument in 
biological symptoms with medical language such as “recurrent episodes of psychotic depression 
that manifests with depressed mood, extreme agitation, and delusion-driven behaviour” (170), 
his statements operate within “the heterosexual matrix” where deviations from 
heteronormativity, which encompasses not only heterosexuality but normative gender 
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performances and a normative sex, are cause for consternation, discipline and Othering. The case 
study operates within a socio-political ambit of mental health, and in Lieberman’s case, it can 
highlight mythologized ideals of gender embodiment. Without Genevieve’s story, no one can 
know for sure what led to her emotional outbreak, to her anger that was diagnosed as “psychotic 
depression” and demonized for her “loud baleful songs'” (171). Female-subjects (interpellated, 
socialized, self-identified, and embodied as women) are told that their anger is unhealthy (Butler, 
Gender Trouble 206), leading to its medicalization or suppression instead of its meaningful 
integration. Rarely are representations of female madness understood as silenced or diverted 
anger, partly because women rarely get to speak about their anger without it being pathologized 
by experts. As Leigh Gilmore reminds us: “One must follow a route of estrangement from 
dominant codes of meaning and look again at the microhistory of cultural production” 
(Autobiographics 2). Historically women psychiatric patients were not encouraged to express 
their anger in healthy or creative ways; instead, they are introduced to ways to suppress and 
“quiet” their anger as we see in Janet Frame’s novel. This is also reflected in contemporary 
statistics on ECT and coercion: three times more women than men are electroshocked, and 
elderly women are at greater risk of being given shock without any prior treatments suggestions.7 
 
2 Read, John, Christopher Harrop, Jim Geekie and Julia Renton. “An Audit of ECT in England 
2011–2015: Usage, demographics, and Adherence to Guidelines and Legislation.” Psychology and Psychotherapy: 
Theory, Research and Practice, vol. 91, no.3, 2018, pp. 263-277. 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/papt.12160. 
 
Here’s an excerpt from the Introduction: "ECT remains one of the most controversial of psychiatric treatments. 
Several meta-analyses conclude it is an effective treatment for depression (Gabor and Lazlo, 2005; Greenhalgh, 
Knight, Hind, Beverley, & Walters, 2005; Kho, van Vreewijk, Simpson, & Zwinderman, 2003; Pagnin, de Queiroz, 
Pini, and Cassano, 2004; UK ECT Review Group, 2003; Van der Wurff, Stek, Hooogendijk, and Beekman, 2003). 
A 2010 review, however, noted that none of these meta-analyses identified any evidence that ECT had any benefit, 
compared to placebo, beyond the end of treatment and that there is no evidence that ECT prevents suicide (Read 
and Bentall, 2010). The most recent review also failed to find a single study showing that ECT is superior to 
placebo beyond the end of treatment (Read and Arnold, 2017). The National Institute of Care and Excellence 
(N.I.C.E., 2009) has stated that ‘Further research is urgently required to examine the long-term efficacy and safety 
of ECT’. Other reviews (Rasmussen, 2009; Ross, 2006) had reached similar conclusions to the 2010 review, such as 
‘Rigorously defined endogenously depressed patients did exceptionally well with sham ECT’ 
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Thinking through themes of anger suppression and coercive medicalization and treatment, I often 
think of Audre Lorde’s 1981 essay entitled “The Uses of Anger” that centers anger as a 
productive and powerful emotion to fuel social change in context of anti-Black racism response 
and white fragility. Lorde explains how her anger is not heard by a white woman who is listening 
to her speak at an academic conference. She highlights how her experience as a Black woman is 
erased by having to attend to the feelings of a white colonial audience who cannot hear her anger 
because they cannot accept accountability and complicity in sustaining the root cause. As Lorde 
says: 
I speak out of direct and particular anger at an academic conference, and a white 
woman says, “Tell me how you feel but don’t say it too harshly or I cannot hear 
you.” But is it my manner that keeps her from hearing, or the threat of a message 
that her life may change? (7) 
I can hear a parallel in Lorde’s statement and in the women ECT survivors’ life writing I 
encountered during my research. Receiving their anger as a legitimate critique of systems of 
oppression (white supremacy, colonialism, patriarchy) would mean that psychiatry could no 
longer pathologize their experience as illness without attending to their complicity in upholding 
systemic violence. The harshness of Lorde’s critique is nothing compared to the harshness of 
 
 
(Rasmussen, p. 59). The controversy also focuses on the extent to which ECT causes long-lasting memory 
dysfunction and increases mortality (Breggin, 2008; Fosse and Read, 2013; Read et al., 2013; Rose, Fleischmann, 
Wykes, Leese, and Bindman, 2003; Rose, Fleischman, and Wykes, 2004; Sackeim et al., 2007). The controversy 
includes the issues of when ECT should be used, and on whom. Some consider it the treatment of choice for several 
disorders. Others argue it should never be used. A common position is that it should be used only as a last resort, 
and only when other treatments have failed.” (Read et al. 263). 
 
Another excerpt: "Most recipients are still women (66%) and over 60 (56%). More than a third (39%) is given 
without consent, with 30% of Trusts not adhering to mental health legislation concerning second opinions. At least 




living in a racist, sexist, homophobic, ableist, sanist, anthrocentric society. Listening otherwise 
(Levinas, Lispari, Voegelin, Todd) to harsh critique creates space for self-reflexive dialogic 
responses and accountability (as Lispari calls response-ability) that can subvert violent 
paradigms. In the postscript of this dissertation, I reflect on the link between anger, critique and 
the silencing form of “patient engagement” (Johannesen) that currently functions as a form of 
“ethical domination” to uphold the psychiatric status quo over knowledge-production. The moral 
capital of psychiatry remains entrenched in the neutral and nice “engagement turn” that sells 
stories of patient recovery that align with medical outcomes, not social justice (Costa et al. 
“Recovering Our Stories'' 86). 
The gendered dynamics at play within how women testimonies, intersectional identities 
and accounts of distress are attended to within psychiatry seem to lack any critical theory or 
feminist analysis. One activist that harnessed her anger was Wendy Funk, who before publishing 
her memoir What Difference Does it Make (which I cite later in this chapter) wrote extensive 
letters to the media, press, and networks discussing how medically biased representations of ECT 
were spreading misinformation, belittling survivor testimony and distorting the potential harm 
regarding “memory erasure”. 
Her anger was diplomatically mobilized, yet still, it remained unheard by decision- 
makers or media executives. In a letter to “Good Morning America” dated May 23rd, 1996 she 
states in response to an interview with Dr. Tim Johnson about how ECT has been modernized 
and is harmless: 
He stated that the memory loss resulting from this treatment is temporary and that 
there is no evidence that it causes structural brain damage. There are thousands of 
people who have had much more than temporary memory loss with modern and 
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new machines. Some survivors of this treatment have lost several weeks, some 
have lost several years, and I myself have lost an entire lifetime of over 30 years. 
It was simply erased by this ‘safe, effective treatment’. (Wendy Funk, letter to 
Jeanne D’Agostina, May 23rd, 1996: Psychiatric Survivors Archives of Toronto, 
Don Weitz Fond) 
Funk did not receive a response to her complaint to “Good Morning America”, which while not 
surprising, shows how survivors’ lived experience is not invited into public discourse or debate 
with the same enthusiasm or respect, and how their claims are completely disregarded by the 
medical community. In a complaint to CTV about a 1996 television movie called All She Ever 
Wanted and its sensational depiction and misrepresentation of ECT, the Vice President of the 
network wrote back to Funk saying “we do not want to get into a debate about the status of 
psychiatric treatment” (Letter to CTV April 30th, 1996, Psychiatric Survivor Archives of 
Toronto, Don Weitz Fond). This response invalidates Funk’s complaints and ignores how the 
movie’s representations of a woman struggling with bipolar disorder and receiving ECT was 
“degrading, insulting and violated her dignity” as a survivor. Funk lost 30 years of her life to 
ECT (Letter to CTV, April 30th, 1996, Psychiatric Archives of Toronto, Don Weitz) which she 
elaborates in her 1999 memoir What Difference Does it Make. 
Her anger was heard by fellow survivors and activists, like Don Weitz, the Toronto editor 
and publisher of Phoenix Rising (see chapter 2), the first publication solely run and dedicated to 
psy survivor activism and analysis. Their correspondences demonstrate the power of community 
organizing to hold space, validate and listen to survivors testimony. Weitz encouraged Funk to 
write her memoir (based on journals she kept in the ward) and to continue raising public 
consciousness about her experience of “memory erasure” after receiving ECT that altered her life 
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forever (Funk 2). In a November 11th, 1996 letter to Funk, Weitz writes “we each have our own 
memories of survival, struggle, support, love…” He then shares testimony from a scientist and 
academic who is campaigning against ECT named Peter Sterling, in hopes of building her case 
against the doctors who gave her ECT without ethical consent and which led to her ongoing 
memory problems (Letter to Wendy Funk, November 11th, 1996, PSAT Don Weitz Fond). 
Mainstream discourse supports an “evidence-based” perspective that only counts one 
kind of evidence. As Funk names, thousands of survivor testimony is completely ignored, 
silenced, and rendered invalid. Not believing survivors of injustice or violence at the hands of 
public institutions or people in positions of power is not new; most marginalized groups face 
such invalidation and gaslighting on a daily basis. The point is to keep speaking despite not 
being heard, as seen in Don Weitz’ support of survivors like Wendy Funk. She refused to be 
silenced, she wrote hundreds of letters in response to representations of ECT in popular media, 
from movies to talk shows, and demanded for survivor voices to be equitably represented and 
brought into the public sphere for a more well-rounded debate, one that respects the accounts of 
“memory erasure” that were being systematically erased from history and from society’s 
collective consciousness. Even if she might not have succeeded in changing the tone of media 
representations of ECT, given the current trends we see in popular journalism today, her work 
did lead to an epistemological questioning of what counts as evidence and bias in psychiatric and 
pharmaceutical research (Burstow, Breggin, Weitz). 
The ECT controversy is deeper than its negative representation in Hollywood films or 
history books. The lack of faith in psychiatric survivor testimony, the dismissal of their voice and 
accounts of trauma, begs the question: what happens to conceptions of recovery as a continual, 
individualized process when it aims for a universal, fast-acting, hyperbolic “cure”? Is recovery 
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even possible when it is described and understood within a dichotomy of miracle/erasure? Who 
can speak about recovery? Whose voice matters most when it comes to legitimizing and 
describing what counts as effective and safe treatments? Although narrative has long been 
recognized as a “key technology of recovery,” (Woods, Hart and Spandler) there has been little 
critical investigation into how recovery narratives are constituted and mobilized and with what 
consequences. Recovery has been co-opted by psy institutions, stolen from the psychiatric 
survivor discourse and praxis. Recovery was once a movement of liberation from the epistemic 
shackles of the medical model; now it functions within the machine of psychiatric knowledge- 
production and power. Bonnie Burstow, in Psychiatry and the Business of Madness, uncovers 
Dr. Max Fink’s current monopoly over electroshock research, public relations, and education. 
Beyond Fink, she illustrates the systemic functioning of the shock industry, the official and 
hidden structure of its discursive techniques. She explains how “memory loss” is not seen as a 
legitimate concern for banning the use of ECT-machines, because FDA “regulations are not 
trying to assess whether or not ECT intrinsically harms but whether or not the machines function 
as they were designed to function” (Burstow, Psychiatry and the Business of Madness, 206). 
Furthermore, she links the ideological stronghold that the pro-ECT “PR machine” has created 
with profits made by the “electroshock empire” (shock machine companies, major research 
institutions, publishing industries, educational-promotional video companies, professionals [ex. 
psychiatrists, anesthesiologists]). The history of electroshock is also authored with the industry’s 
vested interests in mind. For instance, Shorter and Healey’s book Shock Therapy is taken as the 
definitive “history of shock,” while it does not present survivor testimony of the adverse effects 
or any clinical research that demonstrates the cognitive and brain damage caused by ECT. 
Unsurprisingly, Burstow reveals how the book project was funded by Dr. Max Fink, further 
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demonstrating his dominance over ECT knowledge-production (Burstow, Psychiatry and 
the Business of Madness, 208). 
The historicization of ECT is one embedded in tensions between the objective/subjective 
within science. For instance, Richard Abrams praises Dr. Max Fink’s translation of Meduna’s 
autobiography because it tells the “accurate” story of ECT (Abrams 3), one that illuminates its 
biomedical origins. It is a version of ECT’s story where objectivity conquers subjectivity, where 
psychiatry’s major turn towards the brain is depicted as a feat of “intellectual curiosity” over 
“sentimentality”. However, of course, this version of the “objective” story is told from a 
subjective position. It is Dr. Fink’s interpretation of Meduna’s Hungarian words—his translation 
is an intent to showcase ECT as a strictly biomedical procedure far removed from its ancient 
electrical roots. In the autobiographical translation, Meduna recounts his 1922 medical school 
interview for psychiatry. After medical school, he had applied for a small research position at the 
Interacademy Brain Research Institute in Budapest and was interviewed alongside three eager 
applicants. Meduna describes each of the applicants answers to the question: “Why are you 
interested in brain research?” (45). Most of the applicants’ answers revolved around having deep 
empathy for people with mental illness, having relatives with schizophrenia and wanting to bring 
hope to the hopeless. When it came to Meduna’s answer, wrought with anger and irritation, he 
exclaimed: “I am just curious about the structure of the brain and how it works” (45). The next 
day, he received a letter congratulating him on his acceptance to the research institute. Perplexed, 
Meduna asked the head scientist why he was chosen over the other applicants and was told: 
“Doctor, we don’t need people in psychiatry who have sympathy for patients or who have 
humanitarian reasons for becoming psychiatrists. We need people who have intellectual 
curiosity” (45). Rewarded for his strict biomedical interest, his disdain for the personal, altruistic 
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side of medicine—Meduna, in this representation, becomes a symbol of cutting-edge research, 
the promise of scientific intellectual neutrality. His “intellectual curiosity” conquers the 
“sentimentality” of the other applicants—thereby inferring how intellect cannot be mired with 
affect, as if the two faculties were absolutely separate and irreconcilable. The divide between the 
soft/hard sciences is quite evident in his speech. This dichotomy believes hard-sciences are only 
concerned with the measurable, observable, and concrete, whereas soft-sciences delve into 
complex phenomena, the intangible, the emotional, and the relational. Hard and soft are 
antonyms in a semantic power struggle, each under threat by the other. Dividing scientific 
inquiry along such harsh, competitive lines is dangerous; it means that brain-centric research 
methods cannot be humanistic or concerned with subjectivity—or that trauma-informed 
practices, which are deeply subjective, are not clinically evidence-based. Keeping the historical 
dimensions of Meduna’s speech in mind is important; however, this divide continues in today’s 
popular consciousness and in clinical ideology. Privileging the biological over the subjective, or 
as Luce Irigaray says “encoding a world from which subjectivity has been removed and 
subordinated under the Universal” (33) aligns with ECT as a neutral practice that is meant to 
reboot a brain as if it were a machine. As Irigaray warns: “the subject has become a machine 
with no becoming—this is what makes certain discourses successful or unsuccessful, some 
complicit with general mechanics, but somehow beyond time, without past, present or future” 
(3). Detaching science from its subject creates a reductionist, disembodied practice that runs the 
risk of silencing the distress that the patient brings to the clinical encounter. Jeanette Winterson 
takes up this concept beautifully in her novel Art & Lies. One of the three protagonists is a 
scientist with a taste for the sublime and philosophical—in the opening passages of the novel he 
contemplates the angle of 
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his perspective, the ways in which he sees the world informed by science, and the trick of his 
subjective perception: 
My hands shook under the weight of the light. Those heavy yellow squares 
saturated my palms and spilled down my trouser legs. My clothes were soaked in 
light. I felt like an apostle. I felt like a saint, not a dirty tired traveler on a dirty 
tired train. It was a trick, of course, a fluke of the weak sun magnified through the 
thick glass. And yet my heart leapt. In the moment of the moving pool, my heart 
leapt. I put my hand on the book, it was warm, it must have lain in the sun. I 
laughed; a few lines of physics had been turned into a miracle. Or a miracle had 
been turned into a few lines of physics? I turned to see my own reflection in the 
black window. No matter how meticulous the scientists he or she cannot be 
separated from the experiment itself. 
(…) The doctor’s surgery is full of men and women who do not know why they 
are unhappy. “Take this,” says the doctor, “you’ll soon feel better.” They do feel 
better, because little by little, they cease to feel at all. (4-8) 
Winterson’s depiction of Handel’s frustrated quest for certainty and inescapable fear of the 
inexplicable is coupled with scientific limitations. Science can only answer so much about 
experience before it must give up and reach for the miraculous or supernatural. Handel’s 
insistence on explaining away the height of his “illuminating” experience on the train, of 
grounding it in physics, is a form of neutralization and defense against feeling. The “cure” in this 
passage is the cessation of feeling—which is what Handel is both resisting and embracing. The 
ambivalence of scientific epistemology suggests the need to forgo certainty by embracing a 





Contemporary Engagement with History: The ECT ‘Recovery Narrative’ and ‘Miracle Cure’ in 
Pop Culture 
Long after Meduna’s autobiography and the conquest of his “intellectual curiosity”, the 
same dichotomous pattern between “objective/subjective” emerges in the contemporary ECT 
story. In December 2015, The Atlantic, published a polemic article entitled: “The Return of 
Electroshock Therapy: Can Sarah Lisanby help an infamous form of depression treatment shed 
its brutal reputation?” Beneath the title is a caricature of Sarah Lisanby, a young friendly-looking 
psychiatrist, in a white lab coat holding an over-sized magnet over an over-sized pink brain. The 
pink brain sits on an operating table, hooked up to a monitor. There is something silly about the 
image, yet it emanates a calming sense that somehow scientific progress, and new advances in 
research, will right the wrongs of ECT’s history, separate fact from fiction and align the public 
with a singular and stable truth. The return of ECT seems hopeful, couched in “evidence-based” 
language, and Sarah Lisanby does not fit the stereotypical “mad scientist” or “shock doctor” 
image often associated with ECT. She appears to be a sensible, kind-hearted person who wants 
to help. 
A deeper reading suggests a disembodied, biomedical approach to mental health; a 
positivist methodology that is brain-centric, objective and entrenched in hegemonic concepts of 
the Universal (Irigaray 3). Luce Irigaray writes in To Speak is Never Neutral how phallocentric 
scientific discourse functions within patriarchal systems of language. Scientific modes of 
reasoning and speaking refuse to acknowledge that their own partiality, their own perspectivity, 
their own interest in values, implicitly rely upon conceptions of women and femininity to 
maintain their ‘objectivity’, ‘scientificity’, or ‘truth,’; that is, their veiled masculinity (Irigaray 
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5). Irigaray equates the dominant “reductionist” grammar of science to the privileged position of 
masculine-subjectivity upheld by the grammar of a patriarchal hierarchical world: “the form- 
giving subject has always been male; they give form to culture and to the history of ideas. 
Scientific studies prove the sexuality of the cortex, while science maintains that discourse is 
neuter (…) the female remains within an amorphous maternal matrix, still in the reservoir of 
meaning, and the madness of discourse” (4). What Irigaray means is that the reign of binarism 
(male/female, objective/subjective) exhausts any potential for thinking differently about the 
biomedical and its role in our lives. Ideological understandings of medicine are a set of 
descriptive, normative beliefs and values that explain and justify how society is organized, and 
more specifically how health/illness is managed and imagined within the social world. As the 
image conveys, the brain exists outside of a human body, detached, living as a sovereign entity 
to be “fixed” in a technical and disembodied way. By this semantic logic, Lisanby is not 
shocking a person, but rather, she is shocking a brain, placing her electrodes on problematic 
areas and rebooting them (similar to a computer). 
Allusions to the Cartesian mind/body divide are evident in this image, where the brain- 
centric focus attempts to locate suffering in faulty neurotransmitters instead of in broader 
environmental, societal and interpersonal relationships. As feminist medical philosophers have 
demonstrated, the mind/body divide is inherently masculinist (or sexist) as it genders mental 
rationality as “male,” and the body as irrational and “female” (Irigaray 8). The historic erasure of 
the feminine in culture is evident in the “deep economy of language” where patriarchal culture 
has reduced the value of the feminine to “an abstract nonexistent reality” (Irigaray 8). In other 
words, “language rather than anatomy, now consigns woman to her role as object and Other” 
(Irigaray 8). Although Lisanby is a powerful woman within psychiatry as the head of the 
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National Institute of Mental Health, this does not mean she does not adhere to masculinist, 
paternalistic or gendered ideas of mental health. In a sense, her “minority” position within 
scientific knowledge-production leverages and distracts from her human, corporeal capital as a 
white, upper-class, Ivy League-educated psychiatrist. The ambit of power within psychiatry 
between expert/patient remains the same, where she is “encoding a world from which 
subjectivity has been removed, and which is subordinated under the cover of the universal, to 
one single subject” (Irigaray 12). The expedient tokenism displayed in this article, giving the 
illusion that ECT is not only “safe and effective” but is neutrally and objectively administered 
outside of a patriarchal medical system, distorts the material-conditions and gendering of 
invasive mental health treatments within psychiatry. 
This is why survivors felt like their complaints against doctors or psychiatrists were never 
successful or resulted in change in practice, because they were not seen as credible experts, their 
experience was always pathologized and eclipsed by medical knowledge or expertise. In an April 
15th, 1998 letter to Wendy Funk from the College of Physicians and Surgeons (Alberta), the 
Deputy Registrar discounts her testimony of memory loss by saying its “controversial” and her 
complaint or anger proves her “emotional illness.” ECT, according to the College of Physicians 
and Surgeons, saved her life: 
Long-term memory loss such as you describe is complex and somewhat 
controversial, but the general consensus is that the impact of ECT on long-term 
memory is minimal if there is any at all. Your description included loss of 
memory for huge blocks of time, a feature not seen with electroconvulsive 
therapy. In fact, our expert believes it is more likely a feature of your emotional 
illness than the ECT treatments. He indicated clearly that the equipment used was 
the state of the art and that the techniques employed were entirely appropriate. 
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(Wendy Funk- Don Weitz PSAT Fond) 
Funk wrote to her activist colleague, Don Weitz, describing how her “consent” was under 
“coercion and threat of not signing insurance forms unless I followed doctors’ orders or doing a 
partial lobotomy if I didn’t consent.” She then goes on to talk about how her experience of 
memory loss is a “fact” and is not controversial. (May 22nd, 1998, Letter to Don Weitz from 
Wendy Funk in Don Weitz’s PSAT Fond). This exchange is an example of the power of ECT’s 
history written by and for the psy industry, how it maintains the hierarchy of knowledge and 
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places survivor testimony at the bottom as mere opinion, or worse, as evidence of their “illness.” 
Engaging with survivor testimony and history is essential for understanding the complexity of 
power surrounding evidence and how treatments are framed by the psy industrial complex. 
This shiny version of ECT’s history, with Meduna as conquering hero, blinds us to the 
more nuanced and murky beginnings of electricity in medicine. Electroshock predates 
psychoanalysis, the discovery of the unconscious, and the idea that trauma could be a persistent, 
clamouring wound, unseen and unheard by the wounded until they enter a talking-cure or other 
triggering relations. It also predates pharmaceutical drugs. Early technological interventions, 
such as ECT, appeared miraculous because, at the time, there were no other treatments to ease 
distress beyond locking people away in asylums or attics. ECT seemed to bring the most 
hopeless out of darkness. However, the idea of electricity as having power over existential 
problems did not start with Meduna, even if he helped legitimize brain-centric methods in 
psychiatry with the aim of “curing” mental illness through induced-seizures. 
Electricity is a definitive modern invention, marking the second industrial revolution 
known as the “electric age”—it modernized urban life, mechanized labour, and increased the 
speed of human movement. Electricity stood as a symbol of freedom from drudgery, a symbol of 
a new way of living. In a sense, electricity was the miracle of early urbanization: it helped 
enlighten society to new ways of living and working—namely, how to gain mastery over nature. 
The concept of “miracle” has philosophical and theological roots, and its definition thus varies 
depending on its context. Generally, a miracle can be understood as transcending the “laws of 
nature,” an extraordinary occurrence that holds some relevance to the supernatural (Peck 22). 
Miracle in a medical context suggests overcoming illness or debilitation (even death) in ways 
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that cannot be explained scientifically or objectively (through laws of nature). It designates 
overcoming hopeless or “untreatable” physical ailments. 
Prior to the official “birth” of ECT, as we know, Victorian electrotherapy was very 
popular across North America and Europe from 1750 onward—building upon the idea that 
electrical power could cure what was once believed to be incurable suffering in a flash. Early 
medical electricity was advocated by a circle of European natural philosophers such as Abbe 
Nollet (1700-1770), Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), John Birch (1745-1810), Erasmus Darwin 
(1731-1802) amongst others (de laPena). Electricity, for a young science, was the most 
promising branch of experimental philosophy. Mesmerized by the disruptive power of lightning 
channeled into radical “life-saving” therapies, Gentleman’s Magazine in 1745 stated, “natural 
philosophy can work miracles” (Bertucci 89). During this “age of electricity” (Gilman 340), 
natural philosophers experimented with electricity seeking a cure for psychological pathologies; 
perhaps this was because those were the most baffling to treat and understand. 
Electrical experimentation helped many understand the psyche in new ways. Historian 
Borck Cornelius discusses how electricity became defined as an Enlightened Science and the 
cornerstone of modern medicine: “the blending of psychophysiology and electrical engineering 
marks the formation of an electric epistemology in scientific as well as public understanding of 
the psyche” (565). The body was mapped electrically, thus electricity was seen as restorative, a 
way to recalibrate what had been depleted through the stresses of modern urban life or labour. 
Prior to this revolutionary technological period, Benjamin Franklin’s famous kite experiment led 
to a trend in testing electrical remedies for incurable diseases and ailments. Here, electricity was 
seen as a power greater than other interventions for the most hopeless cases. 
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The gendered dynamics of early medical electricity are worthy of mention. Many of the 
metaphors used to describe man’s creative urge to interrogate nature with power (de la Pena) 
align with masculinist hegemony. For instance, Franklin was known for his trials on mute 
“hysterics”— namely young working-class women who were unable to work due to their “loss of 
voice” (Franklin 34). This loss of voice, characteristic of hysteria, came with the ancient image 
of the wandering womb, “a uterus deprived of sexual intercourse and rising in protest into the 
throat, there to create hysterical symptoms” (ix). Using Leyden Jars and frictional machines that 
were able to generate sparks on demand, Franklin would treat his patients by shocking various 
areas of their bodies. In one of his famous case studies, he describes C.B., a young girl with 
uncontrollable “hysterical seizures'' who was given a “globe and bottle” to generate and store 
electricity so that she could electrify herself at home according to his instructions. The young 
girl’s tongue had been “rolled up” after hearing a violent knocking at the door (Franklin 34) 
which threw her into a fit of convulsions. Franklin’s electric cure helped the girl “calm down” 
until her speech returned. Electricity was seen as a “powerful” miraculous intervention that even 
Franklin declared “not to comprehend” (Letters 14). According to Pushbutton Psychiatry, there 
is a long history of shocking women’s bodies (Galen’s widow treatment and Hippocratic 
excision of the clitoris) to combat “female hysteria” (Kneeland and Warren 34). The continuities 
of medical hierarchy and patriarchy resonate throughout the electrical lineage of treating 
psychological pain—or illnesses. 
By the 19th century, a cultural shift occurred in which electricity changed its role from 
being a power source for experimental science to becoming a medium for curing everyday 
ailments, such as headaches or fatigue in fast and “miraculous” ways (Kneeland and Warren). 
 
53  
Electricity and the advent of wearable electrical devices to cure illnesses thus helped re- 
conceptualize the body and its role in the modern project. As Carolyn Thomas de la Pena notes 
in The Body Electric: How Strange Machines Built the Modern American, “Americans gradually 
moved away from viewing the body as a set entity determined by God and toward viewing it as 
raw material malleable under man’s direction. The body could be altered by applied energy” (3). 
Electricity helped re-conceptualize the body. The advent of machines and technologies meant to 
enhance human performance suggests that electricity carried the body into the modern era, as de 
la Pena notes: “People saw themselves as part of a modern project, these technologies promised 
to bring the body along on the road to rapid modernization” (3). 
This shift also coincided with the birth of the asylum, an urban peripheral structure of 
walls and gardens that could reform discipline and separate the mad from the rest of society. This 
period also intersects with the beginnings of psychoanalysis, where a “talking cure” was 
developed to interpret an unconscious story beneath the patient’s affect. One of the grandfathers 
of medical electricity, Alfred Smee, attests to how shock could rebalance the flow of electrical 
energy in the body. As Kadosh explains, “this was encouraged by an emphasis upon the role of 
ethereal powers in the natural world and the divine economy, the generally accepted kinship or 
consonance between electricity and the nervous fluid, and the assumption that all physiological 
processes within the body were fundamentally electrical in nature” (29). In Britain, “madness” 
was regarded as a disease of the brain rather than the mind, and therefore it was believed that 
physical interventions such as electrotherapy or medical electricity would be efficacious. In 
France, madness was understood as a defect of mind capable of being receptive to 
psychoanalysis (Kneeland and Warren 14). The electrical “boom” in medicine allowed for “new 
research regarding the physiological impact of electricity on the head and brain from the middle 
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of the 19th century helped to encourage applications of electrotherapy and its use as a diagnostic 
tool” (Kneeland and Warren, 16). Althaus claimed that electrotherapy applied to the spine was 
able to restore the “power of memory” and “increased disposition for labour” (Kneeland and 
Warren, 16). Thus, the Victorian era saw the development and use of portable electrical devices, 
such as the Pulvermacher Chain (see image below), to help stimulate human productivity and 
cure “nervous maladies”: 
Popular machines for transcranial electrical stimulation that dispersed static or 
frictional, faradic or battery current electricity were available everywhere from 
London department stores to seaside resorts and used at home. The market for 
popular electrotherapeutic and transcranial electrical stimulation apparatuses 
remained strong until 1920. (de la Pena 24) 
Electricity was believed to be a powerful force that offered power over life and death, or at least 
some relief from severe neurosis. As de la Pena notes, “theories of health and rudimentary 
understandings of energy created an age in which industrial energies seemed capable of curing 
physical limitations and ill health that plagued Victorian bodies” (3). 
The gendering of mental health issues continued into the 19th century; the “madwoman” 
became a cultural trope, tied to hysteria and the romanticization of female affect. From Ophelia 
to the “madwoman in the attic”, cultural representations of female madness were often tied to the 
inability to fit into a gendered-narrative, mythologized and sustained in public discourse8. Thus, 
cultural imagination of mental illness is closely tied to identity-formations that ambivalently 
undo and reproduce socially-determined “normal” or “healthy” gender embodiments. Typically, 
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popular representations of female madness in Western culture invoke notions of social deviance 
that trouble patriarchal gendered scripts; namely scripts that embellish female docility, 
romanizations of motherhood and an intrinsic ethic of care. However, during the 19th century, 
there were no mechanisms for women’s voices to be heard legitimately within the public sphere 
(despite it being the beginning of the early feminist movement with the rise of The Suffragettes), 
thus mentally ill women were relegated to the sidelines of society, marginalized, locked in cellars 
and asylums, out of public sight. They were punished for being angry and/or unsettled by their 
traumatic circumstances (physical violence, sexual assault, etc.). Contemporary feminist literary 
theorists Gilbert and Gubar praised “the madwoman” as a transgressive and resistive trope 
against patriarchy—however, during the “age of electricity”, female madness was highly 
fetishized and appropriated by natural philosophers. Exhibitions and public demonstrations of 
electrical devices were always performed on women’s bodies. Rendered into a spectacle for 
modern audiences, the “madwoman” had become associated with mastery over the body and a 
sexualized, masculine dominance over nature. 
Even though “Medical Electricity” had been in use since the early-modern era, physicians 
were reluctant to run electricity through the brain because it was a deadly risk. Despite this risk, 
in 1938, Italian psychiatrists Ugo Cerletti and Bini were the first to attempt electroshock in a 
clinical setting. Building upon Meduna’s clinical notes on camphor-induced seizures in patients 
with schizophrenia, they ran the first clinical trial of electrically-induced seizures in humans. In 
the mid-1930s, they experimented on a homeless “cagoods'' that wandered around the train 
stations near the University of Rome. Based on Meduna’s research, Cerletti had observed that 
epileptic patients would become less depressed after having a grand mal seizure, and this 
prompted his experiments (Burstow, Breggin, Kneeland, Shorter). Electroshock therapy was 
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popularized during the rise of Nazi Germany’s dehumanizing psychiatric experiments on 
German “mentally ill” individuals. Many of these experiments bordered on torture and were part 
of a larger eugenics project. As Burstow writes, “the rise of ECT in the 1930s can be attributed to 
the authoritarian political era in Europe in which 275,000 ‘inmates’ in German psychiatric 
hospitals were starved, beaten, drugged, and gassed to death” (95). Thus, the birth of 
electroshock, as we know it, is tied to fascist origins (Burstow) and repressive regimes in which 
“mentally ill” bodies were dehumanized and seen as contaminants that may pollute the 
evolutionary genetic future of the human race. Within this framework, mental abnormality went 
from being understood as a moral defect to a physiological, neurological problem that needed to 
be either corrected through invasive-intervention, imprisonment, or death (Kaplan). 
The first patient to receive ECT, Enrico S., had been labelled schizophrenic and mute. He 
is often described as the most “hopeless” patient by psychiatric historians and autobiographers, 
such as Dr. Sherwin Nuland, who recounts in his TED talk on ECT how Enrico was a “lost soul 
wandering around… hopelessly schizophrenic… defecating on himself, talking nothing that 
made sense” (TED Talk Nuland). Enrico became the poster-child of the civilizing effects of 
ECT, as he went from a babbling, defecating “animal” to someone who was humanly self- 
conscious and socially aware. After several unsuccessful trials of inducing a grand mal seizure 
using 100 volts, the patient screamed “Attention! Another time is murderous!” (Shorter 41), 
denoting his awareness, self-preservation, and the dissipation of his catatonic stupor. Cerletti 
took Enrico’s impassioned and assertive statement as proof of the patient’s recovery, noting, “the 
schizophrenic is coming out of epileptic convulsions have a visible sense of calm and repose” 
(Shorter 43 sic). At the time, no anesthetics were administered and the violent convulsions often 
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resulted in broken limbs and spines—even death (Breggin, Burstow, Weitz). This bleak image of 
ECT is what many contemporary psychiatrists are attempting to change. 
A promotional film made by Abram Bennett in 1939, entitled Convulsive Shock Therapy 
in Affective Psychosis, describes the treatment as the “most favorable” in treating schizophrenia 
and depression. The silent film reveals “before” and “after” shots of patients in an American 
asylum. The film is meant to encourage physicians to try the new treatment on their most 
hopeless cases. All of the patients are female, and most are elderly. The film opens with a brief 
history of electroshock therapy, linking it to Meduna’s successful trials and stating its powerful 
results in terminating severe depressions within a week. Later it showcases women in distress 
admitted to the asylum. The first woman is sixty-one years old, disheveled, and weeping— 
because it is a silent film we cannot hear what she is saying and must rely on the film’s subtitles. 
After electroshock (we do not see what the treatment looks like clinically) the caption below her 
smiling face reads: “All anxiety disappears, she is euphoric and calm.” (Bennett) Another 
woman, locked up, is portrayed violently banging on the asylum doors that imprison her—the 
caption reads “This housewife tried to kill herself, and now she is completely recovered.” We see 
the woman raising her hands in prayer and the caption narrates: “Things don’t worry me now, I 
have come back from the dead!” (Bennett). This promotional film aligns with themes of rebirth, 
miracle, and conquering hopeless suffering. The gendered aspect of the film also echoes how 
women are predominantly administered ECT—a trend that persists today. Marketing this form of 
treatment seems to draw upon earlier electrotherapeutic tropes, thus continuing the idea that 
electricity could cure madness in miraculous ways. The only difference was, at the time of the 




While electrotherapy machines became the objects of medical museums during the late- 
1970s, electroconvulsive therapy made a “quiet comeback” (Dukakis and Tye 25) in the late-
1980s and early-1990s as the treatment of choice for resistant and/or severe depression. The shift 
has obvious socioeconomic roots in the medical-industrial complex’s paradigm of fast and cost- 
effective treatments, transforming patient care into a high-turnover assembly line. While strides 
are being made to include a trauma-informed and culturally-sensitive approach to mental health 
care, brain-centric ideologies still dominate most psychiatric wards. The global ECT renaissance 
that started around the late 1980s-early 1990s is a response to the psychiatric survivor 
movement, patients’ rights groups, mad activists, and other “anti-psychiatry” groups that sought 
to ban the use of ECT in North America during the 1970s. Leonard Lloyd Frank spearheaded the 
legal movement against ECT. This counter-history, filled with accounts of trauma, brain damage, 
and memory erasure, is not seriously addressed by pro-ECT psychiatrists or historians. At the 
very best, those accounts are regarded as “symptoms” of depression or schizophrenia—or just 
plain “groundless” statements (Fink). The rhetoric of ECT being “new and improved”, and 
nothing like the shock treatment of the 1930s-40s, also helps divert attention away from the 
testimonies that claim it to be traumatic and damaging. As Dr. Burstow writes, “Calling it new 
and improved serves to create the misimpression that the myriad of voices which rise up against 
shock are irrelevant for they are complaining about a prior method” (Burstow 95). CBC radio’s 
White Coat, Black Art aired an episode in 2011 entitled “Marketing Medicine” that explored the 
rhetoric that doctors use to sell controversial or stigmatized treatments, like electroshock. One of 
the doctors interviewed, head of psychiatry at the University of Ottawa, explained how he 
combats cultural stigma and gets patients to say “yes” in a hurry through the art of persuasion. 
“When your brain is out of sync, ECT re-syncs your brain,” he says, to explain 
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how the treatment works because it is an accessible and comforting statement. Framing ECT as a 
way to “rebalance” and “re-sync” the brain is a fiction—those metaphors inaccurately depict 
what happens to the brain after 200 volts of electricity are fired through it, and more importantly, 
they misrepresent the brain as a simplistic mechanical entity when in fact it is the most complex 
organ of soft nervous tissues in the body. 
Today, ECT takes less than an hour to administer, which is part of its appeal for many 
who suffer from enduring mental anguish and distress. Its efficiency and promise of “cure” is 
meant to bring hope to an already overburdened mental health system. In December 2015, the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) reported a shortage of mental health beds in hospitals, 
reflecting the lack of infrastructure and resources allocated to psychological health. In January 
2016, the APA tweeted an urgent call to the public to sign a petition in support of deregulating 
ECT to increase its usage. Due to limited infrastructure, a fast, cost-effective treatment that 
promises to help the most hopeless cases of depression, especially the suicidal, seems like a 
viable and welcomed solution for many experts in the field. As a somatic therapy, ECT relies on 
physiological and brain-centric etiologies, thus moving mental health care away from costly and 
long-term narrative-based therapies such as psychotherapy and psychoanalysis towards more 
“efficient” and timely, albeit more invasive, interventions. 
Yet, despite the technological progress narrative surrounding ECT, many promoters still 
rely on the miraculous: 
(…) fingers anoint my temples with cool ointment and fasten a plastic crown 
tightly around my head. Wires connect me to machines that hum and beep, 
registering the peaks and valleys of my brain and heart. They cover my mouth and 
nose with plastic and instruct me to breathe. (Manning 9) 
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Dr. Martha Manning’s ritualistic description of her ECT experience in Undercurrents: A Life 
Beneath the Surface (1995) reflects a renewed faith in electrical interventions for serious and 
debilitating mental distress. She is crowned and anointed, like a high priestess on a 
transcendental journey, awaiting to be reborn on an operating table. There is a sensuous and 
spiritual quality to her reflection that echoes Victorian electrical tropes where natural 
phenomenon, such as lightning, is juxtaposed with ground-breaking technological inventions, 
such as the light bulb. Awe-inducing scenes of being “struck” with electrical life-force, from 
Benjamin’s Franklin’s kite experiment, Mary Shelley’s reanimation in Frankenstein, or Emily 
Dickinson’s electric lyric: the cultural imagination of electricity has since generated a language 
of faith in the inexplicable, a conjuring of the supernatural, and suspension of empiricism within 
medical discourse. Accordingly, Dr. Manning’s medical autobiography, like many ECT- 
supporters, indulges in themes of rebirth and miraculous recovery, which not only counters 
popular representations of ECT as a barbaric, brain-frying torture machine—it also subverts 
empirical methodologies as medicine’s only means of measurement. This kind of narrative, one 
that circulates with contradiction and nuance, illuminates the difficulty of reductionist binary- 
thinking when it comes to the relief of mental distress. 
However, I wonder, how will too much reliance on technological invasive-treatments, 
even if performed in ethical ways, impoverish psychiatry’s ability to deliver integrative and 
holistic treatment plans that take the patients’ intersectional context into account (gender, class, 
race, ability, etc) as well as broader social-determinants of health? More importantly, I worry 
that the passive nature of invasive treatments like ECT (where patients are not active participants 
in the treatment process) and its easy framing as a “miracle” (similar to how Prozac was named a 
miracle drug) creates the illusion that depression can be cured with the flick of a switch (or by 
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some divine intervention). Such thinking takes power away from patients, from their creative 
processes of meaning-making and symbolization to cope with existential distress, trauma, and 
social injustices that haunt our world. 
In a similar vein, Julia Kristeva writes, “The speaking being is a believing being” 
(Kristeva 3). She continues “not something I can prove scientifically that may be calculated (…) 
but a truth ‘we stumble upon’ to which I cannot adhere, that total fatally subjugates me (…) a 
truth that keeps me, makes me exist” (Kristeva 3). No treatment method is perfect: Even if it can 
be helpful to some, recovery is a continuous journey of learning how to survive (Kristeva 3). 
Taking a passive route and handing over the creative energy necessary for cognitive regeneration 
solely to experts (or invasive interventions) only delays the recovery process, because it does not 
teach the patient how to integrate their feelings of suffering and redirect them into positive 
outcomes (healthy relationships, fulfilling and meaningful career, sustainable nutrition, etc). 
Although the metaphor of miracle has theological roots, it has been married to medicine 
for a long time. Doctors’ ability, and oath, to save life is central to this trope, and the rise of 
complex mental health issues that threaten not only the quality of social life and wellbeing but 
also life itself, has propelled research into effective treatments that can transcend limitations and 
“fix” the brain on a physiological level. These extreme measures, such as ECT or lobotomy, 
reflect the extreme hopelessness and despair of mental distress. 
Broadly, a miraculous event is generally defined as an occurrence that is so utterly 
extraordinary as to shatter the framework of our understanding of nature. Usually, miracles refer 
to an act that could not be solely performed by humans. Invasive-technological medical 
treatments seem to defy the laws of nature: they change biological phenomena in the body and 
often extend people’s lives by decades. Miracles seem to feign empirical explanation, going 
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above and beyond what can be measured (yet there is a limit to measurement tools—not all 
natural phenomena can be measured!). It seems fitting for a treatment like ECT, which does not 
have a solid explanation of how it “works,” to be enamored with the miraculous. 
Dr. Robert E. Peck, who wrote The Miracle of Shock Treatment in the 1970s as a 
response to growing medical and social criticism, explicitly describes the treatment as 
miraculous, calling it “one of those medical miracles that Reader’s Digest likes to write about” 
(13). Dr. Peck invokes the rhetoric of faith healing to illustrate how overcoming a debilitating 
illness cannot always be explained scientifically (or through the laws of nature). There is theatre 
in his statement, the kind of drama that pulls a reader in. There is a certain risk involved, even a 
“leap of faith” (Kierkegaard) that grabs the audience's attention and suspends their intuitive fear 
of electricity passing through the brain. Perhaps, heroic narratives set in homely magazines (such 
as Reader’s Digest) convince readers that ECT is not “so shocking” after all. It can be part of the 
everyday experience of being in the world. Similarly, Dr. Norman Endler in his memoir about 
ECT, Holiday of Darkness, simply skips out for ECT on his lunch break (Endler 25). Recovery 
from depression in both of these narratives appears easy and effortless, the patient just has to fall 
asleep—when they wake up, they have no memory of the treatment and their depression is 
simply “lifted.” He says: “A miracle happened in two weeks, I had gone from feeling like an 
emotional cripple to feeling well (…) my holiday of darkness was over (…) It was great to be 
alive again” (75). Endler’s lament at being an “emotional cripple” is interesting since he invokes 
a sense of not being able to navigate or attend to his moods (by using the derogatory term 
“cripple”) or being in “darkness.” Later on, in the next chapter, he still has no idea how to 
engage in a process of listening to his emotions after ECT. After his so-called miraculous 
recovery, Endler experiences a severe relapse and requires more ECT treatments, thus negating 
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the facile end to his “holiday of darkness”. Even though Endler strongly believes ECT cured his 
depression, his relapses prove that our emotional worlds are complex ecosystems within the body 
that hold unconscious information; they are not simply neurological areas of the brain or 
chemical reactions that can be physiologically governed. Emotions must be attended to and cared 
for like plants in a garden, no matter how difficult to cultivate. The idea of depression being 
“lifted” (extracted like weeds) instead of “worked-through” (like soil) represents the paradigm 
rift between the biomedical and psychoanalytic approach to mental health recovery. Relying on 
miraculous treatments (whether it be Prozac or ECT) erases the value of suffering as a teachable 
moment in our journey of postmodern selfhood. 
The inherent value of this dichotomy is that it reinforces the idea of “normal” (as a 
neutral and emotionless state of being “balanced”) and the psychiatric profession’s ability to 
manage it. Virtually every form of human behavior has been classified within the 
normal/abnormal dichotomy and there appears to be no end in sight to the growing index of 
human dysfunctions, disorders, and diseases (…) the idea that some people are psychologically 
sick or disordered reflects the growth of the pathological approach, a distinctly Western and 
recent historical phenomenon in which it is assumed that personal problems are individual and 
caused by biological/physiological factors (Clark et al. 72-74). 
The framing of ECT as a miracle is also a rhetorical defense, a way to regain public 
support for a treatment that went out of style due to human rights violations and its severe and 
debilitating side-effects (Burstow, Psychiatry and the Business of Madness 201-227). If language 
is a frame of perception that reflects invisible ideological formations, the trend of equating ECT 
with “miracle” seems to be part of the de-stigmatization campaign, a way of diluting the 
controversy to increase usage. This trend is ideologically tied to the goals of biomedicine as a 
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profitable, effective, and productive industry that can engineer happiness. Thus, the metaphor of 
ECT as a miracle is not without its sensational undertones that serve a specific class of people 
within the medical-industrial complex (namely those who profit from the sales and 
manufacturing of ECT machines), and ironically, at the same time, it conjures a certain 
hyperbolic grandeur that inevitably casts doubt on the validity of such curative claims. For 
instance, shortly before the publication of Dr. Manning’s memoir, the cover of New York 
magazine on November 14th, 1994 reads “When Prozac Fails, Electroshock Works!” The 
assertive statement is juxtaposed with an image of a man’s face with a strained and surprised 
expression in his eyes, a bolt of electricity jolting into his head, lifting his hair like a typical 
electrocution caricature. This image contradicts the promise of the title, or at least, it does 
nothing to calm public fears about the dangers of ECT. If anything, the article reiterates and 
reproduces the stereotypes it seeks to dismantle, ultimately adhering to fear tactics to sell a story. 
The caption on the next page reads: “It’s still popularly feared and reviled. But these days—it’s 
kinder and gentler—and widely used. Electroshock therapy is jolting thousands of patients out of 
suicidal depression” (Stone 55). The idea of being “jolted” or “shocked” out of suicidal 
depression is a violent one; even though medical journalist Gene Stone reassures his readers that 
modern ECT is “gentler and kinder,” the only shift in clinical ECT procedures is the 
administration of anesthetics (Breggin, Burstow). Today doctors give better drugs to numb the 
pain of the electric shock, so it may be “kinder” initially, but the treatment is virtually the same 
as the 1940s. 
Healing ECT’s polemical depiction as torture device or miracle treatment goes deeper 
than reframing sensationalized cultural or medical representations; it is an emotional battle with 
contradictory subjectivities that must be attended to, and heard. As Donald I. Templer, a scientist 
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who investigated ECT’s neurological effects and accusations of permanent brain damage, 
affirms, the reason why this treatment is so stigmatized is that “it is difficult to maintain an 
objective perspective because emotional undercurrents tend to run so strong” (95). To begin 
with, objectivity might be an impossible goal to achieve within psychiatry since it is intimately 
tied to interpretation of subjectivity and perception. Furthermore, the emotional stakes of ECT 
are highest for patients who risk losing (or have lost) integral aspects of their subjectivity, such 
as long-term memory (Breggin, Burstow) and cognitive skills, in the course of treatment. Equally 
emotional are claims by patients who frame ECT as a life-saving miracle (Endler, Nuland, 
Hersh). Without ECT, such patients believe they would not be alive today. Such powerfully 
charged statements require more than an “objective” measurement to honour the weight of their 
validity. They require space in which to resound as legitimate stories of distress and healing, 
even if they lose the capability to coherently think through the wound or events. In “Talking 
About the Unthinkable” Maria Medved and Jens Brockmeier discuss how people who experience 
brain injury (much like the type accounted by ECT survivors), go through a “shattering” of self 
and experience difficulty in narrating their perspective in a coherent way, which creates a 
horrifying disequilibrium. By the same logic, patients who experience rebirth or “miracle” 
recoveries also shed and forget aspects of their “former” selves (Johnson, Hersh, Nuland, 
Endler). Thus the narrative self, or identity, is a necessarily fragmented and broken concept, 
unstable and fluid within a postmodern context. Citing Goldstein’s work on catastrophic 
reaction, Medved and Brockmeier describe the person’s feelings after a “mental shock” as: 
not only “inadequate” but also disordered, inconstant, inconsistent, and embedded in 
physical and mental shock. In these situations, the individual feels himself unfree, 
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buffeted, and vacillating. He experiences a shock affecting not only his own person but 
the surrounding world as well. (49) 
“Objectivity” and concerns over empirical measurement methods are central concerns for re- 
balancing the inequality between scientific knowledge-production, medical discourse, and 
personal testimony related to ECT. Patients’ experiences of ECT need to be listened to from an 
intersectional perspective, one that considers the political economy of health and wellness within 
the ambits of power that regulate bodies into silos of sane/insane. 
Maintaining objectivity in psychiatric metrics is another problem: the results of ECT are 
nearly impossible to measure since they simultaneously rely on patient testimony, psychological 
questionnaires, validity scales, and psychiatrists’ observations/interpretation. Burstow reflects on 
the seductive force of measurement-based information (i.e. MMPI tests) within the helping 
professions, because it appeases insecurities about the value/meaning of information, yet it can 
sometimes become an overused tool at the expense of reflective listening or empathy-based 
techniques. The tools used to measure wellness can even sometimes generate illness, she says: 
“traditional measurement theory assumes a correspondence between test scores and some 
existing reality. In contrast, the act of measurement may generate reality” (56). The ambivalence 
of recovery from depression and other affective disorders resists neatly defined terms of what it 
means to recover. ECT (and its discourse) does not take process, coping skills, social 
determinants of health, and long-term outcomes into account when it frames a “recovery 
narrative” around the therapy. 
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The truth is that autobiographical memories are not possessions that you either 
have or you do not have. They are mental constructions created in the present 
moment, according to the demands of the present. (Fernyhough 6) 
 
 
Should I acknowledge the fiction that I am (…) Bounded yes, but not by 
mortality, which is not what I fear, but by smallness, insignificance, which is what 
I do fear. The unlived life. Life in its hard shell safe from the waters above and 
the waters below. The home-and-dry life. Sound. Dependable. True? (…) There’s 
no such thing as autobiography there’s only art and lies. (Winterson 30-31, 69) 
 
Despite its biomedical, yet miraculous (Peck, Endler, Fink) ability to bring depressed and 
suffering individuals “back to life” (Endler 75), the major ethical concern ECT poses for 
psychiatry is its impact on memory. The nuance between forgetting, memory loss, and what 
Linda Andre defines as “memory erasure” is a dangerous slip with ethical contours for 
considering how one narrates or recuperates, a life re-routed by shock. Wendy Funk describes 
ECT as erasing 32 years of her life: “I can’t remember my kids, my career, my life prior to ECT” 
(Shrink Wrap CKLN radio interview with Don Weitz). Linda Andre, author of Doctors of 
Deception, says, “I no longer knew who I was'' (9), recounting how ECT reduced her IQ from 
156 to 118. In contrast to these accounts, the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) claims ECT to 
be safer and more effective than many antidepressants. The defining features of ECT’s safety are 
contested by patient advocates, for instance, as Dr. Peter Breggin states, the terms “safe” and 
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“effective” are fictional at best because the FDA does not test shock machines (Breggin 
interview on CKLN radio). The medical community frames ECT’s “memory loss” as a normal 
and beneficial side-effect. In an interview with a local newspaper, Dr. Lance Patrick, professor of 
psychiatry at the University of British Columbia, names ECT “a therapeutic blocking of past 
trauma” (In Defense of Shock Treatment, March 10th, 1999, 10). Despite psychiatric survivors’ 
testimony of irreparable memory erasure, ECT usage is steadily on the rise. Critics (Burstow, 
Breggin, Weitz, Funk) believe this is because the shock industry is a very lucrative venture, and 
it is beneficial for the industry to have patients forget the harm done during the procedure. 
However, many psychiatrists claim there is no validity to electroshock’s memory erasure (Fink, 
Brodie). Norman Endler, in his memoir Holiday of Darkness, blames society’s negative attitude 
towards electroshock therapy on cultural representations of ECT resembling “gothic horror” 
(64). He goes on to say how shock is an inaccurate term to define the treatment since: “it does 
not produce a physiological, psychological or surgical shock. It is not traumatic. It is probably 
the most effective method for treating the affective disorders” (64). For Endler, too much 
information about ECT comes from film, literature, and magazines which obscures it as a 
“humane treatment” (65) there have been many clinical studies done on shock since the late 
1970s (Breggin 6); they simply have not been taken seriously by the biomedical community. 
While Endler laments the erasure of electroshock’s clinical legitimacy, the canon of 
psychiatric survivor testimony claims it is the erasure of personal memories that need to be 
remembered. 
The ethical contours of recovery under memory erasure demand a critical discussion of 
memory, trauma, and the value of remembering/forgetting. They also require differentiating 
between what is meant by “erasure” and how it compares to various understandings of 
“forgetting.” Examining psychiatric survivor testimony and life writing is useful in teasing out 
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the nuances, but first, I will engage in a critical discussion of memory itself. Memory is a 
“slippery phenomenon”—partly because no one is sure exactly what memory “is” beyond the 
metaphors used to contain its variations. However, it is useful to think about the metaphors used 
to describe memory, since it cannot be seen in and of itself: memory is a process, a phenomenon, 
a continuum in need of symbolization. We are never without memory, even when we cannot 
remember. As Edward Casey writes, “Even though we may misremember, there are few 
moments in which we are not steeped in memory. Every filter of our bodies, every cell of our 
bodies holds memories as does everything outside bodies and brains” (ix). To account for this 
overwhelming event, memory appears through its remainder: the representation that always fails 
to represent. 
Ancient Greek philosophers struggled with metaphors to articulate memory’s ontology: 
from Aristotle’s “bird in hand” to Plato’s “bird in a cage,” memory shifted from something 
mutable and fleeing to something locked away and kept (Ricoeur). The Platonic “wax” metaphor 
has been a ubiquitous symbol of how memories leave traces, imprinted in our bodies and minds. 
Of course, memory is not a simple physical imprint, as theorists, writers, and artists have 
 
demonstrated. However, the struggle to “understand” and symbolize memory has continued for 
centuries. In 1953, Scientific American published “What is Memory?” in which author/scientist 
Ralph W. Gerard explicitly admits how even the sciences cannot agree on memory: “The means 
by which the brain stores the rich variety of human experience is completely unknown” (118). 
Gerard later defends a reductionist vision of memory, naming it a “smooth continuity” (120) that 
should be read in the broadest sense as “the modification of behaviour by experience” (120). To 
complicate this reductionist reading, decades later, phenomenologist Edward S. Casey declared 
that there is nothing consistent or enduring about memory; it occupies the unknown position of 
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the future in the present, while accessing the past. Thus, in the work of memory, the past is 
always transfigured in subtle and significant ways by transcending linear time. Casey writes, 
“Memory is already in the advanced position, always at work, continually going on, often on 
several levels and several ways at once” (ix). Thus “memory” is not something finite or “past”— 
it actively plays a role in keeping the present in contact with the past. 
Memories are not shelved in our brains like books in a library, although this image, along 
with the “filing cabinet,” has been popularized by scientific, neurological and psychological 
discourse (Footnote). Groundbreaking psychologist and novelist Charles Fernyhough, in his 
recent book Pieces of Light: The New Science of Memory, stresses the danger of relying on 
metaphors that limit memory to the physical realm: 
Metaphors of memory are overwhelmingly physical: we talk of filing cabinets, 
labyrinths, and photographic plates, and we use verbs like impress, burn, imprint 
to describe the process by which memories are formed. This view of memories as 
physical things is guaranteed to mislead. The truth is that autobiographical 
memories are not possessions that you either have or do not have. They are 
mental constructions, created in the present moment, according to the demands of 
the present. (6) 
Thinking of memory in physical terms misrepresents the “time of memory” (Scott 33) believing 
it to be something that exists perfectly in the past, filed away in our minds and easily retrieved 
and consulted. This assumption of linearity and materiality would discredit memory as a 
recursive process, as something made in the present from past experiences. Memories are 
constantly happening, in motion, as spontaneous reconstructions from elements scattered through 
various areas of the brain. The latest brain research suggests that memories are more like 
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recursive “collages”, reconstructed, fragmented and jarring, instead of a coherent storage of 
information. 
Based on memory’s epistemic insecurity, Richard Terdiman in Present Past: Modernity 
and the Memory Crisis discusses memory as a “problem” and a modern perturbation, resulting 
from traumatic political and social instability where the “coherence of time and of subjectivity 
seemed disarticulated” (3). More importantly, he troubles any stable definition of memory: 
 
[M]ost often we think of memory as a faculty consisting of our consciousness and 
our self-awareness, as the means by which the coherence of our identity and our 
history is constructed and sustained. Such mnemonic activity is fundamental. But 
there is another side to memory—memory as a problem, as a site of cultural 
disquiet. (viii) 
The “other side” of memory feigns unitary definition: the problem it presents is precisely its 
inability to rest in secure terms. While “memory” can be described as a “faculty” or a 
“phenomenon”—according to Terdiman, memory is a problem that struggles to be heard: 
ideologically, culturally, and beyond. It haunts all aspects of individual and social life, and it will 
not be silenced or contained. It is a silence that speaks and attempts to subvert historical master- 
narratives that persist in present-tense. This “crisis” echoes Frances Yates (1966) seminal text, 
The Art of Memory, where she radically claims: “we moderns have no memories at all” (2). 
Memory, once the poetics and praxis for knowledge-production, is obliterated, according to 
Yates: “We have not only forgotten what it is to remember, and what remembering is, but we 
have forgotten our own forgetting” (2). The depth of this repression for Yates is so devastating 
that memory, as responsibility and agency, runs the risk of becoming obsolete—downloaded, 
projected, and externalized onto machines. Thus, the ability to even define what memory “is” or 
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“can be” for beings is forgotten. Despite this anxiety, in Western thought, memory has been 
relegated as the foundation of subjectivity and collective identity formation. Memory is the 
fodder of knowledge-production—and by extension, its erasure has been used to conquer, 
colonize, and sustain cultural genocide. If memory is always/already unstable, fleeting and 
escaping us constantly—how can it be erased? Perhaps a more productive question is what do 
psychiatric survivors mean when they say their memories have been erased? 
Many psychiatric survivors deliberately highlight the difference between “forgetting” and 
“erasure” in order to articulate how ECT was a form of violence against their selfhood. For 
example, Linda Andre’s seminal investigation and memoir on her ECT experience, Doctors of 
Deception, begins by teasing out the ethical contours of erasure, describing the phenomenon as 
“violent and unexpected” (2). Andre’s first chapter “The Trouble with Time” discusses the life 
events that have been obliterated from her consciousness post-ECT. She can only infer that these 
events happened based on the material evidence (photographs, books, notes, videos, etc.) left 
behind. Andre does not remember being an NYU graduate student in photography on a 
prestigious scholarship; she does not remember writing 24 scholarly articles for publication; she 
does not remember her wedding day; all of these events are remarkable enough that one would 
have some recollection, even if it was only fleeting. She says, “A period of time is wiped out as 
if it never happened” (2). Erasure, in this sense, cannot be linked to forgetting, because forgetting 
necessitates having a memory of what is forgotten. Forgetting is a productive and valuable part 
of memory; the two conjure meaning in an intricate semantic dance. Erasure denotes that the 
experience to be remembered never occurred, which would mean that Andre was never married, 
never published articles, or attended NYU. 
 
73  
Paul Connerton in “Seven Types of Forgetting” would qualify Andre’s experience as 
“repressive erasure” (60). He locates this form of forgetting “in the history of totalitarian 
regimes, where, as in Milan Kundera’s often quoted words ‘the struggle of man against power is 
the struggle of memory against forgetting” (60). The condemnation of memory as a source of 
subversive power aligns with the struggle of many psychiatric survivors who attempt to 
historicize their trauma and abuse at the hands of psychiatry. Erasure is thus an attack, 
intentional and geared towards obliterating potential evidence. More deeply, it is a deletion of 
one’s selfhood or aspects thereof: as Andre writes, “You didn’t just lose your suitcase; you can’t 
say where you got it, what it looks like, what you packed in it, what trips you’ve taken it on. You 
don’t know you’ve ever had it” (2). In this case, Andre distinguishes “loss” from “erasure,” 
saying that if something is “lost” you can recover it because you can still imagine it, and “the 
fact that it ever existed at all is not lost to you” (1). Echoing Andre’s sentiment, GraceAnn 
Inyard laments her selfhood post-ECT in the OFF Center newsletter: 
And my brain was thick with fog and confused, thoughts were vague, incomplete, 









I had been told, so they tell me, that the shock treatments would cause some 
 
memory loss for a short time. Now years have passed, and I’ve since discovered 
that the memories simply got destroyed—like a swipe of an eraser across the 
chalkboard, leaving vague traces of what was once present or blackness. Whole 
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years are gone, large gaps in my personal history, and what memories remain are 
out of chronological sequence. 
(How did I become who I am now? Who was I when I don’t remember existing?) 
And I find myself mourning the death of my self, for I am not who I was, for I am 




But here I stand, wearing someone else’s body, which contains someone else's' 
half-blank mind (…) So, this is me? (15) 
The imagery of an eraser swiping a chalkboard evokes Inyard’s inability to retrace (or rewrite) 
the parts of herself that were once readily accessible. The fragility and ephemerality of memory 
are also conjured in this image. “Who was I when I don’t remember existing?” is a powerful 
question. She has become a stranger to herself, not only in an existential sense but in a literal 
corporeal sense. Her body is no longer her own. She occupies it like a tourist in a hostel, a 
transient resting place that she could never call home. What Inyard has lost is irretrievable—it 
has been utterly destroyed. The traces left behind no longer resonate, nothing can be remembered 
or put back together into a narrative coherence. She is met with disbelief, doctors who tell her 
that her disillusionment is part of her “illness” (15). For both Andre and Inyard (like countless 
others), the experience of disorientation after-ECT is traumatic. It feels like a wiping out of their 
existence, thus classifiable as “memory erasure.” Evelyn Scogin in her memoir Descent has a 
similar description of the difference between “memory loss” and “erasure,” which she equates to 
mourning a death of selfhood: 
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This type of loss is much more and not simply because a memory is gone. It’s as 
if that entire time frame never even existed. Something more fundamental is lost 
because it involves not only whole periods of time but also erases all feeling and 
sensations, all connection of anyone or anything for that part of your life. 
For me, it felt and continues to feel as if I never existed for that period of time. 
(…) I feel afloat in a dark space where I have no sensations, no substance at all. I 
don’t know how else to explain it to anyone who has not undergone such a 
profound loss of self. (135) 
Scogin was given ECT to prevent suicide and self-harm after having been heavily medicated 
with no improvement—she continued to have suicidal ideation after ECT (134). The irony is that 
the treatment’s erasure almost satisfies suicidal fantasy to “never have existed.” If suicide is the 
desire to take one’s life, to no longer exist or never have existed, then, according to Scorgin, 
ECT’s “memory erasure” succeeds in fulfilling that morbid goal. She purposely describes the 
loss as something “fundamental”, more fundamental than memory itself. She laments a loss of 
sensation, perception, and the ability to relate to others—which seems like her fundamental 
humanness. Thinking back to ECT’s claim to be “life-saving”, and a miraculous cure for high- 
risk suicidal depression, one must consider what it means to recover from distress if one form of 
continuous pain is simply replaced with a new form of ongoing torment. 
 
Conversely, erasure takes away one’s capacity to engage in the imaginative, narrative- 
process of remembering—of creatively amassing fragments of the past into a present context or 
“story.” In some ways, Andre is not so much concerned that she does not remember things 
correctly (as sometimes is the case with memory loss or amnesia); she fears that she cognitively 
cannot be creative enough to remember her life. At the core, what she is talking about is her 
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inability to imagine. According to Andre’s account of erasure, if memory is a creative process, 
shock destroys that creativity. Ernest Hemingway, shortly before committing suicide, wrote 
“What these doctors don’t know is about writers (…) what is the sense of ruining my head and 
erasing my memory, which is my capital, and putting me out of business? It was a brilliant cure, 
but we lost the patient”9 (Papa Hemingway). Memory for the artist, and especially the writer, is 
the basis of all their creation—it is where they can re-assemble parts of their lives and embellish 
with fictive elements, so that what they create can ring true to their audience. Memory and 
imagination are intrinsically linked; before we translate our memories into language, we imagine 
a scene in our minds and conjure elements of the past through what Sartre defined as the “magic” 
of fantasy. Accordingly, memory’s low status as a mental faculty comes from this blurring of 
fact/fiction, or false consciousness, which memory has no guarantee of assuaging or preventing. 
As Paul Ricoeur reminds us in Memory History Forgetting, there is always/already the 
trouble of articulation and perception within memory/forgetting. How does one articulate what 
they perceive accurately? Does “accurately,” mean, as Plato puts it, to copy an original “true- 
thing” that precedes it? This would require memory to conjure a faithful resemblance to “the 
anteriority of marks” (Ricoeur 12), which would more likely become a “mask instead of an 
exploration of the truthful dimension of memory” (Ricoeur 13). There is always the risk of 
making mistakes because all we have are impressions that only skim the surface of the past. Re- 
reading Socrates’ Theaetetus, Ricoeur recalls this problem as it is figured in the metaphor of the 
wax imprint. Socrates positions memory as a sort of “wax in our soul” where whatever is 
impressed upon the wax we remember and know so long as the image remains in the wax. 
 
 
4 Ernest Hemingway, talking about electric shock therapy, as quoted by author and confidant A.E. Hotchner in his 




However, this poses the problem of memory and forgetting, because there is the messy transition 
between the moment of perception and the moment of recording the imprint. Before we imprint 
it, the representation must forget. This implies that we must forget to remember, yet one can 
make a mistake between the two. As Ricoeur reminds us of Socrates’ phenomenology of 
mistakes—the act of taking one thing for something else—and remembering falsely. He grounds 
this “falsehood” in the deception of the wax impression: “The mind applies the imprint of the 
absent perception to the perception that is present; the mind is deceived in such an instance” 
(Ricoeur 9 qt. Socrates194a). Socrates asks, “Can a man who has learned something not know it 
when he is remembering it?” (Ricoeur 7). This is different from forgetting as Ricoeur sees it, for 
it is not a denial or unconscious burying of knowledge, but rather a sudden non-knowledge— 
more like making a mistake. Just as much as “remembering a memory may not make it true” 
(10), it does not demote it from the realm of knowledge that one keeps and possesses. This is 
where the metaphors shift from wax to birds. Here, Ricoeur makes a distinction between 
possessions and keeping by using Socrates’s metaphor of the bird in the cage versus the bird in 
one’s hand. This shift in metaphor suggests the transition from passive to active memory. A bird 
in hand is free to fly, to return or never come back to the hand that holds it. The relationship is 
one of openness and freedom, illustrating a knowledge that does not limit itself to certainty. 
Instead, it is a knowledge that maintains doubt and anxiety. Conversely, the caged bird is 
restricted and symbolizes the knowledge we possess, know, and retain. By illustrating how 
memory is an active search for an image that once was, there is an ethical dimension added to 
memory: it is bound by its relation and responsibility to act upon the past. On the other hand, 
imagination is boundless, moving toward unforeseeable futures without the same responsibility 
to remain faithful. Imagination can provide a creative discourse that flirts with ideology and 
 
78  
utopia and allows one to express aspects of the world and experience beyond that of ordinary, 
descriptive language. Objectively, memory might fail us, but we have nothing better to know that 
something happened. 
Andre’s memory metaphors may be inaccurate, but they help her symbolize what has 
been destroyed: the narrative capability to articulate oneself, to claim one has existed. For 
instance, when she equates memory to a suitcase as if it were a container that allows one to 
collect and carry fragments of the past intact, she objectifies memory, limiting it to the physical 
world of the finite. However, her claim of erasure (the lack of imaginative and cognitive abilities 
post-ECT) has been shared by other women. Susan White in “ECT: A Victim’s Reality” 
discusses her frustrated speech and impoverished sense of narrative “selfhood”: “Everybody that 
I come into contact with knows more about me than I do and this makes me feel inadequate, 
confused, very frustrated and angry about my loss. Now knowing who you are and not having a 
‘sense of yourself’ is a very real part of my everyday life!” (4). Being lost within their own 
bodies, homes and neighbourhoods extends to the metaphor of an existential homelessness. 
Without memory, we are lost to ourselves and cannot inhabit the world with others in meaningful 
ways. 
Reclaiming the erasure of psychiatric survivor histories is part of the activism at the 
forefront of Janet Frame and other survivors’ narratives. Re-membering as a narrative project of 
reassembling old wounds toward new and more integrated interpretations may be a key feature 
of one’s recovery process. Dr. Bonnie Burstow talks about the need for her clients to remember 
in order to recover. Memory erasure, she claims, puts her clients at a disadvantage for recovery: 
“When the past is taken away the person cannot function properly as a meaning-making human 
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being.”10 They lose the ability to navigate the world and relate to others. Traumatic memories 
that re-occur and torture individuals with episodic flashbacks are key symptoms of Post- 
Traumatic Stress Disorder. The survivor will sometimes disassociate and “forget” or repress 
certain memories because to remember is too painful and causes serious physical stress. ECT is 
not a precise memory deleting machine. Forgetting can be a necessary part of recovery as well; 
however, erasure is more deeply rooted. Perhaps trauma survivors would want their trauma to be 
erased so that they could live as though it never happened, but unfortunately, ECT cannot 
guarantee that the problematic memories will be gone when they wake up. Although I do not 
necessarily agree with the anti-psychiatry statement that “memory is sacred” (CAPA slogan 
2008), the creative capability to narrate and weave memory into a coherent and meaningful 
representation is an important part of one’s recovery journey and should be nurtured. We cannot 
assume that memories are inherently good or bad or that they contribute to a stable sense of self; 
they simply help us navigate the world with some sense of orientation and confidence—while 
maintaining a healthy amount of doubt that allows one to question what they perceive as “real” 
or “true.” 
Referring back to Leigh Gilmore’s notion that trauma is the limit-case for autobiography 
because it escapes representation, often protectively buried within the subject’s unconscious, 
there remains something inexpressible in the story of ECT. As Ricoeur writes, “The limit facing 
the historian—just as for the filmmaker, the narrator and the judge lies elsewhere: in the 





5 Electroshock and Women” Shrink Wrap Host Don Weitz. CKLN Toronto, September 19th 1999 
(retrieved Psychiatric Survivor Archives of Toronto). Radio. 
 
80  
possibilities of memory to excavate voices and utterances of suffering, those long-buried in an 
epistemic abyss, Ricoeur proposes an ethics and therapeutics of memory to act upon the work of 
history. Namely, Ricoeur seeks to engage in dialogue with a history constructed out of the 
poetics of narratives. He seeks to use memory and forgetting on the narratives that remain 
unquestioned and taken for granted, the narratives that overwhelm, or that remain incomplete 
and lacking in slant. What Ricoeur proposes is for the work of memory to provide an interruption 
and allow silence and forgetting to speak with historiographical discursive practices. Ricoeur 
reminds us that, contrary to what might seem like the work of memory, to remember is 
intimately bound to forgetting. Can we bear to know this history to remember it? Must we forget 
it first? As such, the limits of historical representation have to do with a capacity for reception on 
our part. How to represent the unrepresentable stems from therapeutic as well as epistemological 
concerns. The demand for truth in such extreme cases should be seen as closely tied to what 
Freud called the “work of mourning” (156) along with the work of overcoming the process of 
resistance to this work. How does the test of the impossible speak to Ricoeur’s interest in finding 
a way to reroute the opposition between memory and forgetting at the limit of representation 
within the ECT canon? 
On the other side of the miracle/erasure debate, the biomedical claim that memories will 
return weighs in to discredit survivor testimony and promote the treatment as “safe and 
effective”. “Oxygenation” has been claimed to reduce memory side-effects (Shorter, Endler). 
Most psychiatrists will not use the language of “memory loss” or “erasure” to describe side- 
effects; rather they use medical terms like “retrograde or anterograde amnesia,” which showcase 
a veneer of objectivity and neutrality. In the memoir Perfect Chaos: A Daughter’s Journey to 
Survive Bipolar, Linea Johnson and Cinda Johnson describe their fear of ECT and memory loss. 
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Linea is a prodigy pianist, studying music in Chicago, and relies heavily on her cognitive 
abilities and memory to achieve her goals. Her entire identity is based on her musical talent and 
skill. Being diagnosed with bipolar disorder is a huge challenge for Linea and she goes through 
several life-threatening “manic” episodes. ECT is used to “extinguish” (181) her mania. 
Although ECT causes extensive memory loss and damage, Linea remains “thankful” (301) to be 
alive, even if her music career was put aside she finds joy in “educating” others about ECT: 
(Linea writes) You know, everything just kind of ran together before. Now I hear 
the spaces. Things were kind of gray. No shadows of anything. It is like things are 
sharper to me now (186) (…) Levels of acceptance come and go. I still get angry 
and fight and kick and throw temper tantrums over the fact that I will have to go 
through these ups and downs from time to time. I still get sad about the fact that 
any of it happened in the first place. 
(…) 
 
(Linea’s mother writes) –Linea had never veered from her goal of excelling in the 
world of music. For her to let go of all the years of work and commitment had to 
be so difficult for her. (…) Her commitment to others and her articulate and 
brilliant voice have opened doors for people to understand and embrace an illness 
that is common to so many families. (301-319) 
Linea can listen better thanks to ECT—sounds are “sharper” (186)—so it can be argued that 
ECT enhanced her cognition and brought her out of the depressive murkiness. Becoming the 
“good patient” who welcomes treatment and follows doctors’ orders is the underlying theme of 
the memoir. Linea comes to terms with ECT and learns to accept her need for it—she becomes a 
spokesperson and engages her “lived experience” as grounds to promote the treatment. She 
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complains about losing memories (like her grade 2 birthday party), but in the grand-scheme of 
things, she does not mind, the familiar rhetoric of miracle cure prevails, she ultimately adheres to 
a certain discourse. Besides its impact on memory, one of the major controversies within the 
ECT debate is its disproportionate usage on women (Dukakis and Tye 14). While psychiatrists 
are quick to meet gendered observations with statistics of women being more depressed than 
men (Dukakis and Tye 14), they do not factor in socio-economic, systemic, or gender-based 
oppression within those numbers. Dr. Bonnie Burstow in her article, “Understanding and Ending 
ECT: A Feminist Imperative,” believes gender oppression is an operative aspect of the disparity. 
She boldly states “ECT is a form of violence against women” (115), and reveals insidious 
mechanisms of misogyny within the mental health system using institutional ethnography and 
empirical research. 
Psychiatrist Dr. Peter Breggin’s research also investigates the gender dynamic of shock, 
writing that it is “currently being done to elderly women…because they are the least likely to 
complain” (Breggin 10 Simple Truths about Psychiatry). The Ministry of Health in Ontario 
(Breggin citing Weitz 7) reports that 71% of patients given ECT in hospitals are elderly women. 
Furthermore, the pro-shock argument that women are more depressed than men does not hold up 
when considering “the electroshock therapy review committees found women are electroshocked 
two to three times as often as men irrespective of diagnosis” (Burstow 117). One of the women 
Burstow interviewed stated, “It can feel like a brutal assault on who you are” (46), thus 
emphasizing the psychological, emotional, and physical violence of the procedure. Elaborating 
on the shift in psychiatry from a psychoanalytical to a biomedical paradigm, Breggin describes 
how female patients are rarely listened to by psychiatrists today. Instead, they are diagnosed, 
drugged, and told that maybe a social worker will talk to them (Breggin). At the core of this 
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debate is the silencing of women’s voices, identities, and narratives of suffering through a denial 
of listening and care. 
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CHAPTER 2: Madness Cannot Speak and the Ethics of Listening Otherwise in Psychiatry 
 
 
Madness Cannot Speak 
 
Madness exists beyond language in the silence of infinite, nebulous possibility: it “exists at the 
limits of our world” (Foucault, History of Madness xxviii). A Renaissance term that predated 
biomedical terminology, “madness” was primarily used to describe religious experience, 
perception into other worlds or dimensions of time/space. Madness was a menace to the 
organization of human civilization and culture that was burgeoning after the dark ages 
(Foucault). Despite the history of madness, the objectification of people who display mental 
difference continues today. Madness remains the unspeakable family secret that has been locked 
in the attic of history, and cannot be explained sufficiently to calm prejudice and fear. Madness 
as metaphor is not something that can be cured: it resists science and contests reason, which is 
why it was abandoned by medicine, and the metaphor was thrown out when clearer and more 
refined psychiatric language emerged to explain distress. Despite its banishment from medical 
epistemology, madness has never left cultural representations and memory: from literature to 
philosophy to activism, it speaks both a beautifully and monstrously subversive language meant 





Psychiatric survivors/service users have spent over 60 years reclaiming madness, advocating for 
human rights, system change, and improvement (Mendolia et al. 8). Most importantly, they have 
asked to be listened to on their own terms, to be liberated from psychiatry’s language and 
epistemology. Mad activism goes as far back as the 1960s, around the time that Janet Frame 
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wrote Faces in the Water. From service delivery to hospital policies and provincial legislation, 
some of the core values grounding activist leadership have been (and continue to be): human 
rights, equity, dignity, choice, self-help, self-definition, and self-determination (Mendolia et al. 
9). Early advocacy spawned a new era of language to reclaim madness as a source of creative 
power. 
The Mad Pride movement, which emerged in Parkdale during the late 1970s and 1980s 
post-deinstitutionalization, served to free madness from metaphors and to ground it in social, 
economic, and political practice and human rights. The movement reclaimed madness from 
pathology to reframe it as epistemology and consciousness. Phoenix Rising, a Toronto magazine, 
emerged during this time, documenting testimonies of discrimination and rights violations that 
psychiatric survivors and former patients faced, both inside of institutions and in social life after 
their closure. This publication was a foundational pillar in advocacy and the consciousness- 
raising movement of Mad Pride: “Phoenix Rising helped forge the beginnings of an accessible 
and very public critique of psychiatric practices” (Costa, Mad Matters 197). This public critique 
influenced the formation of the Psychiatric Patients Advocates Office in 1984 (PPAO Report 
1994, 5). Patients were finally able to vote, and significant strides were made for disability and 
psychiatric rights. 
Mobilizing one’s testimony of abuse or human rights violations was key to the ECT- 
survivor advocacy movement, yet it was a struggle for their testimony and lived experiences to 
be heard and legitimized within mainstream public discourse. In the 1980s and 1990s coalitions 
like the World Association of Electroshock Survivors, the Committee for Truth in Psychiatry, 
and Coalition Against Psychiatry were actively engaging in public discourse about the 
representation of ECT as “miracle” in the media, human rights trials, and inquiries into patients’ 
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deaths while in hospitals, but they were ignored. Many activists were motivated by their own 
experiences of harm after receiving ECT and its impact on their memories. 
Mainstream discourse supports an “evidence-based” perspective that only counts one 
kind of evidence: as Funk names, thousands of survivor testimonies are completely ignored, 
silenced, and rendered invalid, even in talk shows for the general public. Wendy Funk was not 
going to be silenced. She wrote hundreds of letters in response to representations of ECT in 
popular media, from movies to talk shows, and demanded survivor voices to be equitably 
represented and brought into the public sphere for a more well-rounded debate, one that would 
respects the accounts of “memory erasure” that were being systematically erased from history 
and society’s collective consciousness. Even if she might not have succeeded in changing the 
tone of media representations of ECT, given the current trends we see in popular journalism 
today, her work did lead to an epistemological questioning of what counts as evidence and bias 
in psychiatric and pharmaceutical research (Burstow, Breggin, Weitz). 
This movement of collective survivor voices and advocacy for system change spawned a 
new field of academic inquiry named Mad Studies, associated with Ryerson University in 
Toronto, which grew out of Critical Disability Studies. Mad Studies seeks to develop new 
epistemologies to understand experience outside of the empirical/scientific model or medical 
model. Lucy Costa offers the most comprehensive definition of Mad Studies I have ever read: 
an area of education, scholarship, and analysis about the experiences, history, culture, 
political organizing, narratives, writings and most importantly PEOPLE who identify as 
Mad, psychiatric survivors, consumers, service users, mentally ill, patients, neuro- 
diverse, inmates, disabled; to name a few of ‘identity labels’ our community may choose 
to use. Mad Studies right here, right now is breaking new ground. Together, we can 
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cultivate our own theories, models, concepts, principles, hypotheses, and values about 
how we understand ourselves, our experiences in relation to the mental health system, 
research, and politics. No one person school or group own Mad Studies or defines its 
borders. (271) 
Mad Studies owes political and methodological allyship with Disability Studies, Women and 
Gender Studies, Queer Studies, Black Studies and critical activism. Mad Studies discourse is 
significantly rooted in standpoint theory, a feminist perspective coined by Sandra Harding which 
argues that knowledge stems from social position. Standpoint theory denies that scientific 
knowledge is objective and suggests that research and theory have ignored the perspectives of 
marginalized people. The work of Dorothy Smith was foundational to this theory. She claimed 
that women’s everyday experiences are fertile ground for researchers to ask new questions for 
more meaningful inquiry into sociological issues. Harding writes that “scientists have ignored 
their own androcentric and sexist research methods and results, despite the claims of neutrality” 
(Harding 438). Applying standpoint theory to Mad Studies emphasizes that psychiatric language 
and methods are not inherently pure or neutral: they are constructed as such. The term Mad 
Studies was first coined by Canadian activist Richard Ingram in 2008 when giving a talk at a 
disability conference, and it grew into a Ryerson University course developed by David Reville 
and Kathryn Church called “Mad People’s History.” 
The aim of Mad Studies is to dissect and unveil psychiatry’s underlying bias, 
assumptions, and ideology. The necessity of seminal anthologies in Mad Studies include Mad 
Matters: A Critical Reader in Canadian Mad Studies (2013), Psychiatry Disrupted (2015) and 
most recently, Madness Violence and Power (2019) have contributed a foundational body of 
disciplinary work. These texts contextualize Mad Studies as a “project of inquiry, knowledge 
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production and political action.” This three-pronged approach is important to remember when 
thinking about contemporary “patient engagement” mandates which exclude or gloss over 
political dimensions. An important contribution to epistemology by Mad Studies is the 
observation that while truth claims of mainstream mental health thinking rest on privilege of 
method, behind them are a set of ontological assumptions about what madness is, how it comes 
about and how it should therefore be treated. Unlike psychiatric survivor research (or survivor- 
research) Mad Studies is less tied to the medical model (Faulkner) and it attempts to move away 
from essentialist rhetoric that traps knowledge within “identity politics” and the myth of 
authenticity. The underlying message is that people can reclaim madness as a source of 
knowledge: “it is not just about ‘experiential knowledge’ but about politically situating our 
knowledge in relation to other sources of knowledge and in relation to our strong history of 
survivor research” (Sweeney 38). This counter-narrative interrupts the smooth history of 
psychiatry and biomedical knowledge as a neutral endeavor. 
Mad Studies has its flaws; namely, it is a predominantly white-centered field. However, 
many scholars have advocated for critical theory to be meshed into its discursive analysis to 
ensure that space is being made for racialized members of mad communities to speak. Mad 
Studies must “challenge the white-centered core of survivor knowledge and research” (Le 
Francois, 2015). This field of inquiry brings mad voices to the academic table, yet these voices 
are still competing against a hierarchy of knowledge dominated by the sciences. Mad Studies is 
also critiqued as impractical because it leans towards theory vs. praxis, and as such, does not 
subsequently tend to the material realities of madness in capitalist society. There is space to meet 
these critiques with the tenets of Mad Studies outlined in Mad Matters: rhetorically, at least, 
there is a declaration of intersectionality and praxis as the core mandates of the discipline. 
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Despite the strides made by advocacy, madness remains an invisible and silent 
category. What is popularly imagined as “mad” suspends everything we thought we knew of the 
observable world; it seems supernatural, above and beyond anything that could possibly be 
recognized as human. As Nature is not a natural concept but a concept of reason (Kant), madness 
is thus irrational and overly primitive, tied to an untamed and primordial existence beyond 
socially constructed time. Yet its chaos reinforces the subtle “order of things” (Foucault) that 
governs curated knowledge which we take for granted: all that has been naturalized around us by 
culture, reason, and civilization. Foucault’s seminal work Madness and Civilization: The 
Invention of an Idea and The History of Madness deconstructed the disciplinary role of 
psychology, a modern vector of power that naturalizes subjectivity/individuality as Euro-centric, 
white, masculine bodies. He was hoping to question the “calm knowledge we imagine we have 
of madness” (Foucault 23) to disrupt the rational/irrational dichotomy produced within modern 
society. When Foucault implies that madness cannot speak, he means that people who have been 
labelled “mad” cannot be heard, or listened to, as valuable contributors. They are always/already 
speaking as mad, and cannot be trusted with being able to perceive the world in an accurate or 
coherent way. Their perception is invalid, thus any attempt to articulate what they see, hear, feel 
or understand about their existence is taken as a symptom or proof of their madness (or illness). 
This devaluing is named as epistemic violence by those who have reclaimed madness as a source 
of valid analysis. 
Foucault’s seminal work has inspired interdisciplinary scholarship and praxis in which a 
merging of the “medical” with the “human” can take place: medical anthropology, medical 
humanities, critical psychiatry, narrative psychiatry, community psychology, critical disability 
studies, and mad studies (to name a few). This subjective “turn” in the medical field has 
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prompted innovative and timely programs and projects that seek to meaningfully engage the 
voice of lived experience toward system change. In my conclusion, I unpack the ethics behind 
these seemingly benevolent gestures of inclusion and position them as “ethical domination” 
(Voronka 33). Even though these projects aim to listen to people who have suffered mental 
health challenges and addictions in ways that were never thought possible during the asylum era, 
they now possess within them a new kind of danger: neoliberal ideals of self-sufficiency and 
productivity. 
Returning to Michel Foucault, the notion that madness cannot speak (The History of 
Madness xxviii) is particularly compelling for psychiatry’s ideas on listening to “find the 
patient” and policy-makers newfound interest in engaging the voice of lived experience within 
the “engagement enterprise” that co-opts Mad history and analysis (Costa, Voronka). To be 
mad is typically characterized as someone that speaks “out of order”, who speaks when they are 
not meant to, defies grammar and expresses emotions that are far beyond the limits of social 
conventions—then how can they be listened to ethically, without the diagnostic reading of their 
speech? Furthermore, when it comes to stakeholder engagement for quality improvement 
projects, what does listening to “the voice of lived experience” really mean? Voice must always 
be understood as plural, even at the cost of grammar, because our identities are fluid, incoherent 
and constantly evolving. Therefore, the expectation of a representative “voice” that can speak 
eloquently on behalf of a diverse and heterogeneous group of people who suffer from mental 
health challenges is inherently tokenistic. 
Psychiatric listening is diametrically opposed to ethical forms of listening. Psychiatric 
textbooks describe listening as “finding the patient” (Mohl 2), The “commonplace” (Felman 13) 
of madness, as Shoshana Felman describes in Writing and Madness, is worthy of attention 
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because it subverts modernist attachments to certainty, to what can be knowable and self-evident: 
“It has caused the verb ‘to know’ to be put in quotation marks” (13). Felman argues that madness 
is now culturally abundant and over-represented and that “we are experiencing an inflation on 
the discourses on madness” (13). The normalization of madness creates a paradox, a collapse 
between the inside/outside of what is taken to be culturally expected as “mad.” Felman says, 
“Madness usually occupies a position of exclusion; it is the outside of a culture. But madness as 
‘common place’ occupies a position of inclusion and becomes the inside of a culture (...) it is 
inside, paradoxically, to the extent that it is supposed to be the outside” (Felman 13). The 
ambiguity that madness offers between insider/outsider culture, the blurring of lines between the 
aesthetics of madness and the lived experience of mental illness/disability, is troubling. The co- 
optation of “mad speech” and social justice posturing could potentially dilute people’s lived 
experience of mental health issues and trauma. Madness is not a metaphor, even while it is 
strategically used as such. 
In Foucault’s project, the metaphor of madness is to be excavated and described as it was 
before science conquered it with language. The pre-scientific history warns of how madness 
might turn to ashes and be forgotten. He writes how the object, and even the possibility of 
madness, “will close upon itself and the traces it will have left will no longer be intelligible” 
(Foucault 541). The doom will be its ongoing silence that forgets it ever existed, and how future 
generations will be not able to learn from madness because it will not make itself known. 
Linguistically speaking, the word madness is already obsolete, replaced by mental illness on the 
mental health spectrum. Thus, what worries Foucault is the silencing effects of discursive 
practices that make us forget a history that has led to current abusive psychiatric practices and an 
inability to think with madness: 
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The familiar game of gazing at the furthest part of ourselves in madness of 
lending an ear to those voices which from far away tell us most clearly what we 
are, that game, with its rules, its tactics its inventions, its ruses, its tolerated 
illegalities will forever be nothing more than a complex ritual whose meaning will 
have been reduced to ashes. (542) 
The further voice we hear might be the most familiar, but remains something we think we hear. It 
forces us to doubt what we think we know, and leads us to believe that it may be easier to simply 
not listen, to pretend that we cannot hear ourselves in others. In this case, madness may even 
reinforce our fictions of sanity, or at least, our fictions that sanity is opposed to madness. 
On its own, sanity lacks shape, definition, and solidity: there are no accounts of sanity, no 
testimonies of its lived experience. In Going Sane Adam Philips attempts to describe sanity, a 
concept that is not clearly defined in our culture, despite so much depending on its existence: no 
one knows what it means beyond the “absence of madness.” For Philips, sanity is an ethical 
responsibility and nuanced form of courage that fosters quality relationships, essential for the 
“good life,” a life where everyone can live well (i.e. suffer well) within caring, loving and 
compassionate environments where they are listened to. Sanity is the courage to confront one’s 
monsters, one’s suffering, and to be an active agent in social change. To further elucidate his 
thinking, Philips distinguishes between “superficially sane” and “deeply sane”: “For the 
superficially sane, sanity means a life without conflict, a life of relative peace, a life without 
malice or greed” (180). To be deeply sane, as Phillips suggests, is to be able to hold onto one’s 
madness in such a way that it can inform one’s wisdom: 
For the more deeply sane, whatever sanity might be, it is a container of madness, not a 
denier of it. (…) His sanity is both the cause and the consequence of not having 
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conformed, of discovering his true nature through a refusal to comply. (…) The deeply 
sane accommodate their desire to the needs of others. (180) 
Philips’ imagining of sanity as a container for madness is hopeful; it holds space for madness to 
speak. In a sense, to be “sane” is to be able to listen to one’s “mad speech”, the monstrous world 
of suffering and fear, which we all return to when confronted with traumatic life events or simply 
vast chasms of the unknown. At the same time, to be sane is to be validated and listened to in the 
broader social world. Philips describes the “deeply sane” like tragic heroes who have survived 
their ordeals (181) and can describe what they are “made of” (181). They are not skimming life 
on the surface; they are deeply connected and civically engaged. Unlike the vapid and empty 
form of reassurance that keeps us complacent and “safe”, this kind of sanity awakens us and 
forces us to act in new ways. Contemplating how madness cannot speak, psychologist Gail 
Hornstein asks how we could listen beyond our desire to know exactly what someone is trying to 
say. Could there be space for the ambivalent within psychiatry? Hornstein thinks that listening to 
madness, as is, might help us understand behaviours that seem outside of reason. It may reveal 
implicit coherence, a raison d’etre that needs acknowledgment and welcoming, while forever 
being out of our grasp: 
Can we possibly understand people who decide to throw themselves under trains 
or any other strange and anguished things that being ‘out of your mind’ can bring 
about? Might the accounts that crazy people give of their own actions actually 
help us grasp them? (156) 
By learning to listen beyond diagnosis, psychiatry can play a very special role in medicine: it has 
the opportunity to gain insight into the complexity of distress in an intimate way and to help 
build capacity for the voices of people with lived experience of madness to be integrated into the 
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mental health system and towards change. Psychiatry can listen in multiple ways, from the 
hermeneutical to the ethical and exact-empirical. It can do more than simply “find” patients; it 
can leverage their stories of distress and empower people to make coherent meaning out of loose 
ends, while at the same time helping them deal with their symptoms. Perhaps, to be able to listen, 
psychiatry needs to come from a fundamentally different paradigm, one that does not see sanity 
in opposition to madness. As disciplines like Mad Studies and Critical Disability Studies attempt 
to move beyond the binaries that have separated the subjective experience from the medical, 
according to Phillips, sanity is merely the act of recognizing our humanity, the constant 
reassurance we need to believe we are still human despite the decay, violence and suffering 
around us: 
Sanity is the project of keeping ourselves recognizably human, therefore it has to 
limit the range of human experience. To keep faith with recognition we have to 
stay recognizable. Sanity, in other words, becomes a pressing preoccupation as 
soon as we can recognize the importance of recognition. When we define 
ourselves by what we can recognize, by what we can comprehend, rather than say, 
by what we can describe, we are continually under threat from what we are 
unwilling or unable to see. (141) 
We are terrorized by our blind-spots, by what we cannot accept within ourselves. Thus, deep 
sanity, much like deep listening (Voegelin 2), is closer to ethical gestures because it is also 
composed of communicative meaning-making, the ability/privilege to speak and be heard. Being 
able to describe what one is “made of” and articulate one’s perspective on traumatic experiences 




The “good intentions” of psychiatry to diagnose with the aim of curing or “finding” 
(Mohl 2) their patients are not helpful if they silence someone seeking love, compassion and 
listening. Not being listened to is what prevents madness from speaking. Building upon the 
words of Winnicott, Philips claims that “madness is the need to be believed” (178): it is the 
result of not being recognized or of not being validated. The lived experience of not being 
listened to runs deep for many psychiatric survivors. They have mobilized for decades (Mad 
Pride) to be legitimately heard within civic spaces, outside of psychiatric confinements (both 
physical and discursive). Mad Studies scholars have taken up and subverted Foucault’s statement 
that madness cannot speak in many ways. They have proven that “madness” can indeed speak, 
and it is time for the mental health system to listen to its counter-discourse: 
Medicalized individual models of mental illness have dominated all aspects of 
madness and distress in the Western world since the 18th century Enlightenment. 
Over the years, they have increasingly been exported to colonize, subvert or 
overshadow other cultural and societal understandings and interpretations of these 
fundamental human experiences (…) that is why this book is so timely and so 
important. It provides a counter-discourse that is desperately needed in our times. 
It is a counter-discourse, which like the social model of disability of the 
 
international disabled people’s movement, does not seeks accommodation or 
understanding from dominant traditional medicalized understandings, 
but instead seeks to confront them head-on and provide alternatives that offer 
positive promise for the future. (LeFrancois et al. ix) 
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The genealogy of madness that Michel Foucault traces in The History of Madness is not one that 
speaks for itself but is articulated through institutional discipline within which the voice is 
silenced under the weight of authority: the Church, the Law, the Hospital. Disciplinary listening 
is what psychiatry excels at. If therapeutic communication relies on the psychiatrist’s 
understanding as a conquest over the patient’s irrationality—such understanding is necessarily 
false—one devoid of ethically listening to the patient’s subjectivity and difference. The 
psychiatrist’s “difficulty” in this communication is tied up in a need for recognition. Moreover, 
can understanding even be possible if it is forced or expected? The Lippincott’s Psychiatric 
Nursing Manual defines the “therapeutic relationship” as a pursuit of understanding that leaves 
no room for uncertainty or affect. This relationship is founded on “planned and structured 
psychological, psychosocial and/or interpersonal intervention aimed at influencing the 
behaviour, mood and/or emotional reactions of a mentally ill patient”. Thus, the framework and 
structure of such communication regularizes speech between patient and nurse into” productive” 
timesaving streamline coherence. As the manual proclaims: “We are looking for the best 
framework with which to frame the subject in order to understand and interpret the symptom” 
(46). Such “frameworks” reflect Foucault’s discussion on the medical gaze as a constraint on the 
patient’s subjectivity. What happens to madness in this therapeutic framework? Does “madness” 
as historical subject-position disappear under the standard statements of “therapeutic 
communication”? Here we see how psychiatry’s pseudo-objective stance on mental illness 
intervention lacks “truth”, or rather a self-reflexive relationship with the historical, discursive, 
and representational construction of madness. According to Foucault, “true psychology should 
respect madness” (Madness: The Invention of an Idea 56) and learn how to speak with it, 
through discursive time and space. 
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Foucault predicts the end of madness with the words, “One day perhaps we will no longer 
know what madness was” (Foucault 541), and from a historical perspective, he writes of its 
complete disappearance due to sophisticated modes of neutralization that have “removed the face 
of madness” from Western culture. Removing the face of madness means to dehumanize its 
expression, to render people labelled “mad” as pathologically, biologically, and morally inferior. 
Thus, when Foucault eludes to madness cannot speak he means the patient as a “person” is 
forgotten and erased from the equation of biomedical listening; their body is emptied of all 
emotion, will, and soul. The very notion of “care” becomes an absurd concept, a sort of joke that 
no one laughs at. Psychiatric/medical students read textbooks that define caring relationships, but 
in practice, they are rarely able to live up to those textbook standards (due to downsizing 
cutbacks, staff shortages, lack of time/resources etc.). 
This history warns against what might become of madness, how it might turn to ashes 
and be forgotten. As I will elaborate further in the dissertation, psychiatric survivors/Mad Pride 
movements have sought to reclaim their voices on their terms and methods. “Survivor Research 
in Canada” (Landry) challenges what counts as evidence and how survivors/Mad people have 
been historically excluded from knowledge-production. Beyond metaphors, this emancipatory 
movement that gives madness an audible public-facing “voice” is not without its controversies 
and tensions, as madness is not a homogenous identity or political standpoint. As Landry states: 
“any analysis of survivor research or mad studies, I would argue, ought to take a critical 
perspective. It is only through a critical analysis that we can take survivor research concerns 
about the effects of discourse into account. For instance, how subjects are repositioned through a 
process of self-identification that talks back to psychiatry” (Landry 1441). What counts as 
survivor or Mad people’s knowledge is so difficult to define, because what “counts” cannot be 
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counted empirically, resisting mainstream categories and epistemologies. Again, to resist binary 
formations between madness/sanity, we must question how madness was invented in a search for 
sanity that was never found. Trying to shift the evidence “measuring stick” (Landry 1446) is 
incredibly frustrating when madness keeps trying to prove its value against psychiatry. Instead, 
we need to value mad epistemology on its own terms, in its own divergent and diverse discourse 
that does not resonate in even and harmonic tones. Social change requires a paradigm shift 
towards madness as a new kind music that requires us to listen otherwise: “In order to put an end 
to these recurring findings survivor research must use the knowledge it generates to make visible 
how conventional research practices discursively reproduce destructive experiences for 
survivors” (Landry 1446). 
Psychiatric survivors have mobilized their lived experience to be recognized, to be 
treated with dignity and for their basic needs to be met. In 1980, at one of the first ex- 
patient/psychiatric survivor rallies in Toronto, Carla McKague spoke about the need for 
solidarity more than the need for psychiatric treatment. Based on her lived experience as an ECT 
survivor and her reflections on socioeconomic factors (lack of stable housing, a meaningful job) 
that led to her hospitalization, she elucidated how social-determinants of health impacted her 
life—long before public health institutions were on board with these ideas or even considered 
them relevant. The psychiatric survivor/Mad Pride movement was integral to ethical shifts within 
the mental health system, with many people contributing to this movement (artists, poets, policy- 
makers, teachers, etc.). Carla McKague’s call to action is one where health care professionals 
learn to empathize, as a starting point, towards deeper ethical commitments and responsibilities 
of transforming the values entrenched within these institutions (psychiatric education to 




held a public hearing in Toronto’s city hall (Costa, Mad Matters 197) specifically about a female 
patient who was coerced into ECT treatment and when she continuously refused the psychiatrist 
tried to get her husband to consent. Their goal was to shift the values that trivialize lived 
experience, consider doctors as gods, and turn a blind eye to systemic forms of violence that 
perpetuate health inequities. But the work does not end with empathetic engagement, but rather, 
it begins with listening towards recognition and speaking truth to power: 
One of the reasons that most of you are here is to ask what we as a community 
can do to help these people. What we need, first of all, is friendship, 
understanding, people who do not shy away from us because they don’t quite 
understand us because we are a little bit different from the rest. We need a place 
to live. We need a job. We need legal protection. And mostly what we need is 
recognition that we are not some strange breed. (Costa, Mad Matters 197) 
 
The psychiatric survivor and Mad Pride movement continue to mobilize the mental health 
system to listen to their concerns and critiques surrounding research, policy and treatment 
methods/praxis. The problem is that now, instead of being recognized, they are being co-opted 
and distorted in the patient engagement enterprise that espouses neoliberal values (Johannesen, 
Costa, Voronka). This kind of tokenistic listening is similar to the silencing mechanisms from the 




Listening in Psychiatry 
 
“There is nothing more healing than being found by another” (Mohl 12). 
 
While Foucault critiques the impossibility for madness to say anything that can be genuinely 
received by biomedical psychiatry, the reparative narrative turn in contemporary psychiatry 
welcomes the messiness of patients’ voices and seeks to interpret meaning as co-creation, a work 
in progress. What is the context in which madness might speak and be heard? Can psychiatry as 
a paradigm listen to an experience as it is “lived” instead of how it is conceptualized by the 
medical model? Could psychiatry welcome the phenomenology of “hearing voices'' alongside the 
checklist of schizophrenia symptoms? Can psychiatrists listen to their patients meaningfully if 
they are searching for symptoms within a personal narrative? Or do they listen more like a 
prosecutor looking for evidence to prove someone is guilty? Could they listen otherwise, from 
the place where madness speaks? Answering these questions would demonstrate how psychiatric 
listening is diametrically opposed to ethical forms of listening. Looking at psychiatric curriculum 
and education, I wonder if there is room for students to learn how to listen beyond the limits of 
diagnosis? 
In “Listening to the Patient”, the first chapter of Psychiatry (2008), a textbook for 
medical doctors, psychiatry residents, and students, Paul C. Mohl attributes listening as the “key 
skill” (3) for psychiatrists to acquire to locate their patients. He posits listening as the “primary 
tool” (4) of psychiatry—and thus it should be the first learning-module that students encounter 
when they specialize in psychiatry. Like other psychiatry textbooks, the language in Psychiatry 
vacillates between “patient-centered” and “disorder-based” (McIntyre 887). Although there may 
be debates over how listening should be applied as a tool, no psychiatrist would argue against 




first thing that must happen within the clinical encounter. The patient speaks of what is bothering 
them and the psychiatrist listens to find symptoms beneath the narrative of suffering. However, 
how the psychiatrist listens is dependent on the school of thought they ascribe to (cognitive, 
behavioural, psychodynamic, psychoanalytic, existential, etc.), the context they work in (clinical, 
private practice), and their orientation towards the patient. Mohl attributes these different styles 
of listening to the “art” of psychiatry that “involves guiding the depressed to tell their story of 
loss in addition to having the ability to name, describe and quantify symptoms of depression” 
(3). In Mohl’s eyes, psychiatrists are artist-investigators of the psyche. With the rise of 
biochemical, neurological, and medical interventions, psychiatry is losing its art; it is forgetting 
how to listen to patients’ anguish beyond biomedical diagnosis. 
Just because the art of diagnosis has gotten more sophisticated during the last few 
decades (Mohl, 2), this does not in turn mean that patients’ inner experience should be 
abandoned. Perhaps the reliance on words to do all the talking fails to communicate what we 
cannot articulate or hear. When the meaning of the word stands in for the ethical gesture of 
saying, we fill up silence with meaning that remains flat, absolute, and fixed. Words enable thick 
concepts to hold our thinking hostage. Acousmatic listening, or listening to sounds beyond 
language, moves away from origins, gesturing towards the other places that the sound takes us, 
towards the imaginary, unknown, and that which conjures awe. As it stands, medical listening 
aims to name and organize to cure. As Gaston Bachelard reminds us, “The eye cannot 
necessarily go beyond a description of the surface, sight says too many things at the same time. 
Being does not see itself. Perhaps it listens to itself” (72). Through the act of listening, the 




up for re-thinking the past and recovering for the future. This is a space of potential, possibility, 
and healing for patients: a place where they can re-member their past alongside a trained listener. 
Psychiatric listening, also known as “examination” or “therapeutic listening”, began with 
Freudian psychoanalysis (Mohl 3) and allowed the doctor to “see” or visualize patients’ distress 
and thus help them work-through pain or confusion through creative, free-associative narrative. 
In his essay “Construction in Analysis” (1937), Freud paints the psychiatrist (or analyst) as an 
investigator who searches for the patients’ repression through perfected listening skills that can 
decipher and construct meaning out of jarring and seemingly meaningless fragments of 
dreams/memories: 
He (the patient) gives us fragments of these memories in his dreams invaluable in 
themselves but seriously distorted as a rule (…) It is out of such raw material—if 
we may so describe it—that we have to put together what we are in search of. 
What we are in search of is a picture of the patient’s forgotten years. (378) 
Listening is thus a tool to visualize suffering, much like brain-imaging locates a tumor or lesion. 
Contrary to the great divide between the art and science of mental health care, Freud’s 
observations portray psychoanalysis as closely related to psychiatry. Emmanuel E. Garcia 
compares the relation between the two disciplines “as gross anatomy to histology” (63). Garcia 
deepens his comparison, drawing similarities between psychoanalysis and the microscope: both 
are invented around the same time and understood to grant “access to an entirely new realm of 
observation” (63). This emphasis on the ocular coincides with psychiatry’s desire to “find” (or 
define) patients with a “medical gaze” (Foucault Birth of the Clinic), to see their illness at the 
microscopic, or unconscious, level. Listening is operationalized as an imaging tool, an x-ray of 




psychotherapeutic). Ocular dominance also plays into Foucault’s notion of institutional 
disciplinarity: being built into therapeutic listening, it seeks to inspect, observe, assess, and 
surveil. The psychiatrist comes to the patient, unknowingly, under a medical gaze, a product of 
neoliberal values with epistemological traces uprooted from the Enlightenment. 
The paradoxical role of medicine consists above all in this neutralizing gaze from which 
we cannot disentangle the conditions of its history from the density of discourse. The clinical 
scene of medicine came to exist as part of a wider structure organizing knowledge. This 
perspective prioritizes the ocular over all other senses—and renders the gaze the highest form of 
interpretation—yet the patient is not in control of this interpretation. The gaze, to be clear, holds 
much more than visual representations (what can be seen), it also assumes the ideological 
structure with which one can see/speak of objects and come to “know” them. In The Birth of the 
Clinic, Foucault addresses the genealogical growth of implicit knowledge (the gaze) particular to 
a historical moment that does not know its history as shaping the epistemological essence of 
future generations of medical professionals. The “medical gaze” is a product of institutionalized 
knowledge about the body, stemming from early anatomical studies during the 17th-18th 
centuries. Here, biological reductionism is tied to categorical thought that can order the things 
found in the world. Therefore, the birth of the clinic, as Foucault sees it, comes with a whole 
ideological shift in medical understanding of disease and health, one influenced by Kantian 
practical reason in opposition to the unconscious, unknowing shadow of superstition or 
metaphysics. As Foucault says: “Disease exists in the essential space of categorical thought, 
since this space constitutes it as nature, and yet it always appears rather out of phase in relation 
to that space” (9). The doctor’s gaze was believed to penetrate surface illusions, which modernity 




medical gaze assumes certain purity: things are what they are, essentially, without history. 
Another illusion is that the gaze exists before intervention—seemingly stripped of all discursive 
traces. But yet, there is a history of ideas regarding this supposed “true discourse” (The Birth of 
the Clinic 23)—shaping the medical gaze within the space of the clinic. As Foucault mentions, 
these illusions were necessary for scientific authority: the clinic “gained recognition for its 
observations” (The Birth of the Clinic xi) but not necessarily for its objective truth. This gaze 
granted a certain privilege to medical professionals to “know” more than the average layperson, 
because they could “see” things in themselves, empirically. The patient is thus placed in 
parentheses, observed and spoken for by the medical gaze. 
As Derek Hook explains in “Critical Psychology,” this kind of listening encourages a 
confessional mode of exposition, “like the doctor’s gaze that yields knowledge like prescriptions 
of intervention based on visual analysis” (20). Listening is generally understood as a passive 
form of communication, a way for psychiatrists or psychoanalysts to connect with their patients’ 
lived experiences, but as an instrument, it is more like a purposeful, goal-oriented mechanism 
actively working to see the patients’ brains. 
Narrative is the “raw material” (Freud 378) of psychoanalysis and psychiatry, and the 
only way to work with it is to listen to patients. This “raw material” needs to be excavated, 
examined, and understood from a medical perspective to be listened to. The narrative turn in 
psychiatry, a reconnection with psychoanalytic “talk-based” approaches, relies on coherent 
narratives that align with a psychiatrist’s ability to “understand” what the patient is really 
saying—what is said beneath the surface of speech. Diagnosis doubles for understanding. In this 
case, Mohl states: “Patients are storytellers primarily about their important relationships, who 




understood works twofold: it alludes that the patient is “lost” (misunderstood/alienated), and thus 
it characterizes the psychiatrist as “investigator”, asked to solve an unsolvable aspect of the 
human psyche: the unconscious. Mohl equates being “found” through listening as feeling 
validated, loved, and secure in the world (13). Being “understood” suggests being found (3), and 
feeling at home. Even though therapeutic listening, as a medical technique, predates brain scans 
and the biomedical turn in psychiatry by several decades, it still reflects a desire to identify and 
categorize (to locate illness). Perhaps the only difference between the two modalities is that 
therapeutic listening can “find the patient” with less “objectivity” (Mohl 3)). 
To be “listened to” is an urgent ethical desire: to be recognized and legitimized by 
another (Levinas, Todd). New research regarding mirror neurons demonstrates the neurological 
benefits of listening, finding that being listened to can change one’s brain: 
Now we know that just as there is a neurobiological basis for the power of 
listening to heal, to lift psychological burdens, to re-moralize, and to provide 
emotional regulation to patients who feel out of control in their rage, despair, 
terror, or other feelings. The art of getting the patient to describe and quantify 
their stories of suffering, with the hopes of changing their neurological pathways, 
requires four key skills and abilities: hearing, seeing, comparing, and intuiting. 
(Mohl 4) 
All of these skills help frame the patient's story for better and more accurate diagnosis. Thus, 
when Mohl says he thinks listening helps psychiatrists “find” their patient, he is really talking 
about finding the right diagnosis to define the patient and treat them accordingly. 
For this reason, therapeutic listening is based on an “interview” model, whereby the 




patients’ answers with diagnostic categories and identifiable illnesses. Listening, as a means of 
diagnosis, is instrumentalized, neutralized, and objectified. Yet the only way psychiatrists can 
elicit highly nuanced stories of distress is by cultivating an atmosphere of trust, which 
necessitates “listening beyond hearing” (Mohl 4). This demands empathy as much as it demands 
neutrality, which may foreclose ethical or sincere engagement with the patient’s story in a 
dialogical dynamic. The psychiatrist is posturing superiority by glorifying their ability to “reach” 
their patients, to lower themselves to their level, and “listen.” Despite the goals of “patient- 
centred” care, the psychiatrist still has a mission to alleviate symptoms, and thus needs to focus 
on the “disorder” within the patient's narrative. As McIntyre et al. state: 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that often the patient’s goals for treatment 
(e.g. safe housing) are not the same as the psychiatrist’s (e.g. decrease in 
hallucination). This dichotomy can often be traced to the interview where the 
focus was not sufficiently person-centered but rather was exclusively or largely 
symptom-based. (889) 
Therefore, even while patients are encouraged to express their suffering in their own words, their 
words are pillaged for evidence, and are always inherently framed within a health/illness 
dichotomy. In “Interviewing the Difficult Patient”, McIntyre et al. outline strategies for engaging 
the patient who is “treatment resistant” and unable to “focus” on their recovery. The authors 
describe how patients may be swallowed by their delusions, amplifying the scariness or 
unworldliness of their illness. Their words cannot be trusted. Being labelled as the “difficult 
patients” suggests one is not able to listen to “doctors’ orders” and submit to treatment. The 
“good patient” is one who listens, who does not ask too many questions, who does not talk back. 




may even obscure systemic power dynamics and sanism11 embedded within the encounter by 
indulging fantasies of the “good patient.” Another imbalance is that the patient gives “their 
story”, their “lived experience”, as currency to access care—while the psychiatrist reveals 
nothing of their intentions, motives, experience, etc. They are veiled by professionalism and 
maintain respectful distance. Their story of care is never elicited or made transparent. 
Mohl outlines the “crucial attitudes that enable effective listening” that psychiatrists must 
adopt to conduct good clinical practice. Patients will open up to psychiatrists if they trust them 
and if they feel safe. In Psychiatry Reconsidered, Hugh Middleton writes that trust might be the 
most important aspect of the therapeutic relationship between psychiatrist and patient—yet he 
does not identify listening as one of the ways to establish trust. He never mentions how 
psychiatrists can work to establish trust. Trust is an abstract after-thought that Middleton 
structures his entire argument around—it is a vague ideal, unachievable at best, and presumed at 
worst. 
Mohl is careful to balance the diagnostic approach with an empathetic desire to help the 
patient, since the two must coexist within the psychiatric interview. One labels and defines the 
process of therapeutic listening; it requires sensitivity to the storyteller, integrating a patient 
orientation with a disease focus. The listener’s intent is to discover what is wrong, to put a label 
on it. Simultaneously, the listener is on a journey to discover. However, the clinical encounter is 
plagued with “the lack of time” (especially in emergency rooms, as reduced staff equates to lack 
of time). As a result, “checklist listening” becomes a default solution to “the lack of time”. The 
 
6 Sanism was coined by attorney Morton Birnbaum in the 1960s, when he was representing Edward Stephens, a 
patient with mental illness who claimed he was receiving inadequate treatment. Law professor and mental health 
advocate Michael L. Perlin has perpetuated the term in legal literature, writing extensively about it since the 1980s. 
American activist and educator in the psychiatric survivor movement Judi Chamberlin coined the term mentalism in 
her book On Our Own: Patient Controlled Alternatives to the Mental Health System, published in 1978. Neither 




psychiatrist will listen to fill a checkbox of symptoms and measure what they hear using scales 
“for objectifying the severity of illness to treatment: the ear is tuned only to measurable and 
observable signs of response to therapy and biologic intervention” (Mohl 5). The patient can be 





“Saying does not happen through the content of what speaks, but through the 
nearness and orientation we bring to the other” (Levinas 34). 
The concept of listening otherwise stems from dialogic ethics (Levinas), by which ethics begins 
in dialogue and listening suspends our desire to know the Other. This form of listening respects 
the Other’s absolute otherness and alterity without trying to contain, define or circumscribe it to 
a fixed interpretation. In the framework of dialogic ethics of listening otherwise, listening is an 
epistemology comfortable with discomfort: it remains “open-ended”, unfinished, unsure of what 
it knows. This is an epistemology that undoes itself, urges us to let go of understanding, to empty 
our vocabulary of hierarchy, and to let silence (or madness) speak. Listening is a mode of 
relationality that creates the possibility of learning from the Other instead of imposing meaning 
onto them in a symbolically violent manner. The ethical possibility of listening respects the 
Other’s alterity and attends to it gently: ethics always involves an engagement with the other’s 
otherness, such that one’s view of the Other will inevitably be partial and incomplete, and in this 
sense, the Other will inevitably be radically and utterly unknown because otherness resides 
beyond one’s thought (49). 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas espouses the notion that the history of European 




reduced to the same, in the sense of intending to subsume the other into the sphere of absolute 
knowledge. Respecting the Other’s unknowable difference is at the heart of Levinas’ ethics, and 
he proposes listening otherwise as the most viable way to attend to this difference. Even if we are 
empathetic and deeply moved by someone’s speech, it does not mean we are listening fully to 
the difference that marks their experience as distinct from our own. We always want to 
understand, to swallow the Other in our words, our experiences, our memories—we make 
meaning in this exchange. We listen to relate the information back to ourselves. Often, we do not 
realize the distinct boundary between our subjectivities—how we cannot ever know the Other; 
no matter how hard or how much we listen. The point is to let go of understanding, to welcome 
all that cannot be known, to hold the richness of absence. Levinas notes how listening is 
threatening to the ego; it plunges the ego in uncertainty. Thus, ethics for Levinas requires a 
responsibility towards the Other that is asymmetrical subornation. Turning towards the Other is 
an act of renunciation where we give up our attachment to what is familiar and understood. 
Reading Levinas, Gemma Corradi Fiumara in The Other Side of Language: A Philosophy of 
Listening describes listening as a risky undertaking: “Any new attitude must take on the 
semblance of a loss of the previous mode of seeing things and evaluating them” (152). To listen, 
one must let go. 
In this sense, listening becomes a gesture towards, a gesture that never arrives at finite 
meaning. Levinas described this radicality of the Other as “a horizon”: we can only perceive its 
distance and never reach it. Building upon dialogic ethics and Levinas’s work, Lispeth Lipari 
describes listening as a voice that is always speaking, even if we cannot hear it (46). How we 
listen says more than what we might think, and it should be the foundation of all communicative 




otherness that is itself a voice of awareness of receiving and obedience, the voice is always 
speaking” (135). She affirms the role of vulnerability in supporting the awareness of the radical 
alterity of the Other. Listening otherwise refers to the acknowledgement and acceptance of 
vulnerability of both self and other. Not only are we called forward to attend to the suffering of 
others, but we must also attend to our own suffering. Vulnerability counters the medical 
authority and rational logic within diagnostic listening practices maintained by psychiatry. 
Vulnerability in psychiatry would require a renunciation of power and a dialogic process of 
intersubjectivity and inner listening. 
Thus, listening otherwise creates space for what might seem inarticulable. Inhabiting a 
symbolic space through listening can heal distress that cannot speak, the wound of not being 
heard or being forgotten. In Learning from the Other, Sharon Todd argues for the importance of 
creating a context for listening, where attentiveness is a response to something more than speech. 
Listening thus becomes a place in process, where undisclosed secrets, thought dead and gone, are 
revealed in other ways, beyond words, re-symbolized and read anew. Even as language fails, 
listening salvages the communicative relationship. This openness and uncertainty is difficult 
work, not a protocol or instrument, but an art form that takes years of practice as well as failure. 
As Todd stresses, listening to “that which is not easy” (27) and which has the potential of 
disrupting a sense of self requires courage and the ability to risk everything that keeps us feeling 
certain and sure of what we know. 
One of the greatest aspects of listening otherwise is its emphasis on compassion before 
understanding. Empathy and compassion often get tangled and used interchangeably. Empathy, 
as Todd has argued, is not always useful for ethics: it does not require responsibility and can 




also vastly different from understanding: while many of us think that we must understand in 
order to feel compassion, the engagement with alterity instructs that we cannot understand if we 
cannot first let go of wanting to know the other in a categorical way. Understanding means to 
throw away your knowledge and know that you cannot put yourself in the place of the Other. 
Attending to patients in this way allows the psychiatrist to hold space for what they 
cannot know, what cannot be articulated or understood in a biomedical sense. How can a 
physician who is trained to diagnose, to find a biological root of illness, be able to listen in a way 
that does not reduce the person to an illness or a checklist of symptoms? Listening otherwise 
seems incompatible with the goals of biomedical care, or even psychotherapy: however, I think 
that it provides a useful exercise for psychiatry to think through how it prepares residents to 
become qualified listeners to experience. According to Rimondi, the likelihood of being listened 
to by a psychiatrist is pretty slim: “The main focus of the training of psychiatrists is on diagnosis 
and treatment based on the traditional doctor-centered approach to the psychiatric interview” 
(161). Their study confirms that the “emotional intelligence” of psychiatry is essential for proper 
diagnosis and treatment. They claim that active-listening skills with “emotion focusing skills 
should be a major learning target in psychiatry” (162). Although their study remains directional, 
they do outline two solution-focused approaches to listening (active/passive). They discuss 
adopting a patient-centered approach to listening beyond the goal of diagnosis. This approach 
requires “psychiatrists to dedicate special attention to focused patient-centered interviewing in 
terms of active listening skills which are underused by psychiatry trainees” (168). They also 
observed that doctors’ communication styles are formed during their undergraduate training and 




education and contributes to a mainly doctor-centered approach. Medical education is changing 
and needs to center madness and listening otherwise. 
Centering madness as speech worthy of attention and giving psychiatric survivors a 
platform to speak does not mean that anyone is listening, fighting for their rights to fair and 
ethical treatment. Framing survivor “stories” in “recovery narratives”, PR campaigns, and patient 
engagement enterprises may serve to assuage guilt for centuries of abuse and make those in 
decision-making/system-level positions comfortable with their gestures of inclusion. These 
voices are sprinkled into reports, copied and pasted, but they are not attended to, no one engages 
with the affect within the chosen quotes. Although “guilt”, as Sharon Todd suggests, may 
provide a starting-point for ethical engagement with difficult or traumatic knowledge (56), to be 
done effectively it requires taking responsibility and attending to one’s limitations and/or failings 
instead of trying to defend against them. Psychology and psychiatry as methodology have yet to 
absorb the critical dimensions of Foucault’s work: they have neither engaged madness as an idea 
(with a long political history), nor have they understood the political economy and vested 








(…) remembering every note, although her sense of time seemed to have suffered. 
Listening to her, one experiences a deep uneasiness as having avoided an urgent 
responsibility, like someone walking at night along the banks steam, catches a 
glimpse in the water of a white face or a moving limb and turns quickly away, 
refusing to help or to search for help. We all see the faces in the water. (…) We 
smother our memory of them, even our belief in their reality, and become calm 
people of the world; we can neither forget nor help them. Sometimes by trick of 
circumstance or dream or a hostile neighborhood of light we see our own face. 
(Frame 131) 
 
Janet Frame wrote long before the language of human rights and advocacy for psychiatric 
survivors. Moved by the deep uneasiness of her experiences in the ward, her voice challenges 
much of the violent and unethical practices performed in the name of care within the psychiatric 
paradigm. She does so with great spirit and inventiveness, by listening to her own madness speak 
through sonic metaphor. The above passage signals how we might all on the surface empathize 
with those who are incarcerated in psychiatric wards, but we take little responsibility when it 
comes to enacting social change to strengthen the quality of their lives. We do little to listen 
meaningfully to their grievances. We all see the faces in the water but do nothing until we see 
our face reflected. This forecloses any ethical possibility to meaningfully listen to or attend to the 




our desire to “see ourselves” in our surroundings diminishes our ability to listen otherwise and 
engage with difference. 
In this chapter, I focus on Frame’s 1961 novel Faces in the Water, which re-members her 
twelve-year stay in the New Zealand asylums (1945-1957) where she received electroshock 
therapy against her consent, as forced treatment. I also explore the soundscapes of the asylum 
and think about listening as medical and moral surveillance. I begin with an exploration of the 
historical and political context surrounding Frame’s writing through her autobiographical trilogy 
An Angel at my Table, then I move on to a brief synopsis of the novel Faces in the Water 
towards a deeper textual analysis of the soundscapes in the text that embody listening otherwise 
and madness as a new kind of music. Music in asylums might have been used as therapy or 
medicine for inmates (MacKinnon 92), but what Frame describes in her novel is a subversive 
force of reclaiming one’s voice through music that bends the rules in light of surviving ECT’s 
memory erasure. 
Frame's autobiography provides insight into her fascination with music and soundscapes, 
which extend beyond Faces in the Water and reverberate throughout her life writing. Song is her 
introduction to poetry, and symphonic/orchestral music is a transcendental mechanism for her to 
experience and understand her inner emotions in a new way (to flow with her inner life, instead 
of trying to control it with strictly goal-oriented voices). It is also a way for her to relax outside 
of the mundane anxieties of Teachers College, a place that did not feed her thirst for imagination 
and poetic conjecture. I will explore the complex relationship between Frame’s development of 
“voice” and agency, her misdiagnosis of schizophrenia and how her creative process of listening 
and writing leads towards the compassionate integration of madness. I call this process, in 
Frame’s case as in the women who survived ECT’s memory erasure and chose to represent it 




being a site of suffering and emptiness to being a site full of creative and radical potential for 
transformation. She speaks from erasure to transform the soundscape of the ward as one of 
hopeless punishment to one of meaningful resistance. 
Frame’s writing is political and her medium of disruption is sonic. Her voice is powerful 
because it exposes the everyday life of psychiatric inmates/survivors in a compassionate tone at a 
time when their experiences were largely silenced and under-represented. Dolly MacKinnon, an 
Australian historian and sound studies expert, has written about the acoustemology and 
soundscapes of asylums often omitted from mainstream literature and scholarly writing on 
madness (78). Uncannily, Faces in the Water was published the same year as Michel Foucault’s 
concept of madness cannot speak at the beginning of deinstitutionalization and the psychiatric 
survivor movement, which in many ways embodies that ethos. What is fascinating about 
MacKinnon’s archival research is that asylums were not silent at all, but rather, they were 
clamouring with distress that went unrecognized: “while asylums silenced the mad, asylums 
from their inception until the 1950s with the introduction of psychotropic drugs, were anything 
but silent spaces (79)”. Sound was used to define and differentiate between those thought to be 
sane and those seen and heard as insane (MacKinnon 79). Although Frame did not publicly 
identify as a “psychiatric survivor” per se, she did view her writing as political. Her writing, and 
particularly its phenomenological descriptions of sound, transmits what the asylum felt like and 
sounded like from the inside, but it also resounds with psychiatric survivors’ voices (her own and 
those around her) and their need to be heard compassionately and legitimately within society. 
Faces in the Water symbolizes psychiatric patients' lives under erasure, with their muted voices, 
distorted faces, and more profoundly, the social imperative to attend to their distress outside of 




of quieting people” (8). Frame’s experience of mental health issues was at a time when there was 
no such thing as “recovery” or “wellness” for someone with a psychiatric label. As she puts it, 
there were “no voluntary admissions; we were all insane under the Mental Defectives Act, 1928” 
(36). As I discussed earlier, during the asylum era, people who were diagnosed with a psychiatric 
disorder (or in some cases, “defect”) were consequently stripped of their civic voice, freedoms 
and/or rights. They were not allowed to have their own bank accounts, have jobs or participate in 
society (Frame 36). Asylums, much like the psychiatric wards of today, functioned as prisons for 
the unwanted, the poor and unproductive members of society, who were seen as a diseased 
population beyond hope (MacKinnon 78). To relieve the burden they were to their families, 
state-run asylums were set up to be places of confinement, structure, and order, in which for 
them to spend the rest of their days, safely tucked away from view. The rationale was to lock the 
unwanted away to preserve moral hygiene. When Frame highlights the soundscapes of the ward 
in her writing she is amplifying the voices of patients who have been erased and silenced from 
public discourse. MacKinnon traces the archival soundscapes of asylums during the mid-20th 
century, but the archives are mainly focused on the staff and institutional records, not the 
patients: “Medical records comprise the voices of the asylum staff (...) the sonic flurries, fluidity, 
fury and volubility of the asylum soundscape when committed to paper are made at once both 
static and silent” (78). Frame’s writing amplifies the voices that had been muted behind asylum 
walls: as she reclaims erasure as a voice that challenges medical labels and authorities, it 
becomes clear that this is a voice that talks back to psychiatry in a way that points to how 
psychiatry should listen to patients. Beyond diagnosis, this form of listening holds space for the 




Janet Frame’s Life Writing, Autobiographical Fiction of ECT: How to Re-member the Self under 
Erasure. 
 
Both Frame’s life writing and creative process entail a profound inner listening, as if to excavate 
the core of selfhood and allow it to speak for itself, without the memory of others’ voices to 
interrupt its flow. But at the same time, Frame’s life writing is entrenched with ancestry and 
attempts to channel those voices through her own. Her process was to listen as if the sea had 
stopped. Frame, as she describes in her autobiography, An Angel at my Table, always struggled 
with feelings of being at home within herself and within the world (11). This kind of listening 
happens at a limit, when everything we take for granted, like the ebbing and flowing of the ocean 
and the earth’s rotation around the sun, can no longer be counted on. We are asked to listen in a 
completely new way, in a way that cannot be grasped with our current ways of relating in the 
world. 
For Frame, life writing was a form of anchoring the self, so that she could one day say: 
“that’s me” with confidence and pride (An Angel at my Table 320). To locate oneself in 
space/time through writing does not guarantee a purely independent agency, a self-made 
selfhood owned and defined entirely by us alone, a self that does not depend on how others 
interpellate or interpret it. In fact, Frame discovered that the more she wrote, the more she had to 
risk relating to others. One of the major concerns and themes that Frame illustrates through her 
fictional and autobiographical work is the interplay between time and memory and one’s ability 
to speak for oneself as one is able to listen to the dead. 
Frame was keen on autobiographical fiction; her writing, although highly imaginative and 
abstract to many readers, is always rooted in her life. Some literary critics considered her writing 




Frame, autobiographical life is inseparable from a fiction writer’s process: “Reality is the ore of 
polished fiction” (An Angel at my Table 320). Autobiography is found-fiction for Frame: “I look 
at everything from the point of view of fiction and so it wasn’t a chance to be writing an 
autobiography except that it was based on fact” (An Angel at my Table 320). As a result, Frame 
has often been misunderstood by literary critics of her generation, in the 1950, 1960s and today. 
Literary critics and psychiatrists alike have prodded and pathologized her writing to find signs of 
madness, or, more harshly, incurable mental disability (Oettli-van Delden). Frame was criticized 
for the “logic” or plausibility of her novel Faces in the Water: How could Istina Mavet, as 
protagonist, represent her testimony so eloquently and imaginatively if her brain had been 
damaged in the asylum? How could she write an autobiography (which is what she proclaims in 
Chapter 1) if she cannot remember her life? If autobiographical fiction seems to be a 
contradiction, then writing an autobiographical fictional text about one’s experience of memory 
erasure is near impossible. This is the limit-case. In a sense, literary critics were asserting 
madness cannot speak by devaluing how Frame spoke and transformed her life through fiction. 
What the critics overlook is that both Frame and her protagonist Istina are writing about 
the experience of madness in a society that punished difference. Like many literary critics of the 
time, authors who suffered from mental breakdowns and were institutionalized were forever 
marked with literary pathologies. They became “mad writers”, and their texts were pillaged for 
proof of their insanity (Oettli-van Delden). They could never escape the stigma of being labelled 
psychotic, and their literary work would be assessed much like their minds were assessed by 
psychiatrists, on trial for symptoms. An extreme example of this phenomenon is found in An 
Angel at my Table. Frame recounts being saved from leucotomy after her novel The Lagoon won 




writing and be normal: “Everyone felt that it was better for me to be ‘normal’; and not have 
fancy intellectual notions about being a writer, that it was better for me to be out of hospital 
working an ordinary occupation” (264). In the 1930s and 1940s, it was impossible for someone 
like Frame to exist without being considered “abnormal”: being poor and a woman was a major 
contradiction with being very well-educated, not to mention her aspirations of being an 
intellectual poet and novelist. The psychiatric label prevented her from being a writer in the eyes 
of the medical staff that monitored her every move. Even after she escaped the hospital due to 
winning the literary award and was given a place to live and to write with Frank Sargeson, 
routine visits to the Doctor dampened her literary triumph. She routinely had to prove her sanity 
and explain that she was not the protagonist in the novel. The psychiatric label “schizophrenic” 
followed her into literary reviews and in her everyday encounters with people, from Doctor visits 
to grocery stores. Frame had to demonstrate the absence of scars on her temples for the Doctor to 
believe that her novel was fiction. She found the whole process to be dehumanizing and 
invalidating of her talent: 
Later, when the book was published, I was alarmed to find that it was believed to 
be autobiographical, with the characters actual members of my family, and myself 
the character Daphne upon whom the brain operation was performed. Confronted 
by a doctor who had read the book, I was obliged to demonstrate to him the 
absence of scars on my temples. Not every aspiring writer has such a terrifying 
but convincing method of displaying to other ‘proof’ that she has been writing 
fiction. Daphne resembled me in many ways except in her frailty and absorption 
in fantasy to the exclusion of ‘reality’: I have always been strong and practical, 




Frame is right: most writers do not have to prove their sanity after publishing a novel about a 
character who received psychiatric treatment. There was an assumption that because Frame had 
based the character on her experiences within the asylum, that the novel had to be “true”. This is 
the first mistake that readers/critics tend to make in assessing works of autobiographical fiction. 
The second is the assumption that just because a piece of fiction resembles someone's life, it 
therefore means it is someone's life. This misreading relates to an ongoing theme of not being 
believed, compounded by memory erasure, that Frame expresses in Faces in the Water and her 
memoir An Angel at my Table. Frame’s writing seeks to make visible what has been hidden from 
history, and in that process she is simultaneously discredited while being credited. These 
contradictions serve to further demonstrate the tensions of representation and voice under the 
spectre of madness cannot speak and psychiatric pathologies. Searching for proof of insanity in 
her novel is the sign that her words are not trusted to be intentional art, but merely confessional 
accidents. 
Another example of this literary “proof” of psychiatric diagnosis is found in Sounds from 
the Bell Jar: Ten Psychotic Authors, a text co-authored by literary critics and psychiatrists, which 
declares: “Psychotics often describe themselves as being cut off from the rest of the world as 
though they were mere spectators of life” (Claridge et al. 200). They are referring to Sylvia 
 
Plath’s introverted identity as a writer—her breakdown and eventual suicide. Using a diagnostic 
approach, literary criticism becomes a way to legitimize Plath’s insanity, to justify or explain 
away her suicide, and the author’s pathologization stands as the central lens for interpreting her 
work. Reductively framing Plath as “psychotic” (Clayridge et al. 200) locks her into abnormality, 
also trapping her writing within psychiatric discourse. The psychiatric pigeonholing of her 




embedded in the text, namely anger and rage. The psychiatric gaze forgets the gendered 
socioeconomic context that Plath playfully critiques in The Bell Jar. The “psychotic author” 
(Clayridge et al. 27) stands in as a universal reading, undercutting articulations of anger that 
circulate within the novel. It compromises her literary agency and subjectivity, because 
“psychotics” cannot get angry. They are always/already operating under the spectre of unreason. 
Consequently, such labels “cut her off” from the literary canon and turn her into a strange, unruly 
object to be fetishized and ‘othered’ by psychiatric language. She becomes the ‘madwoman in 
the attic’ of literature. 
 
The literary disciplining of madness, an attempt to simplify complex existential problems 
with psychological/psychiatric discourse, is rooted in an anxiety of knowledge that cannot be 
understood or easily contained within hegemonic knowledge-production. Authors like Frame and 
Plath were trying to confront the social scripts that devalued their voices and stand up to the 
implicit ways patriarchal psychiatry is sustained in never-ending and dangerously covert systems 
of knowledge-production. Although the madwoman metaphor does little to subvert dichotomous 
or essentialist thinking, and that utopian visions of madness can be insulting to people with lived 
experience, most of these representations fail to locate or define women’s anger beyond a 
romanticized madness. As Foucault emphasizes in the Birth of the Clinic, we need to explore 
how the modern subject has been shaped through the cultural authority of the psy-complex. 
Frame writes from her embodied experience within madness, and she writes using madness as a 
method to resist the hegemonic social categories that constrained her identity, punished her 
behaviour and pathologized her imagination. 
Freeing Frame’s words from the literary criticism that silenced and pathologized their 




metaphors that seem trapped in the asylum. Can we overcome the quarrel of authenticity? 
Language is a site of political struggle. The “personal is political”12 highlights how one’s lived 
experience of oppression is part of a larger political landscape governed through discursive 
practices. Being able to name one’s oppression is part of the fight for liberation, yet language is 
always/already an instrument of patriarchal, capitalist white supremacy which makes it difficult 
to speak out in any authentic way by default. Marginalized groups and populations utilized 
“lived experience” as a method for articulating their experience of structural violence and 
discrimination within the public/private sphere, and to gain authenticity. Many “consciousness 
raising” groups during the late 1960s-1970s would encourage people to express their lived 
experience of oppression in order to mobilize strategies of critique and social change. As bell 
hooks, a prominent feminist theorist/ educator, states: lived experience offers people who have 
been systemically silenced and opportunity to “talk back” and hopefully be heard. hooks situates 
the language of lived experience as a site of struggle—how naming one’s pain can help 
transform it, and how the Black feminist community needs to first become subjects and 
legitimize their subjectivity through language: “the act of becoming a subject is yet another way 
to speak the process of recovery” (32). Another example of this kind of strategy is echoed in the 
 
7 The personal is political was first publically coined by feminist, Carol Hanisch, in 1969. It makes the connection 
between subjective experience of oppression and systems of power. Hanisch noted that "political" refers to any 
power relationships, not just those of government or elected officials. In 2006, Hanisch wrote about how the essay's 
original form came out of her experience of working in male-dominated civil rights, anti-Vietnam War and left 
political groups. Lip service was given to women's equality, but beyond narrow economic equality, other women's 
issues were often dismissed. Hanisch was particularly concerned about the persistence of the idea that women's 
situation was women's own fault, and perhaps "all in their heads." 
Many consciousness-raising groups during the late 1960s-1970s encouraged people to express their lived experience 
of oppression in order to mobilize strategies of critique and social change. As bell hooks, a prominent feminist 
theorist/ educator, states: lived experience offers people who have been systemically silenced and opportunity to 
“talk back” (hooks 24). hooks situates the language of lived experience as a site of struggle—how naming one’s pain 
can help transform it, and how the black feminist community needs to first become subjects and legitimize their 
subjectivity through language: “the act of becoming a subject is yet another way to speak the process of recovery” 




“personal is political”, coined by Carol Hanish and popularized by feminist poet, Audre Lorde. 
Lorde locates Queer Black women’s experience within the mainstream white-middle class 
feminist movement to redress inherent inequity and racism within these so-called “safe spaces” 
(Lorde 7). Merging the “personal” with the “political” bridges gaps between private/public 
strategies for empowerment—it makes political work relevant and meaningful in people’s 
everyday lives. Ultimately, it illuminates how one’s experience of violence is not an isolated 
matter—it exists within a larger hegemonic political structure: “when we convert our experience 
into a theory, we enlarge its scope and include the experience shared by others similarly placed” 
(Kapoor 81). Valuing autobiographical “lived experience” as an authentic expression of 
knowledge permits intersectional perspectives of oppression and community-building, thus 
furthering equitable approaches for social justice work. Overall, subjectivity within knowledge- 
production acknowledges how knowledge is never neutral, but is rather a complex web of power 
relations and vested systemic interests. Frame wrote about psychiatry using its language while at 
once inventing her own. Naming her pain happens in her transformation, exaggeration and 
manipulation of it through these fictional characters that were based on the people she knew 
from the asylum. She becomes a subject through this ventriloquist-like manner of speaking, at a 
slant, in the words of others. 
Finding our voice in the voices of others is part of what makes the reader/writer 
relationship so powerful and transformative. Daphne Marlatt in “Self-Representation and 
Fictionalysis” talks about the production of selfhood through the “mythical mechanisms” 
(Marlatt 1) that produce human being always/already as abled bodied, wealthy, men—and so, 
women are by default “non-man” (and of course nothing exists for those who lives outside of 




women must seek the lost and obscure texts of the lives of forgotten women, women whose 
utterances “would never be valued by literary standards” (Marlatt 1). She urges for women 
writers to reclaim their realities and truth because in many ways, especially through “mythical 
mechanisms” women’s lives have been so fictionalized. As such, Marlatt is not interested in 
inventing as much as she is in the details of her life. She finds the sublime in the everyday. Even 
though Marlatt’s essay was published long after Frame’s novels, it shares a similar sentiment of 
exposing the beauty of unlikely settings in our lives. 
Autobiographical fiction writing serves as a sounding board for one’s past that will not 
pass. It can be thought of as an exercise in letting go and transforming or exorcising painful life 
events. “Sounding out” one’s life under memory erasure, re-membering experience between the 
valence of fiction and history becomes Frame’s act of resistance. In Storying Sadness, Suzanne 
England speaks to the re-membering effect of autobiographical fiction, writing, “It is in speaking 
the unspeakable anguish of depression that one begins to recompose the narrative, to trace the 
threads of the story from the past to the present and to find a way to make new sense out of old 
material. The imagery of everyday life provides the space for reflection and transcendence” 
(England et al. 93). Similarly, bell hooks in Talking Back talks about how telling her story was 
linked to wanting to “kill the self without having to die” (155). hooks does not want to forget the 
past, “but to break its hold” (155). This is the essence of re-membering as a responsibility 
towards the past that haunts us and that we must transform through creative practice. As Derrida 
says, “We must transform/transgress our social historical mourning—re-visit, re-member, re- 
conceptualize and represent knowledge from the past” (Derrida, The Work of Mourning 66). 
Autobiographical re-membering in Janet Frame’s life writing and fiction creates a space for 




Frame’s work straddles the autobiographical and the fictional in a way that allows 
madness to speak. She captures what being alive was like for someone whose experiential 
analysis was undervalued and whose voice was repressed. Fiction based on her life was the best 
mechanism for her to reimagine a world in which her life could have meaning. Frame reclaimed 
what had been stolen through her pathologization. Her experience was devalued to the point 
where she needed to fictionalize it to make it “real”. As Marlatt describes: 
I think most women’s lives have been so fictionalized that to present life as a 
reality is a strange thing. It’s as strange as fiction. It’s as new as fiction. I’m not 
interested in inventing because what actually happened is so huge…what’s the 
necessity of inventing? Whatever it is that writing gets at; it’s precisely that 
remarkable quality of being alive at this point in time. I don’t see anyway of 
honoring that quality except by writing directly about our own life. (Marlatt 192) 
The risk of sharing her truth, even in fiction, was in not being believed. Even if the act of writing 
was an act of defiance and reclamation, Frame put herself at risk of being shamed and devalued. 
Literary critics’ pathologization of Frame’s writing can be seen as a form of gaslighting 
because they invalidate her experience of suffering as “attention-seeking” (Oettli van-Delden 
34). The literary backlash against Frame’s life writing, attempting to unearth inaccuracies and 
flaws in her moral character, are precisely the reasons why Frame stayed away from writing 
about her experiences as autobiography. She kept her life in the realm of fiction, because, as she 
puts it, the truth was far too unbelievable for readers to handle; it had to be softened through the 
craft of fiction. Thus, autobiographical fiction recovers narratives that are too painful to be told 





Frame does not symbolize madness per se; she symbolizes what it felt like to be unwell 
and what it felt like to be confused by those feelings. Her lush and somewhat psychedelic 
imagery resists the generalizations of psychiatry that name depression as a series of clinical 
symptoms. Her descriptions of the experience of “feeling bad” are relatable on a basic human 
level: it is hard to be alive in a world that thrives on exploitation. It is hard to be alive in a world 
where productivity is synonymous with meaningless repetitive labour, where sanity and 
wellbeing are incoherent concepts, and where people are expected to be happy at the expense of 
knowing how to handle sadness or distress. 
Frame’s project seeks to frame madness as a source of subversive brilliance, so bright 
with darkness it casts an illuminating shadow. After her release from Seacliff, Frame was urged 
by her psychiatrist to write about her experiences in the asylum, the lost years. He suggested 
writing as a recovery exercise because she could not live without writing; it was her lifeblood 
and the only way she could situate herself in the world. 
Despite the limits of autobiography as verifiable evidence of the “real” or the pure 
fictiveness of “fiction”, Frame’s writing has been reduced to genres and interpretative 
frameworks that do not honour its inventive liminality, hybridity, cultural significance and 
ethical gestures for reshaping how mad people are understood by society. Literary critics have 
diagnosed Frame through their textual analysis instead of welcoming her voice, instead of 
listening to the sonic textures and the weighted silences she conjures in vivid environments 
where poetic language inhabits prose, as a madness that speaks. Her fiction has been taken for 
autobiography and her autobiography taken for fiction, which is not too surprising, given the 
fluidity of the two genres. The confusion also points to questions of what constitutes 




anxious over hybrid or experimental forms of writing at the time of Frame’s writing career? The 
critics who gave her bad reviews for not adhering to the codes of genre, diminishing her craft, 
were calling upon her lived experience within mental institutions and with ECT to devalue the 
truth-effect or believability of her prose. For these critics, such as Williams, her use of the 
subjective voice is labelled “lazy” fiction, and she is disregarded as a bildungsroman narcissist 
(Williams 1990), someone who cannot make believe and deliver artful falsehood through pure 
imagination. 
Until “memoir/life writing” and “creative-non-fiction” became genres that one could 
study in creative writing programs, autobiography was seen by many fiction writers as a means 
of bypassing the need for imagination (Hemley 3). Real life was to be kept away from fiction, as 
Leigh Gilore explains: “Autobiography’s impediments to such working through consist of its 
almost legalistic definition of truth-telling, its anxiety about invention, and its preference for the 
literal and verifiable, even in the presence of some ambivalence about those criteria” 
(Autobiographics 129). At the heart of misattributions of Frame’s writing, beyond the quarrel for 
aesthetic authenticity and purity, is the search for the meaning of her madness, the root cause and 
proof that it is real and exists. Her life of poverty, humiliation, grief and trauma not only 
informed her creative process, but enabled her to seek refuge in imaginative worlds that she 
rendered beautifully through malleable narrative structures. Literary critics would use words like 
“schizophrenic” or “OCD” to describe her writing in their close readings, and then legitimize the 
use of such language by tying it to her lived experience of being institutionalized as a mental 
patient, conflating her literary devices and innovations as symptoms of mental illness. Like many 
fiction writers, Frame weaves experiences that belong to her and others into a complex 




To say that Faces in the Water, or any of Frame’s novels, are autobiographical would not 
be completely true, but neither could one claim them to be pure fiction. There is no such thing as 
pure fiction; there are always moments of one’s life and memory that serve as clay to be molded 
for a new meaning. 
 
Janet Frame’s Life: An Angel at my Table 
 
 
It is impossible to understand Janet Frame without understanding her socioeconomic context. 
She was born in 1924 to a poor family in New Zealand. They lived in several small towns in the 
south of South Island before settling permanently in Oamaru in 1930. Constantly moving, never 
dwelling in one location for longer than a year, gave Frame the feeling of being a “migratory 
bird” (Towards Another Summer 6), existing in many places at once without ever feeling at- 
home (An Angel at my Table 233). “Home” is a central metaphor in a lot of Frame’s writing. Not 
having a secure and stable home led to Frame’s feelings of insecurity and constant worry about 
the future. Her Oamaru world resonated with the widespread Puritanism that was typical of New 
Zealand in the 1930s (Tinkler 90). 
Frame recounts the humiliation of being poor, the hunger and decaying teeth as a way to 
share her story, from her own perspective, outside of her psychiatric history. She writes of 
feeling like a social outcast, afraid of interactions with others and especially authority figures. 
She also talks of her refuge inside books and the world of her imagination. Yet, the shame of 
poverty is something she never put to rest and arguably was a contributing factor to her twelve 
years of moving in and out of mental institutions. Frame was not able to cope with the stress of 




Frame’s personality and interests did not fit into her socioeconomic class and the limited 
life prospects it offered. She wanted a life of knowledge and art, which felt like something she 
did not deserve, and it proved to be a struggle for her to eventually stand tall as an artist who 
solely lives off their craft. Angel at my Table can be considered a defense of her imaginative 
process, interwoven with the life experiences that grounded much of her fictional work. Long 
before there was language to describe the social determinants of health13, or the systemic 
circumstances that profoundly affect one’s wellbeing, Janet Frame’s shy and nervous behavior 
was diagnosed as schizophrenia. This misdiagnosis was repealed twelve years after she had been 
subjected to over 200 electroshock treatments without consent. Today she would be considered a 
textbook example of how poverty and early-childhood trauma can negatively impact the 
development of an integrated selfhood. At the pinnacle of her distress in the 1940s, there were no 
conceptual frameworks to understand how her distress was more complex than brain chemistry, 
but rather was interwoven with events far beyond biology or behaviour. According to 
Diderchesen’s model of health inequity, “social position” is found to be the central mechanism in 
determining one’s health and wellbeing, and this position is mainly composed of “social 
contexts”, “social stratification” and “differential consequences” (WHO 5). These structural 
dynamics assign individuals to different class positions within society, and whether they have 
mobility to rise above their current position will greatly depend on State intervention (subsidies 






8 The social determinants of health (SDH) are the social and economic factors that influence people's health. These 
are apparent in the living and working conditions that people experience every day. The SDH influence health in 
many positive and negative ways. Extreme differences in income and wealth, for example, have negative health 
consequences for those who are living in poverty and these effects are magnified when these people are congregated 




a neoliberal trope; it engages the magical thinking of pulling oneself up by the bootstraps and 
forgets how context often is out of one’s control or choice. 
Poverty and the tragic drownings of her sisters, Myrtle and Isabel, had a devastating and 
traumatic impact on her early life. Frame and her entire family were ostracized politically and 
economically; they were judged as being a “bad family” after the drownings of her sisters. 
Frame’s cosmology as an “inward sun” appeared rooted in worlds other than her peers’, as she 
was introspective and illuminated despite being clad in ill-fitting clothes and being ridiculed for 
having wild orange hair (An Angel at my Table 73). The prospects of fitting in were scarce for 
the Frames, even if the social and cultural pressures to do so were high. Frame had a “secret 
desire to be a poet” (An Angel at my Table 214) despite being poor and discouraged from the 
luxury of daydreaming (107), confined to being “a good girl, who was no trouble at all” (107). 
She started to publish in small journals during her adolescence which bolstered her confidence 
(An Angel at my Table 214). 
Frame’s mother’s poetic sensibilities were a saving grace. Despite not being well- 
equipped to deal with the labour of everyday life, her mother did instill a sense of poetic 
imagination in her children, and she was an important influence for Frame’s future as a 
writer/poet. Her mother taught her to look at the ordinary world with transcendental wonder, to 
see the sublime in the everyday, and would often show her how poetry was everywhere. Poetry 
was the link between the world of the living and the world of myth and spirit; it could help 
conjure relics of the past in the present as a form of hauntology. Much like the ancient poets who 
acted as society’s oral archive of history, Frame’s mother provided genealogies that transcended 
the divides of fact/fiction. She conjured the family’s mythical origins through her engagement 




amount of mythology and processes that have much less to do with linear time than with the 
mysterious linkages of the hauntological. As Frame recounts: 
The Ancestors—who were they, the myth and the reality. The Frames had a 
passion for making things. (…) Mother appeared to be rarely in the present-tense, 
or like an unreal person with her real self, washed away. Perhaps we were jealous 
of the space that another world and another time occupied in our mother’s life; 
and although, perhaps fearing immersion in this foreign world, we struggled to 
escape, we were haunted by her tales of the Guards, the Herberleys, Diffenbach, 
shipwrecks in the Sounds, life in Waikawa Road and down the Maori pa, family 
life at the Godfreys, remembered as paradisal. (5) 
Frame’s mother showed her how to occupy more than one embodiment of time/space at once, to 
vacillate in realms of past-present reverie toward imaginative futures. Frame’s passion for 
making things came from her mother. This is a skill that Frame honed in her writing, with her 
narratives skipping through time/space as a form of poetic re-membering. The point of this form 
of re-membering is not a search for accuracy, but a sense of meaning and connectedness to the 
invisible bonds of ancestry and the work of others that has led to where one is currently situated. 
It is important to consider the contrast between the luxury of her mother’s ability to live 
in dreams and memory with Frame’s “poverty of memory” and its erasure. In An Angel at my 
Table, after winning the Hubert Church Award and being released from Seacliff, Frame 
describes her memory as being “shredded”, “weakened” and “permanently destroyed” (266). 
These words followed Frame throughout her writing career; she continued to feel as if she had 
not deserved to be a writer due to her stay in the asylum and its impact on her brain. Unlike her 




life, for trying to escape the home. Although her writing “saved” her life (An Angel at my Table 
264), it was difficult to fully recover from the intergenerational trauma that seemed to be 
saturated in her voice, as well as the psychiatric legacy that her writing was immersed in. 
Charles E. Scott explains in the Time of Memory how “the poets relate the past and its 
figures, but in this seemingly pragmatic activity, they establish both a definitive past and a 
meaningful present in which the deathless live. They tell people who they are and where they 
came from by reference to bygone days and to an eternal present that is not linear in its 
disclosure” (121). Frame’s mother was able to see things that no one else could see; she could 
see the past in a remarkable ageless present. Never for a moment does the journey back through 
time make us leave our contemporary realities: 
When Mother talked of the present, however, bringing her sense of wondrous 
contemplation to the ordinary world we knew, we listened, feeling the mystery 
and magic. She had only to say of any commonplace object, ‘Look kiddies, a 
stone’ to fill that stone with a wonder as if it were a holy object. She was able to 
imbue every insect, blade of grass, flower, the dangers and grandeurs of weather 
and the seasons, with a memorable importance along with a kind of uncertainty 
and humility that led us to ponder and try to discover the heart of everything 
(Frame 5). 
In An Angel at my Table Frame sketches her artistic development against all odds. Frame’s 
attempt to symbolize events homeless in time is an act of reclamation, of taking back the time 
that was taken from her within the asylum. Her lived experience is tied to the act of re- 
membering and meaning-making that restores the stories we can live with and that help us 




stories that live in the blurred edges, losing the cognitive tools to make meaning out of one’s life. 
Growing up in poverty instilled in Frame a sense of lack and impossibility, a hunger to be like 
everyone else—to be a child with pretty things. For Frame, those pretty things were “impossible 
presents” (74) in her world of practical survival. The following passage expresses how lonely 
poverty could be, how it weighed down her spirit like the heavy lace-up leather shoes on her 
feet: 
I felt desolate at school. I longed for impossible presents, a doll’s house, a 
sleeping doll, birthday parties, pretty dresses, button-up shoes, patent leather, 
instead of the lace-up leather shoes with their heavy soles and toe plates, hair that 
fell over my face so I could brush it away saying “My hair is getting in my 
eyes…” instead of frizzy red hair ‘up like a bush’ with everyone remarking on it. 
(74) 
Frame’s desolation was alleviated by the success of her poetry. Her first poem, written at the age 
of ten, was greatly appreciated by her teacher Gussy, who believed every child had a talent to be 
nourished through education (74). When Frame shared the good news with her family, they were 
proud of her, and her father supplied her with notebooks from his railroad job to allow her to 
write more poems. This early encouragement gave Frame a sense of belonging, a sense of her 
unique purpose. The prospect of having fresh notebooks to write in made Frame “dizzy with 
delight” (75). She describes this period of her life as being in a constant state of hunger for words 
(75). After seeing a musical film, for example, Frame wanted to know the exact words in each 
song. To appease this hunger, her older sister brought home song books so that they could see 
the words and follow along. Frame’s early life was filled with music and words, which might 






The Song of an “inward sun” 
 
Folk songs were Frame’s introduction to poetry. She writes fondly of the impact of music on her 
psyche as an artist, how during her darkest times classical music made her understand the 
experience of recognition, of feeling understood and being at home in the world. In her 
autobiography, Frame describes herself as an “inward sun” (An Angel at my Table 55), shy and 
painfully introverted, yet vibrantly conscious and alive. Attempting to balance this internal 
dynamic was difficult; not until she developed an identity as a writer did she learn how to “stand 
on the rock of herself” (Frame 769) and to trust the worth of her unique imaginative voice, to 
speak on her own terms. Discovering the autobiographical roots of Frame’s affinity to song, 
music and sound (which are abundantly reflected throughout Faces in the Water) elucidates why 
marrying the two art forms made sense to her as an artist. Listening to a symphony was akin to 
reading a novel for Frame: “Why had I not known before that listening to a symphony was like 
reading a book in all its progressions with its special shape and silent and noisy moment?” (218). 
Sections of Faces in the Water flow from structured symphonies to found soundscapes, 
as the narrative bends time and space into dichotomous rhythms. She writes about memory 
between the “ticking clock” and “rushing sea”—events measured numerically or experienced 
phenomenologically through sound. Frame has a concept of the asylum as an “orchestration of 
madness” where patients enact a “new kind of music” that is rarely listened to with compassion 
and attentiveness. This new kind of music is a “curse or cry”. The asylum, often composed as a 
monument of silence, is where patients are orchestrated, surveilled and silenced in a disciplinary 
fashion. However, Frame’s attention to this “new kind of music” is what elevates the voices we 




sound metaphors and imagery. Her “inward sun” sings for those who have no means of being 
heard. 
Asylum soundscapes were complex and they paradoxically amplified and silenced 
inmates voices; as MacKinnon describes, the architectural acoustics of asylums were made up of 
“hard surfaces, plastered walls, stone and brickworks combined with wooden floors thereby 
creating acoustically resonant spaces generated by unsound minds” (81). While inmates were 
silenced through diagnosis, forced treatment and restraints, their voices were amplified in the 
echo of the hallways and recreational spaces. Frame spent a lot of time describing the asylum 
acoustics that surrounded her in contrast to the natural landscape or the gardens around the built 
structure. 
Prior to this shift in Frame’s life as a reader, living a life of writing was something that 
Frame always wanted but never thought she could practically afford, given her impoverished 
upbringing. She had witnessed her mother’s downfall and how her artistic dreams were 
extinguished by poverty. Frame knew that her family was not financially prepared to invest in 
dreams. The heartbreaking story of Frame’s mother, a brilliant singer and poet whose talent 
never saw the light of day (An Angel at my Table, 88), made Frame conservative in her 
ambitions: she settled on becoming a teacher because it seemed safe and stable, yet she clung to 
dreams of being a full-time poet. In her autobiography, Frame describes her writing style as 
practical and lyrical because she sought approval from her parents. Yet she also describes the 
influence of song and singing, an interest inherited from her mother, on her development as a 
poet. In a house that could not afford books, song lyrics were her introduction to poetry: 
My poems were a mixture of conventional ideas about poetic vocabulary and the 




small popular song books brought home by Myrtle and the songs sung by my 
parents and grandparents. I continued to write my poems, sensing the approval of 
my parents—of Mother who saw the birth of something she had mourned as lost 
from her life, whose overwhelming might-have been was the publication of a 
book. She once sent a collection of her poems to Stockwells, England, which 
advertised regularly in New Zealand newspapers and magazines, and her joy at 
having the poems accepted for publication was lessened only by the knowledge 
that she couldn’t afford the sum of money they quoted for publication, and 
although she resigned herself to never having the money, she could proudly say 
now and again, I’ve had a book of poems accepted for publication by Stockwells, 
England. (Angel at my Table 88) 
 
This passage highlights not only the lack of New Zealand-based publishers who could support 
local writers, it also illustrates the dependence on the British canon and the difficulty of 
impoverished artists to be recognized. In the late 1930s, there were no supports for the poor to 
thrive as human beings, to say nothing of thriving as artists. Her mother’s defeat and pride, 
“resigned to never having the money” but holding on to being accepted for publication by a 
British publisher was the highest form of achievement possible for someone of her 
socioeconomic status. Frame wanted to be published and to be recognized as a writer on the 
world stage more than anything in the world. 
The notebooks given to her by her father became a place for Frame to express her 
“inward sun”—it was also where she would write about folk songs and poems that inspired or 
haunted her imagination. For instance, she writes about the impact of “Tender Wood Dove Softly 




the household, their cooing sounds providing her with comfort. Frame also found comfort and 
respite in nature’s rhythms; her novels and poems are rich with landscape and natural imagery. 
The tender dove song touched Frame deeply, and it was one of her obsessions as an early writer: 
In the elm tree gently swaying, take your rest 
I long to watch your gentle flight 
Your spreading wings snowy white 
All day at work I hear you 
Tender dove 
 
Take my little song to cheer you 
 
With my love. (An Angel at my Table 71-72) 
 
 
The song haunted Frame because she felt herself being like her mother, lonely, singing to the 
wood dove, her voice trapped within the walls of the household. 
Frame writes about the impact of symphonies on her wellbeing. Being shy was not 
welcomed in Teacher’s College; Frame felt constant pressure to perform, and she feared “being 
inspected” (An Angel at my Table 216). This fear of surveillance is sonically conjured by the 
authoritarian sounds of the headmaster’s footsteps in the corridor: “I heard the steps of authority 
approaching along the corridor, so that a visit by the headmaster to a class sitting rapt with 
attention…” (216). One day, she decided to escape by attending a recital that made her feel at 
home: 
I was standing outside the door of the gramophone room, trying to pluck up the 
courage to go in, I heard the piano being played (…) I still had little knowledge of 
classical music, and I had never listened to a long piece of music—a symphony or 




Pathétique, and among the handful of students I listened to the unaccustomed 
sounds dragging, dragging their awful burden and gloom, on and on, and when 
the music arrive at the ‘tune’ I knew…I experienced the delight of recognition. 
(Angel at my Table 218) 
The “delight of recognition” was tremendously important for Frame. During her career in 
Teacher’s College, she worked as a housekeeper to afford a room and board, constantly feeling 
like an outcast compared to the wealthier girls who could spend their free time studying or 
socializing. College seemed like a natural habitat for Frame; she could hide out in books all day 
and be rewarded for her intelligence. She adored teaching poetry to children and revealed their 
unusual use of language. But college is also where she had her first breakdown. Scholastic 
pressure fortified her perfectionism; her fear of authority, of being tested and examined, gave her 
tremendous anxiety to the point of not being able to function in everyday life. After her first 
breakdown and return home from the hospital, part of her process of finding herself was to buy 
an exercise book and to start writing her first novel Owls Do Cry. Of this period, she writes, “I 
gained my life as I had wanted it to be” (8). 
 
 
Faces in the Water Synopsis 
 
Faces in the Water (1961) is written in the first person, as a poetic testimony of Istina Mavet’s 
life in New Zealand’s psychiatric asylums and her experience of electroshock therapy during the 
1940s. The novel begins with Istina Mavet describing an apocalyptic fantasy using soundscape. 
She listens to the city as an outsider, alienated and afraid. Istina imagines how social norms 
would dissolve into “hysteria” under the stress of a doomsday natural disaster. Citizens would 




mundane everyday of city life: “The streets throng, resounding with people who panic, covering 
the scissors, sucking the poison from a wound they can’t find (…) But the shop windows were 
speaking to me (…) I was not yet civilized, I traded my safety for the glass beads” (5). Although 
Frame is not overtly describing the chaotic sounds of the city, she infers a soundscape of anxiety 
and hallucination, one that questions the borders of real/imaginary sounds. This scene 
foreshadows her later diagnosis of schizophrenia, which by the end of the novel, turns out to be 
false: this misdiagnosis reflects a mishearing. As the social world and the institutional world of 
the asylum do not hear Istina as a subject or agent, they instead hear symptoms of schizophrenia. 
They hear a psychiatric label, when they should be hearing and attending to her suffering. 
Frame’s soundscapes allude to the regulatory function of psychiatric language and listening. 
Furthermore, she plays with the notion of “hearing voices” to question its intrinsic abnormality 
and subvert its claim of insanity. Instead of suppressing the hallucinated voices, they are listened 
to and allowed to speak as they need to. This freedom is contrasted with the medical model’s 
version of listening, in which the patient speaks and the doctor hears biological symptoms 
intertwined with a story. They hear the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM), the categories of 
illness embedded in the patient’s speech: but they do not hear the patient. 
Stylistically embodying Istina’s disorientation and existential homelessness, the novel 
disrupts the notion of linear time and storyline. She belongs nowhere. Not in the asylum, not in 
society or at home. Just as emotions exist outside of time, as Freud’s essay “Repeating, 
Remembering and Working-Through” suggests, Istina is perpetually confused about date, time 
and season as she struggles to figure out where she belongs. She is most at home in nature, most 
at peace amongst trees, rivers and flowers. The asylum is a dark and never ending winter, a direct 




The river is an important metaphor for Frame, and it features widely in the novel as a 
both a source of freedom and sublime natural power. Frame underscores the centrality of the 
river as a symbol in her autobiographical writing. She writes about changing her last name to 
Clutha, after the Clutha River, to preserve her reclusivity: “I felt the river was an ally, that it 
would speak to me” (An Angel at my Table 195). The river that claimed both her sisters, face to 
face with Clutha, a being that persisted through all the pressure of rock, stone, earth and sun: 
living as an element of freedom, not in isolation, but “linked to heaven and light by the slender 
rainbow that shimmered above its waters” (Angel at my Table 203). Across Frame’s body of 
work, rivers are closely tied to Frame’s struggle with identity and sense of belonging. 
One of the novel’s most compelling characters is Brenda, a leucotomy patient who was 
once a brilliant piano player, but post-surgery is unable to play simple songs on the ward piano. 
Sitting in the day-room with Istina, Brenda sees her face in the piano and feels like she should 
play. While she tries to play “Always Chasing Rainbows,” her sense of timing is off due to the 
effects of the surgery and she gives up in anger. Brenda’s frustration at her instrument results in 
her violently pounding on the keys in a fit of rage. This scene becomes the pinnacle of the novel. 
It is when Istina realizes just how cruel the entire institution is, and how Brenda’s rage is 
rendered meaningless by psychiatric treatments that destroy her cognitive abilities and 
communication skills. The nurses blame the piano for her agitation instead of the leucotomy. 
Brenda’s anger is pathologized, reduced to a mental disorder, and it is punished with restraints. 
Instead of interpreting her reaction as a genuine expression of loss from being wronged by a 
system that coerced her into giving up her most important asset, her anger is trivialized, and she 
is forbidden to ever play piano again by the nurses. In this moment of injustice, Istina 




uncomfortable that we must submerge them instead of attending to them. Istina sees this kind of 
forgetting as a social injustice and a way to avoid responsibility. At the core of this repression is 
the fear that one day we will see our own face in the water. Istina realizes that in an ethical 
system, Brenda would be encouraged to play piano. Her emotions would be engaged and listened 
to as valid expressions. Istina can no longer ignore the social complicity in Brenda’s plight. The 
metaphor of “faces in the water” is compelling; it strongly evokes Emmanuel Levinas’ ethical 
concept of the “face” (Ethics and Infinity) and Lisbeth Lispari’s theory of listening otherwise. 
The singularity of the face directs our attention to the universal that we can never escape, as we 
are forever indebted and responsible before the infinity of the Other. This relationship to the face 
(the Other) connects us back to the whole, the unknowable infinite complexity of the universal 
that we must remain open to receiving through a “quiet listening, vigilant against its own 
interference, cautious of its own interference, careful not to disturb” (Levinas 45). 
The level of anxiety and surveillance that Istina observes varies depending on which 
ward Istina is held in. Ward 2 is coined the “disturbed ward” where all the “trouble” patients are 
locked away, and Ward 7 is the privileged ward where patients are given luxuries such as penny 
candy and trips to the garden. There is also the TB ward, where patients wait to die. The further 
along Istina goes within the asylum, the more her memory disintegrates due to ECT, and the 
more fearful she becomes. She feels herself becoming more and more docile, but she is still filled 
with sadness and increasing anger at the injustices around her that she is powerless to address. 
Istina thinks that she is being cured of having an individuality, which being an artist from a poor 
family was a disorder in the society in which she was born. One of the ways she comforts herself 
from the constant terror is to escape into memories of poems and her mother’s songs. Istina 




out into a field and keeps running until she passes out. She is later found by Sister Bridge, one of 
the nurse-nuns, and is severely punished and put in seclusion. This stunt leads to Istina being 
convinced that she needs a leucotomy to let her “unsuitable personality fly out like a migratory 
bird” (213). However, she is soothed to find out that Dr. Portman, a recent graduate in the “new 
attitude” of Behavioral Psychology that understood mental illness as a kind of “childishness” that 
could be cured in a “Victorian environment with the persuasion of stern speech and edifying 
literature” (210) and he grants her parole. 
 
The novel ends with the promise of Istina being granted parole and waiting to be sent 
home. There is a celebration called the Bowling Green, a sort of garden party on the asylum 
grounds. Istina is hopeful but anxious, fixated on the nurses’ words “you must forget this place” 
(223). The image of being received by “her people” (her family) with open arms, but their arms 
are made of spikes, proves to be unsettling. It leaves readers pondering whether Istina will ever 
be welcomed into the world and live as a free woman. We never find out if Istina makes it out 
alive. She ends her story with the nurses’ last words, repeating her need to forget the asylum if 
she is going to make it in the “real world”. Then Istina addresses the readers by saying, 
ironically: “And by what I have written in this document you will see, won’t you, that I have 
obeyed her?” (223). It ends as it begins, with readers left without direction as to “what happens” 
or “what happened”. This kind of narrative ambivalence suggests that “what happens” doesn’t 
matter; Istina is forever a prisoner of the asylum even if she physically leaves. Her mind is not 
the same, parts of herself have been permanently erased and she is forever scarred by the abuse. 
The only hope is that she survived to tell her story as coherently as she could and that it may 




What I find fascinating about being a reader, far into the future, is that institutional 
change has happened: The asylums have closed, and “mental health” is now understood from a 
recovery-based perspective. In spite of these changes, the treatment of psychiatric patients 
remains problematic. Biomedical psychiatry still has much to learn on how to listen with 
compassion, empathy and from a patient-centered perspective to narratives that might not make 
sense. They can learn this from Janet Frame’s representation of the impact of not being heard— 
and, most importantly, they can learn this from the patients they are meant to care for in the 
present-tense. 
 
Faces in the Water: Literary soundscapes and theories of listening 
 
Janet Frame wrote Faces in the Water (1961) as a therapeutic exercise while she received care in 
London, under the advice of the psychiatrist Dr. Crawley; she was listening to doctor’s orders. 
He believed that it would be cathartic and beneficial for Frame to work-through her asylum 
experiences using poetic fiction. At the heart of writing Faces in the Water is Frame’s hope to 
shed light on an obscured section of society, to destigmatize improve the lives of people behind 
the asylum walls: “If a few revelations would help get the hospitals improved and perhaps help 
change the public attitude to mental illness…Old buildings can be pulled down and new ones put 
up overnight but it is harder to deal with the invisible structures of suspicion and fear” (Tinkler 
97). Frame believed poets and writers were the “moral legislators of the world” (Tinkler 100), 
whose job it was to expose the injustices veiled by social habit and convention. Regardless of the 
impact of her writing at the time of its publication, she understood that the societal perception of 
people living with mental health issues was going to be harder to change because those hardened 
ideas are adaptable to social progress. Stigma morphs with the times, and it can live covertly in 




Frame wanted to expose asylums for the horrors that they were, she was also apprehensive 
because the text was fiction based on the “most private” aspects of her life (Tinkler 97). 
MacKinnon’s acoustic archival research of Australian and New Zealand asylum’s aligns with 
what Frame describes as the “Season of Peril”, how sound operated as a mechanism of discipline 
and regimented gendered musical therapy: 
From the nineteenth century onwards in Britain, America, Canada, Europe, South 
Africa, India and Australasia, the treatment of the mentally ill saw an increasing 
move towards incarceration in purpose-built asylums, which not only comprised, 
articulated and gendered architectural spaces, but also implemented a regulated 
and regimented soundscape. Architecturally, asylums comprised hard surfaces, 
with plastered walls, stone and brickwork combined with stone or wooden floors, 
thereby creating acoustically resonant spaces that amplified the sounds generated 
by unsound minds. (78) 
MacKinnon asks how sound was used to both punish in cure and how those sounds are difficult 
to trace historically without the accounts of patients themselves. This is why Frame’s novel 
provides experience evidence of the asylum’s soundscape, ECT treatment and its impact on 
memory. 
Although Frame’s emphasis on sound in Faces in the Water (1961) is not pure 
phonography, it does embody a phenomenology of listening otherwise (Levinas, Lispari, 
Voegelin, Todd). Faces in the Water is a call to recognize ourselves in the Other, not to swallow 
their difference in our attempt to empathize or understand, but to reflect on their human features, 
the grain of their voice that resounds in our everyday engagement with the world. In a sense, 




imprisonment and into the realm of harmony, compassion and ethics. Faces in the Water 
poetically and sonically straddles polemics. ECT as “the new and fashionable way of quieting 
people” (8) as both miracle cure and as torturous punishment. 
In this section I map the various soundscapes in the novel and analyze them according to 
the ethics of listening I outlined in Chapter 2. There are four major soundscapes: cityscape, 
asylum, nature and internal world/voice. Each represents a built or organic environment. She 
attentively describes the sounds of each environment to create a space for these women’s voices 
to speak beyond the limits of psychiatric institutional language. 
Within these sonic metaphors, Frame draws attention to power and ethics in relation to 
listening and recognition for psychiatric inmates whose voices, memories and experiences are 
systemically erased. She writes sound as a call to action for us to listen to those who are trying to 
speak but are being drowned out by institutions. Then, I move into more micro stylistic analysis 
of her sonic metaphors and their symbolism. 
Like all of Frame’s novels, themes of alienation, confinement and selfhood are found 
throughout the non-linear storyline. It is written in an experimental narrative form; Frame blends 
dreamscape with the mundane edges of realism. The main character, Istina Mavet, is a figure 
who arrives to the reader without context or background; we never find out how she ends up in 
psychiatric confinement. Yet the novel begins fully immersed in this character’s psychological 
landscape with intensity and disorientation. As readers, we are as lost as Istina. We soon discover 
that this is a story about Istina Mavet’s loss of selfhood, memory and sense of time after being 
subjected to 200 treatments of ECT that she never consented to. Later, we discover that this is 
also a story about the terrible conditions of asylums that psychiatric patients lived in until they 




ethnographic record of lives under erasure, lives that were not meant to be recorded by history. 
As such, the novel stands as a critique and examination of society’s treatment of distress and 
poverty. Istina honours each patient. Through her voice we see, hear, taste, smell and feel in the 
asylum from an intimate, emotional perspective. Istina is a character whose main role is to listen, 
to be a witness and to make-meaning out of the chaos. 
Frame’s novel makes the case for listening to memories under erasure as resistance through 
engagement with fragmented testimonies of electroshock that speak out-of-order, that have been 
displaced and replaced with the promise of erasure as miracle cure. Her thematic use of sound 
images, sonic metaphors, and soundscapes to illustrate the emotional extent of the shock 
experience provoke readers to “listen to” the disenfranchised, forgotten and silenced mad 
women in her novel. She also calls attention to the lack of humanistic care and listening within 
psychiatric procedures. Unlike most authors in the electroshock canon (Plath, Kesey, Fisher), 
Frame uses sound metaphors to situate the protagonist, ontologically and politically, within the 
anxious landscape of society and the asylum. 
Salome Voegelin begins her book Sonic Possibilities with musings on “textual 
phonography,” explaining that writing produces imagination for the reader that is not the sound 
heard “but the sound generated in her action of perception of reading about sound.” (3) Writing 
is a form of sound recording that triggers our imaginations of sound, not the sound itself, but the 
idea of what sound could be: “I use words to grant you access to sound’s present unfolding for 
you not to hear the same but to hear possibilities” (3). This method of treating sound as a verb 
that rewrites the experience of listening creates new possibilities of existence. As Voegelin 
elaborates, there is a dialogic reciprocity between the reader’s internal voice and the text that 




imagination of what it might have been that I heard and what they might have remembered to 




The Season of Peril: Listening as a Safety Measure 
 
In this section, I map the ways in which the asylum functions as a sonic panopticon to 
surveil inmates and I demonstrate the use of listening for patients as both a means to stay safe 
and to learn how to speak out for one’s human rights. Istina’s “Season of Peril” is a time of 
listening to the asylum, to survive its cruel rituals and prison-like environment. The sounds of 
ECT are represented as mechanisms of fear that serve primarily to control patients. This form of 
listening is hopeful, despite the terror she must endure. Frame’s use of literary soundscapes 
alludes to the regulatory function of psychiatric language and listening, and happens through 
Istina’s ethnographic descriptions of her surrounding soundscapes. Using sound as both a 
mechanism of fear and safety, Frame creates a phenomenon of “shock” that intersects with 
speech and the unsayable. In this upside-down world, monotony competes with timelessness; 
Frame contrasts the two extremes to highlight how the protagonist is caught in a never-ending 
cycle of hope/despair. Frame’s soundscapes of the asylum (sonic panopticon) offer insight into 
the lack of listening and human dignity for patients at the time and makes the case for ethical 
reform to psychiatric practice. 
“The Season of Peril” is a refrain that Istina Mavet invokes throughout the novel—it 
refers to memory erasure caused by electroshock, a time of endless winter, a time where she is 
trapped in an apocalyptic nightmare where no living organism can survive. In this section, I map 




punishment and surveillance. The sonic acoustemology of life behind the walls of the asylum is 
something that is not recorded in most historical accounts. Since deinstitutionalization in the 
1960s, many asylums have been turned into museums or memorial sites, but few of them have 
the soundscapes of their recent past. Frame’s novel could be read as a soundscape recording of 
life on the inside, from a patients’ perspective, one where madness sings its own songs and 
speaks its own verses liberated from the regime of linguistic medical dominance of pathology 
and control. As Dolly MacKinnon has stated, there is a lack of sonic interpretations of this 
psychiatric survivor history that regulated intersectional identities of class, gender, race religion 
within the asylum, and this history is one that is clamouring to be heard in the present: 
Many facilities now stand deserted and abandoned, giving a false acoustic 
impression of madness as silent. From their inception and construction in the 
early nineteenth century until the introduction of drug therapies in the 1950s, 
asylums were sites of noise, which linked different types of sounds to specified 
architectural spaces. These now empty and quiet buildings belie their noisy and 
acoustemological past. (77) 
The “Season of Peril” refers to the fear and distress felt by the asylum inmates and how 
listening could be used as a safety measure to weather the punitive ECT treatments. I also map 
out the parallels between this kind of anticipatory listening, sound surveillance and selfhood 
management in psychiatric wards. As medical anthropologist Tom Rice puts it: “the ward 
soundscape can play an important role in creating and confirming a particular experience of 
patienthood, bringing patients to experience themselves as patient-selves” (22). Institutional 
discipline was defined by the creation and instigation of silence and sound; for example, in 




about the use of whistles to regulate unwanted behaviour and how "meals were to be eaten in 
silence only acceptable music was to be provided by staff" (82). The “Season of Peril” is 
where Istina (and by proxy Frame) realizes that she is a patient and no longer a free agent, no 
longer “self” but “other”. In this section, I analyze how Frame’s motif of distress is created 
through a sonic panopticon where nurses and doctors enact disciplinary forms of listening 
within an institutional rhythm of control and surveillance. This sonic panopticon sustains 
patienthood within a fear-based anticipatory listening, always on edge as they await 
punishment for “bad” behaviour. 
With the recurring phrase “the Season of Peril,” Frame symbolizes the long duration of 
depression and the hopelessness of being incarcerated in an asylum and being surveilled through 
sound. “The Season of Peril” also displaces the subject in time/space: they wake up in winter 
even in the middle of spring, and despite a bright sun outside, they are cold. The symbolic weight 
of winter gives Frame’s account a hopeless tone. Life seems impossible in winter; nothing can 
grow or bloom. The cold is stagnant, absolute and violent. The only way out is to learn how to 
listen as a form of resistance, to stay safe by anticipating threat and to cunningly time one’s 
actions accordingly. By knowing how to act within the “time of the 
asylum”—within this rigid and regimented world, much like prison, where bodies are regulated 
under an authority figure’s watch—one can appear “sane” if their timing is right. Being able to 
harmoniously flow within the “time of the asylum” allows one to be set free, to be seen as 
“cured.” 
For in-spite of the snapdragons and the dusty millers and the cherry blossoms, it 
was always winter (…) and it was always our Season of Peril: Electricity the peril 




safety measures must I apply to protect myself against electricity? And I listed the 
emergencies—lightening, riots, earthquakes, and the measures provided for the 
world by man’s Red Cross God Safety to whom we owe allegiance or die on the 
separated ice floe, in double loneliness. (Frame 11) 
In the above passage, Frame creates a storm image that sings terror. The violently singing wind 
also mimics the harsh words from the nurses and the dangerous living conditions within the 
asylum, evoking the persistent emotional and physical abuse that Istina must withstand. The 
accompanying soundscapes that Frame uses to describe and enhance “the Season of Peril” are 
associated with the coldness of the institution, the surveillance and authority of medical staff. 
When Istina reflects that her stay in Seacliff was a “time of listening” (11), Frame is emphasizing 
how the protagonist can stay safe by listening to the rhythms of the asylum and its people. To 
survive within this stark landscape, Istina must learn to listen. Listening enables an intuitive 
defensive stance, to learn how to detect when danger is fast approaching: 
It was a time of listening—to the other patients walking along the corridor for 
breakfast; the silence as Sister Honey, her head bowed, her eyes watchfully open, 
said grace: ‘For what you are about to receive the Lord makes you truly thankful. 
(11) 
In this passage, we learn that listening is a way to predict what the nurses might do next, what 
painful treatment is about to be given. “It was a time of listening” (11) means that she spent most 
of her time in suspense, in anxiety, even if the nurses encouraged her to be “thankful” for the 
treatment she was about to receive. Istina is to receive shock with grace; as if it were a meal, she 
is meant to give thanks. The conflation of treatment and punishment is palpable throughout the 




this literary device is meant to confuse readers, to enact in writing the competing voices in one’s 
head. To add to our confusion, the opening paragraph of the novel reads somewhat like an acid 
trip, a psychedelic opening of consciousness or a different way of perceiving the world. Istina is 
presented as having a highly symbolic and affective sensitivity to the world around her. The 
merging of safety, salvation and cure suggests the liminality between medicine and religion. In 
this merging, recovery is only possible in one’s surrender to an authority figure—it cannot come 
from within or from spiritual self-empowerment. One must give up their subjectivity, admit their 
illness as sin and beg for forgiveness. The novel opens with an elusive statement about safety 
(gendered as male and poised as a spiritual God-like savior) by a paranoid protagonist: 
They have said that we owe allegiance to Safety, that he is our Red Cross who 
will provide us with ointment and bandages for our wounds and removed the 
foreign ideas the glass beads of fantasy, the bent hairpins of unreason embedded 
in our minds. (3) 
Safety as a concept denotes protection from vulnerability or risk—but it is one-sided given by 
the Red Cross, by the establishment of institutional law and order. It also denotes a fear of the 
unknown; staying safe means knowing what to expect and being prepared for the worst. Safety is 
not something one can create for oneself; it is ordained from above in a set of commands “lists of 
safety measures” (3). Frame begins the text with a visual saturation of anxiety, a highly imagistic 
representation of its internal and external manifestation. It is a landscape that later expands into 
auditory textures. But her opening statement also contains the voice of authority that vows to 
“protect” the vulnerable juxtaposed against the voice of collective fear (or the collective memory 
of fear). Frame’s use of biblical connotations like “Red Cross God '' and references like 




safety is authoritative, puritan and tied to medical religious ritual. The speaker’s voice, unknown 
to us at this point, imaginatively juxtaposes Christian iconographic imagery (Cross) with medical 
symbols. Frame holds the logic of salvation, both spiritual and physical, within this split image. 
The promise of modern medicine is not unlike the promise of eternal afterlife. By accepting its 
message, much like welcoming a faith in Christ, the speaker trusts in a divine economy that will 
return them to a state of sanity. The “ointment and bandages for our wounds” (3) contain medical 
and ritualistic meaning that assert to “remove the foreign ideas, the glass beads of fantasy, the 
bent hairpins of unreason embedded in our minds” (3). The concept of “the foreign'' is linked to 
fantasy and unreason: a mythic “other” thick with difference and distance. What is foreign is to 
be feared and policed. What happens, then, when foreign becomes familiar? 
Frame goes on to conjure an apocalyptic scene where anxiety is sonically palpable. Her 
“dangerous reality” (3) is one of disasters waiting to happen, being in perpetual states of 
emergency and collective preparation for the end of the world. The uncanny collective voice, 
“we” without concrete or direct reference to a specific group, could suggest the narrator’s split 
identity. Perhaps they identify as a collective set of voices, or they simply identify as “we” and 
not as “I”. Or it could symbolize the “we” of the asylum, the patients’ collective voices that have 
been muted and silenced within the medical landscape of care. But with the “we” there is a 
“they.” “They” is the voice of perceived authority, the voice of rules and regulation: the voice of 
law. 
Moving away from the industrialization of the ear and the sonic panopticon of the 
 
asylum, Frame symbolizes the acousmatic “ecological voice” (Schaffer) of natural environments 
as liberatory and crucial for self-development. There is a stark division of perspective between 




refracting in a prism that causes colours to split into a spectrum. Istina’s fascination with the 
natural world is a way to return to a state of wholeness, of pure being, without the words or 
labels of society and psychiatry. She listens to nature in order to give it a voice, and the earth 
speaks through her ear. Returning to a place before language, in the flow of instinct, she 
rediscovers joy amongst flowers, birds and sunshine. Music falls out of the earth’s rocks and 
roots, its trees and rain. Istina could breathe onto the trees and make them speak. Nature 
soundscapes provide solace from the sonic panopticon. The birds, trees and wind help Istina 
reconnect with her past self; she is transported to a time when she was free. Sound theorist Pierre 
Schaffer describes environmental soundscapes as necessary for the development of voice, stating 
that “we could not express ourselves vocally without the wind we first inhale from the 
atmosphere and then exhale over the cords of the larynx perhaps we flatter ourselves when we 
think that our voices belongs to us alone” (Pettman qt Schaffer 70). Istina is sonically connected 
to her environment and suggests how voice is co-created with the world which troubles the 
dominance of human subjectivity over nature. Her solidarity with ecosystems is part of her 
learning to listen otherwise to the unknowable other with compassion, humility and curiosity. 
However, the sensory deprivation of the asylum, the dark, cold and damp isolation, 
renders Istina emotionally volatile and unable to find the ground to recognize her voice. As such, 
the lines between her identity as a patient blurs with that of being a prisoner. Tom Rice in his 
sonic anthropological study of hospital soundscapes talks about how the machinery and the 
sounds they produce remind patients of their illness and inability to leave the hospital creating a 
subjectivity that was under “persistent medical scrutiny” (22). In Faces in the Water, Frame 
sonically juxtaposes a lightning storm and the sound of the ECT trolley suggest how 




punishment: “I continued to have ECT, dreading more and more the sound of the trolley and the 
stifled screams as it moved from room to room, nearer and nearer.” (67) Her dread and fear of 
the sound of the trolley highlight the importance of sound in creating the asylum landscape, it 
signals to the readers just how silenced and oppressed each inmate was at this time. The asylum 
sounds like a prison, which inhibits Istina’s ability to be in touch with herself and to listen to the 
voice in her head that was seeking comfort and protection from harm. There are also tones of 
ritual within the asylum, the scheduled treatments and daily routines are all timed with specific 
sounds (bells, alarms, nurse calls, trolleys, etc): 
The soaked cotton wool being rubbed on our temples until the skin tears and 
stings and the dregs of spirits run down our ears making sudden blockage of 
sound, there is the final outbreak of screaming and panicking (…) 
And now there is the sound of the early morning catarrhal, the springing squeak 
of rubber soled-shoes on the polished corridor outside, syncopated with the hasty 
ping pong steps of Cuban-heeled dusty shoes. (16) 
In the following passages, Istina collapses the image of the patient/prisoner; while she awaits 
ECT treatment, she feels like a prisoner on death-row. This prisoner trope is also found in other 
ECT literature like Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar. Although the execution imagery is similar to The 
Bell Jar, in which the protagonist, Ester, fantasizes about the execution of the Rosenbergs’ in 
NYC which foreshadows her psychiatric hospitalization and ECT, Frame uses the image to 
signal the timelessness of laws that serve to end people’s time on earth. She is also commenting 
on the futility of ritualizing what is instrumental, what is unnecessarily done in the name of state 
law and serves no justice in the process. Istina is cut off from time itself, in a liminal space 




It is said that when a prisoner is condemned to die all clocks in the neighbourhood 
of the Death calls are stopped; as if the removal of the clocks will cut off the flow 
of time and maroon the prisoner on a coast of timelessness where the moments 
like breakers, rise and surge but never touch the shore. But no death of an 
oceanographer ever stopped the sea flowing; and a condition of sea is its meeting 
with the land. And in death cell time flows in as if the cuckoo grandfather clocks 
and alarm clocks were striking simultaneously in the ears of the prisoners. (24) 
Time stops for the prisoner who is about to be executed: their names will not be remembered, 
they die stigmatized and anonymously as “a bad person”. Frame compares this death to the death 
of a valued member of society, “an oceanographer,” which is an apt metaphor. The 
oceanographer is a scientist of the sea, and although he has vast knowledge of the ocean, he 
cannot dominate or control it, and his death will not impact the ecological survival of the ocean. 
His power is limited compared to the power of earthly forces. Frame is suggesting that certain 
environmental conditions are inevitable, and that no amount of intervention can prevent them. 
But despite this contrast, the prisoner is a prisoner of time. The alarm clocks that ring in the 
prisoner’s ears signify artificial “human” time, the time of sentences that force time onto 
individual bodies. Time spent locked away from the world. The “asylum time” is slow and dead, 
removed from the pace of capitalism’s “productive” time. The asylum is “unproductive” time: 
patients wait for meals, they wait for treatment, they wait for death. 
Sound is a trigger for Istina and the other patients/prisoners to stay informed about what 
is going on around them, all that is beyond their control from the ECT trolley to lightning storm. 
The asylum patients reside in an environment of hidden agendas and codes, and nothing is 




sharply, and their words sting like snake bites (67). Frame emphasizes the imminent and 
predatory threat of the asylum and the necessity for keen survival skills, much like the skills 
needed to stay alive in the wilderness. Here, unlike the wilderness, one is caged, tied down and 
held prisoner. During the stressful ordeal of her first shock treatment, hearing the other patients 
be wheeled away screaming, Istina calms herself by reciting a poem and visualizing the face of 
her primary school teacher. Seasons are the metric of time for Istina, to locate herself against the 
erasure of time and memory. The natural soundscapes offer solace and spiritual grounding; they 
remind her of her mother’s poetry and songs stands in stark contrast to the conjuring of the 
sounds of a Great Unreality. Madness is rendered unreal, all in one’s head, like a secret 
knowledge or a way to perceive what is intrinsically hidden. Sound is a signal of potential 
danger, but also a source of soothing and groundedness. 
From a phenomenological perspective, a question that persists throughout the novel is: 
Who is hallucinating? The patients or the asylum staff? It is also interesting to note how we, as 
humans, hallucinate sounds more than sights (Ackerman 180). If we extend the auditory 
hallucination metaphor to hearing voices, Istina may not be in a state of delusion when she hears 
voices; she is merely listening to the voices of the patients around her who are not being properly 
engaged by staff. Frequently, the patients are told that their imaginations are illnesses (24). 
Instead of seeing their imaginations as radical and creative solutions to complex traumas, as 
innovative ways to change their internal world and imagine it otherwise, the staff see 
imagination as a threat to the cure of civility. As the staff punish patients for existential reasons, 
because they sing too loudly when happy or start to cry when they are sad, it appears that they 
are seeing things that no one else can see, inferring that the staff misinterpret the patients’ 




down to characterizing psychosis in terms of creation—starting from an initial non-sense for the 
subject—of something meaningful for this subject that is non-sense for others” (129). This calls 
into question the madness of the misdiagnosing doctor or the patient who perceives the world 
through imagination and sensitivity. How do we receive the world of the speaker, the world we 
cannot inhabit with them? Auditory hallucinations, according to Castoriadis, work as a double: 
they are animatic solutions, created to vanquish what is unfamiliar and disturbing. They serve 
mainly to recover a sense of the familiar, and propel a vital force for the psyche to create a “new 
witness” (129). This new witness is able to bear the weight of the world that is far too heavy for 
the subject to bear. 
We later come to know that Istina is not living with schizophrenia; she is living with the 
fear of not being able to survive in a capitalist-patriarchal-colonial society, a place that is harshly 
competitive and economically ruthless. She often thinks about how there is no way for a woman 
to survive without a husband; even with a promising career, she suffers economic hardships. In 
real life, Frame periodically checked herself into hospitals because she was afraid of not being 
able to cope with the stress of poverty. The asylum functions as an escape from capitalism, 
where one can exist outside of time and memory. Time is surveillance. Someone is always 
telling you what time it is and how you are meant to use that time. In the asylum, there is no free 
time and no free-will. Sound is also depicted as a mechanism of fear. The nurses use sound to 
control the patients, to scare them into submission. Whether by using gongs or loud voices, Isitna 
is programmed to be afraid of the sounds around her, which usually signal punishment on the 
horizon: 
Then the pegging footsteps as the massive Matron Glass on her tiny blackshot feet 




surveying us, with a query to the nurses, like a stockman appraising heads of 
cattle to go by truck to the slaughterhouse. (11) 
 
The “pegging footsteps” foreshadow the “slaughterhouse” (coming to take patients away to 
Ward 2 for disobedience). Since Istina is always locked away or hiding, her perception is limited 
to sound, and so she witnesses through sound, developing “sound as a verb”. Focusing on the ear 
rather than the eye, Isitna has a change in perception. The way she comes to know the world 
around her shifts, and this knowledge changes the materiality of the world around her: it is 
always winter, even in spring. Salome Voegelin, in her essay “The Ethics of Listening,” argues 
that centering the ear as the primary mode of perception changes the world around us: “And so it 
is different: its materiality, its status and what it could do, is enable in terms of understanding the 
condition and process of existing in time” (1). Even if listening is a way to stay safe from 
punishment in the asylum, being subjected to the terrifying sounds on a routine basis causes 
unnecessary stress for Istina. Sound remains a mechanism of fear that never ceases to startle and 
keep one uneasy. Psychological studies have demonstrated the negative impact of noise, sound 
pollution and loud sounds on the psyche (Ackerman 187). In most cases, such noise can lead to 
higher levels of cortisol production. Neurologists have suggested that it may be a relic of our 
evolution, when shrieks of terror alerted us to sudden doom. In Istina’s case, the constant 
exposure to loud noise, cries of terror followed by uncanny silence, are what drive her over the 
edge, towards her devolution: 
Hearing other people threatened so often made me more afraid, and seeing that a 
patient, in the act of being taken to a single room, always struggled and screamed, 




change people who screamed and disobeyed into people who sat, withdrawn, and 
obeyed listlessly when ordered Dayroom, Dining Room, Bed. (45) 
 
The “Season of Peril” is described using the institutional rhythms and sonic panopticon of the 
asylum where power is held solely by the medical staff and patients live in fear. The ECT scene 
is akin to hostile violation, an intrusion on one’s body and psyche. Istina never consents to ECT; 
she is never asked what is best for her. In this era of medicine, during the 1940s, doctors and 
medical staff were all-powerful, holding patients’ fates in their hands. Istina is told to wait in a 
room, without any information or indication of what is about to happen. When she experiences 
ECT, it comes as an absolute shock. Because there is no patient-centered care or listening to 
patients’ needs or concerns, there is no transparency. Istina is constantly listening to hospital 
sounds, as though with a stethoscope, to figure out what will be done to her. As Dolly 
Mackinnon says, the asylum functioned as a place of diagnosis madness through “hearings” that 
were run by asylum medical staff. They used listening and observation techniques to distinguish 
the patients who were more on the sanity spectrum and those that were completely mad, and 
these modes of distinction were blurred with gender, class, and racial bias: “Within the confines 
of the asylum, noise, sound, and silence determined the boundaries between sanity and insanity – 
madness and reason, sane and hysterical women – the points of intersection were places of 
cultural confusion and clamour.” (81) Asylums were noisy even while madness was silenced 
through disciplinary power. From the perspective of the patients, as Frame elucidates, the asylum 
soundscapes are terrifying and confusing which can easily drive one to the point of severe 
distress and/or muteness. As Frame describes, the terror of sound builds, and Istina becomes 




I continued to have ECT, dreading more and more the sound of the trolley and the 
stifled screams as it moved from room to room, nearer and nearer (...) 
 
Suddenly I heard the familiar calamitous despairing cry of a patient undergoing 
ECT, and snorting noises in the room next door, and the sound of something 
being wheeled along the corridor to my room. (60-67) 
 
In addition to Istina’s fear of ECT, she lives in fear of being transferred to Ward 2. Patients who 
disobey orders are sent there as punishment. The disappearance of people in the night, the secrets 
behind closed doors and wards, leads to Istina’s heightened ear:  
You learned with earnest dedication to ‘fit in’; you learned not to cry in company 
but to smile and pronounce yourself pleased, and to ask from time to time if you 
could go home, as proof that you were getting better and therefore no need to be 
smuggled in the night to Ward Two. (32)  
Istina, like all the patients in her cohort, must listen to authority, and they must not talk back. 
“Treatment” is administered as punishment for one’s subjectivity. Patients are not allowed to 
show emotion or have a voice. Istina mentions how one must listen to fit in, to figure out how to 
pass unnoticed, to survive and escape punishment. Uncooperative patients, who do not obey 
orders, who do not comply with the absurdity of institutional life, are given shock treatment or 
leucotomy to turn them into docile bodies, emptied of subjectivity and hollowed out of meaning. 
In the context of memory erasure, recovery is impossible. There is no hope of patients 
returning home. A selfhood without memory is meaningless, because one is unable to locate 
oneself in the world. Frame uses the metaphor of a “homeless parasite” (18) to describe the 




Then I rise disembodied from the dark to grasp and attach myself like a homeless 
parasite to the shape of my identity and its position in space and time. At first, I 
cannot find my way, I cannot find myself where I left myself, someone has 
removed all traces of me. I am crying. (18) 
In this instant, we come to know how destabilizing this treatment is for her, how it confuses her 
mind and causes her memory erasure. This is what ECT does to her, or at least what it feels like. 
Thus, it is safe to say that “erasure” is not a compassionate miracle for Frame. She describes 
electroshock as an existential death sentence. And while others might claim it to be a treatment 
that saved their lives, I think it is important to consider how devastating this autobiographical 
fictional account is. Despite the imaginative sound metaphors, it reveals a grave mishearing of 
human suffering: 
When I think of Cliffhaven I play the time game, as if I have been condemned to 
die and the signals have been removed yet I hear them striking in my ears, 
warning me that nine o’clock, the time of treatment, is approaching and that I 
must find myself a pair of woolen socks in order that I shall not die. (24) 
Istina is still trying to find a way to protect herself against peril. The wind cuts, merciless and 
dangerously (here, electricity is symbolized as wind), much like the harsh words from the nurses. 
The ongoing emotional and physical abuse seems never-ending: it is always winter. No matter 
the season “outside” the asylum, “inside” it is always cold and dead. The symbolic weight of 
winter gives Istina’s account a hopeless tone. Life seems impossible in winter, when nothing can 
grow or bloom. The cold is stagnant, absolute and violent. Her prayers are mixed with safety 
measures, because praying might not be enough. She needs extra reassurance, because the 




against electricity, she conjures memories of her father’s rubber boots. Her attention to detail is 
intense and visceral, a strong depiction of family life, rural poverty, and perhaps her father’s 
sense of humour: 
But it would not come to my mind what to do when I was threatened by 
electricity, except that I thought of my father’s rubber waders that he used for 
fishing and that stood in the wash house where the moth-eaten coats hung behind 
the door, beside the pile of old Humour Magazines, the Finest Selection of the 
World’s Wit, for reading in the lavatory. (…) Lost in a foreign land, take your 
position from the creeks flowing toward the sea, and your time from the sun. (12) 
This image renders erasure as an experience of being lost and not knowing one’s way home. 
Istina remembers that when lost, she should use the natural rhythms of the sun and the direction 
of the water’s current to locate herself in time/space. This is Nature’s Survival guide: how to 
navigate in an unknown forest, on a fishing trip, off the beaten path. But Istina is in an 
institutional and foreign land where there is no hope of knowing where one is. There is no sun. 
One is forever lost in the sterility, homogeneity and “sameness”. There is no way of knowing 
what day it is, or even what year. She must listen for clues. There is no way of knowing one’s 
name. One does not have a name. One does not speak from that name in the asylum. Blank faces, 
looking out from windows onto the lawn and gardens. Istina observes the china cups that contain 
patients’ false teeth. They are numbered instead of named, because names are meaningless: “the 
ink slips on the impenetrable china surface, and spreads, blurring from itself” (14). The intense 
alienation that Istina feels renders her not even unrecognizable, as no one can relate to her. She 
becomes nameless and without memory. Yet her rituals and superstition remain obsessive (ex. 




power, however imaginary or superstitious it may be. She is still holding on to fragments of free 
will: 
Yes, I was cunning. I remembered once a relationship between electricity and 
wetness, and on the excuse of going to the lavatory I filled the bath and climbed 
in, wearing my nightgown (…) and thinking Now, they will not give me 
treatment, and perhaps I may have a secret influence over the sleek cream-painted 
machine with its knobs and meters and lights. (12) 
Her effort to find “wool ward socks” (9) to keep warm, to defend against death, to protect herself 
from the “new treatment” and violence symbolizes Istina’s drive and passion for life despite the 
draining effects of electroshock that leave her feeling empty and cast off to nowhere, a 
“homeless parasite” (12). Listening is tied to resourcefulness, and Istina must struggle to survive 
and to remain herself. She listens to preserve a shield around her subjectivity, humanity, free will 
and agency in an institution that seeks to cure all the creative parts of her selfhood: 
I was cold. I tried to find a pair of long woolen ward socks to keep my feet warm 
in order that I should not die under the new treatment, electric shock treatment, 
and have my body sneaked out the back way to the mortuary. (9) 
Institutional listening manifests as compliance to rules and surveillance. ECT is depicted as a 
way to make patients more docile; after electroshock, they speak less and listen to orders. Thus, 
Istina observes shock as the new way of “quieting people” (9): 
the new and fashionable means of quieting people and making them realize that 
orders are to be obeyed and floors are to be polished without anyone protesting 




ECT subdues patients into a malleable pulp, perfectly molded to institutional rules. Gong sounds 
manage ward movement. Patients respond to the gong and position themselves, ready for orders. 
Nurses shout at them like drill sergeants. Auditory surveillance and medical listening indicate the 
presence of authority in the ward. The ward sounds are stressful for Istina: 
Suddenly, from somewhere in the ward, a deep gong boomed again and again and 
immediately the whole ward seemed to come alive, as if the sound had disturbed 
the patients, like insects or flightless birds from their nests, and I saw people small 
tall fat thin deformed mongoloid dwarfed appearing as if it were from nowhere 
from corners and hiding places and with their little bags of treasures in their 
hands, hurrying and scurrying to the obedience to the gong. (72) 
The treatment is designed to remove all agency, voice and spirit, quieting emotions instead of 
confronting, consoling, interpreting and learning from them. Weeping is a crime: here, we see 
the criminalization of emotion. Faces “fixed” into smiles symbolizes the harsh and inflexible 
methods of keeping people superficially “sane”, passively “okay,” but deep down they are still 
suffering an unnamable pain, something they don’t even understand or have a relationship with. 
The suppression of patients’ emotions also reinforces the idea that “negative” emotions are to be 
deleted, repressed or “fixed into smiles” instead of worked-through, engaged or negotiated 
toward new meanings. Sadness can be an opportunity to attend to a deeper wound, a silent 
cellular trauma, that one has never been given the language it needs to move through the body, to 
be spoken and released. 
The ECT soundscape that Istina describes before and after shock treatment sounds 
nothing like therapy. What would therapy sound like? Perhaps, the beautiful songs her mother 




screams and disorientation. With each treatment, she is unable to remember what warranted the 
shock treatment. There is no consent. She struggles to remember what she had done “wrong” (9). 
While in Ward 2, “the disturbed ward” (12), she claims to hear noises of distress, suggesting the 
extent of pain resounding in asylum. Istina is in the sensible category still, not in the “noisy” 
ward. The sounds of patients’ slurred speech scares her into thinking her time might come: 
“Were we not the “sensibly” ill who did not yet substitute animal noises for speech or fling 
limbs in uncontrollable motion to dissolve into secret silent hilarity” (19). Perhaps the 
treatment is what stole their ability to speak, to use language in a coherent fashion. Most of the 
people on this ward have received leucotomies and hundreds of ECT treatments, so much so 
that they barely have cognitive function. All of the permanent patients live in Ward 2: 
We heard them as background noises from their special park and yard and at night 
when their sleeping quarters, known as the Brick Building, became like a hive of 
bees wailing and screaming behind the rusted wire-netting windows, as if their 
day’s honey had been lost or never gathered. (36) 
What can their perception of the world be from behind rusted wire-netting windows? The sound 
of treatment on this ward is “stifled choking scream” (13). Here, Istina reflects on how the 
experience of erasure/unconsciousness is equivalent to loneliness: she no longer has thoughts or 
an imagination to keep herself company. After this scene, she goes back to nature metaphors; 
trying to locate herself in the forest/foreign land, trying to find her way home despite the 
memory erasure. Weaving the survival-camp dream imagery with the asylum, she is in/out of 




ground for Sing Sing’s electric chair (16). Istina’s “Season of Peril” is an example of how the 
asylum functioned to forget/erase deviant bodies from time. The screams behind closed doors 
sound: “convulsed and snorting” (16) are reminders that in order to survive she must listen to 
orders. Her rituals to stave off death, to count the seconds before treatment, to hold on to a sense 
of time is what preserves her sanity/agency. 
In losing one’s memory, one loses the tools to communicate with legitimacy. After ECT, 
Istina describes her mind as a scarred landscape, devoid of living plants. The image suggests the 
futility of her efforts to save or preserve any of the landscape; her memories will be burned in a 
raging forest fire. She describes this lost voice as lost tools and a scarred landscape with no hope 
of regrowth. She remains desolate and barren: 
It was early in my dream. The tracks of time crossed and merged with head on 
collision of hours a fire broke out blackening the vegetation that sprouts a green 
memory along the side of the track. I took a thimbleful of water distilled from the 
sea and tried to extinguish the fire. I waved a small green flag in the face of 
oncoming hours and they passed through the scarred countryside to their 
destination and as the faces peered from the window at me I saw they were the 
faces of the people awaiting shock treatment. (13) 
The violence of memory erasure is palpable, Istina no longer has the cognitive tools to make- 
meaning that will console and soothe her constant fear/anxiety of disaster. Istina describes the 
phenomenology of memory erasure as being like a “like a surgeon without his tools” (30). She 
feels robbed by psychiatry, and no one can be held accountable. Memories are immaterial, 
invisible and constantly changing—yet they are important meaning-making tools. It is near 




affected can know. This highlights the problem that most ECT survivors confront when 
attempting to share their stories. This is a powerful description of what ECT does to the person’s 
sense of self and their ability to communicate. Patients are lobotomized. They never get out. 
Straitjackets and brain damage keep them prisoners for all time. Their cells are held prisoner, the 
very essence of their atomic being: “Atoms in prison dress revolving and voyaging, if that were 
possible, in search of their lost nucleus” (77). However, what is fascinating about Frame’s use of 
the word “nucleus” is that it can also refer to phonology, where the nucleus of a syllable is the 
most sonorous part of a word (Anderson). Thus the nucleus with the most sonorous sound carries 
the most acoustic energy. Frame might have been alluding to the patient's desire to reclaim their 
lost acoustic energy that has been muted by the asylum’s sonic panopticon. Beneath the surface 
of Frame’s language is a sounding impulse for liberation. 
Throughout the novel, Istina fears becoming like the empty vessel humans she sees in the 
dayroom waiting for shock treatment or staring blankly out the window. Into nothing. There are 
no thoughts to keep them company (13). Istina often forgets that she is no longer a school 
teacher, a career she had before entering the hospital, and that she has been in the asylum for 
eight years (13). 
The doctor’s hospital “rounds” are rituals in pretending to listen to patients and 
pretending to care about their endeavors to pass the time (20). Patients have no ambitions, they 
are basically waiting to die, so the whole production of asking them about their macramé and 
needlepoint, as if it were their passion and drive in the world, is completely absurd. It is 
patronizing. The optics, however, gesture toward compassion, Dr. Howell seems to endorse the 
“new attitude” of patient-centered care. He is young and fresh-minded, and he has the latest 




other “alternatives” to the hopeless lock and key. Istina describes the excitement that he brings to 
the ward: “It was the youth of Dr. Howell which appealed to us” (22). After being surrounded by 
death, Dr. Howell brings hope that mental health care can be humane, as he advocates for leisure 
and occupational therapy. He believes mental patients ware people, not cattle. In The Birth of the 
Clinic, Foucault seems doubtful of these staged “encounters”. He describes how the very “idea” 
of doctor-patient relationships is stifled by the language of rationality and the medical gaze: 
The mindless phenomenologies of understanding mingle the sand of their 
conceptual desert with this half-baked notion; the feebly eroticized vocabulary of 
“encounter” and of the doctor-patient relationship exhausts itself in trying to 
communicate. (ii) 
A meaning has taken shape and hangs over the doctors’ and patients’ heads, preventing them 
from speaking from a “free” subjective position. They have already been written into the story of 
their relational transaction, and anything beyond this structure is erased, forgotten. Their training 
in the “new attitude” is meant to enhance consistency and effectiveness of care, by providing 
doctors with the scripts to systematize communication, and, in essence, to avoid error. One can 
understand the need for such paradigms: doctors’ care can make the difference between life and 
death, which demands ethical integrity and consistency. However, death is the ultimate 
inevitability, beyond all error. Despite stressing the need to treat patients as whole persons, the 
“new attitude” depicted by Frame is very similar to contemporary legislation of patient-centered 
care. The weight of professionalization has positioned the “care plan” before the patient—thus 
silencing the patient’s speech even within a “plan” that claims to encourage feedback and 
teamwork. “It was Dr. Howell who tried to spread the interesting news that mental patients were 




fact, like all doctors in the asylum, Dr. Howell is managed by the nurses, who say he is “too 
‘busy” to listen or answer patients’ questions about when they can “go home” (24). The patients 
crave a sympathetic listener; they are hungry for recognition. Within the economy and hierarchy 
of care, an assembly line is formed, where attention is distributed mechanically to each patient. 
The nurse-nuns (Matron Glass and Sister Honey) bitterly and purposefully interrupt the 
interaction between the doctor and patient. Although Istina does not know why, she describes 
these interruptions as the nurse-nuns aiding in maintaining Dr. Howell’s distance and allowing 
his exit from the caring scene: 
Then giving a troubled guilty glance around the dayroom, he would retreat for the 
door while Matron Glass and Sister Honey attended to the mechanics of his exit 
unlocking and locking the door and keeping at bay those patients whose need to 
communicate to a sympathetic listener made them hurry forward in a last attempt 
to show their tapestry or hurl abuse or greet-and-demand with Hello Doctor, when 
can I go home? (22) 
Dr. Howell is in a “privileged position” (22), above the patients. Istina describes how he drinks 
from a “special cup” to distinguish himself from the rest of the staff and patients and to prevent 
the spread of “diseases” (20). Much like today’s neoliberal hospital, there is no time to listen, 
because time is an expensive resource. Listening costs too much money. The doctor sometimes 
grants a patient sitting in the dayroom with a brief greeting, “but at the same time glancing 
hastily at his watch” (20), not paying attention, giving only a superficial portion of his time. The 
way Istina describes the scene, it seems like a parade, where the doctor (almost like a celebrity or 
god) tours the ward as a symbol of medical authority, scientific rigor and legitimacy. But he 




(who are all female) as they breathlessly compete for his attention, for the slight chance of being 
asked to speak: 
The patient chosen for conversation with the doctor would become so excited at 
this rare privilege that she sometimes didn’t know what to say or else began a 
breathless account which was cut short by Matron. (21) 
Condescending and disrespectful, the nun-nurses dismiss the patients who seek the doctor’s 
attention—whatever the patient says is not very important. It is simply seen as silly, a waste of 
time: “Now Doctor’s too busy to listen to that, Marion. You get on with your fancy work” (21). 
Speaking is regarded as a disturbance to the doctor. The nurses uphold the medical hierarchy 
more than the doctor, and it is suggested that perhaps Dr. Howell did not choose to be in this 
revered position of power. The asylum makes him uncomfortable. It is unsightly to witness. As 
the Matron Glass (head nurse) shoves aside Marion, a lonely patient, she apologizes to the doctor 
by saying, “She’s been uncooperative lately. We put her down for treatment tomorrow” (21). 
The nurses are bullies; they seem to hate the patients, most likely because they live and work 
with them so closely. The doctor is behind the glass door, watching them from his chart. He does 
not touch them; he does not get too close. He is scared, but also ashamed. He does not perform 
ECT: a team of nurses does it. 
All of these scenes boil down to uneven power dynamics that impede genuine and 
compassionate listening, which we still see today in contemporary psychiatric care. For example, 
The College of Nurses of Ontario (CNO) has a statement on “power” within the psychiatric 
nurse and patient relationship, it defines the term as a homogenous, flat entity that only the nurse 
can administer: “The nurse-client relationship is one of unequal power. Although the nurse may 




4). Power, here, becomes something that psychiatric nurses hold exclusively, as if it were a direct 
embodiment of medical ideology. Nursing students are taught to feel solely responsible for the 
patient’s recovery, which can have devastating results for thinking about the sharing required in 
ethical forms of communication. Absolute power feeds absolute knowledge and it leaves no 
room for listening to a story otherwise, or even subjectively. Critical of this absolutist approach, 
Foucault’s articulation of power counters tyrannical ownership. He writes, “Centers of power 
form multiple segments linked to one another which the individuals of a mass traverse or inhabit 
body and soul” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 23). Power is thus a matrix, intricately in flux, 
producing possible relationships and reality before it represses that reality. Such “reality” is 
never stable or true without a power-knowledge dynamic to organize it and make it true. 
Therefore, the discursive power-knowledge dynamic of the psychiatric training manual that 
names the nurse as the sole executor (or dictator) of power in the therapeutic relationship creates 
a false truth. The statement that nurses “have more power” (CNO 4) than patients seems 
redundant and obvious—almost absurd, since, according to Foucault, power is never unified and 
homogenous, but rather relational, functioning in a web of historical, social, political and 
economic exchanges. Of course, the nurse does have power, but such power is never without 
history. Even naming the patient a “client” reinforces the transactions of capitalist power based 
on a demand/supply economy—therefore, “clients” have power too. They can refuse treatment. 
They can threaten the nurse and the medical institution. They can bring their business elsewhere. 
They can die. Under these specters, nursing pedagogy understands “power” in simplistic and 
overt ways—and naming these power-relationships in such a way silences the very possibilities 
to change the discursive dynamics they produce. Power is about change, as well as repetition— 




From a historical perspective, we see in Frame’s novel how the “new attitude” (mental 
patients are people, like you and me) spreads as a less invasive mechanism of power—it operates 
under the guise of care but aims to ultimately control patients’ individual time and agency. 
Occupational Therapy is introduced slowly, and the concept that leisure and meaningful 
activities for patients can have a healing effect starts to become important. The language shifts in 
this moment as well: the optics of the “asylum” must be transformed into “psychiatric unit” (61). 
Calling it something “new” (new attitude) erases the traumatic history of the asylum (similar to 
the language of lived experience engagement), and it sterilizes the truth: 
[T]he doctor would nod absentmindedly, make a fatuous remark and because of 
his intelligence immediately realize the fatuity and mentally step back from 
himself like a salesman who has slighted his own wares. (21) 
The PR machine of healthcare operates to distance staff from having to take responsibility for 
their guilt. Re-thinking the doctor’s “guilty glance” as a means of escape, according to Sharon 
Todd in Listening to the Other, allows for guilt to be an opportunity to take responsibility, 
perhaps even to change attitude; but in his case, it is defeat, resignation to a hopeless view. These 
patients were never going to be viewed as worthy of respect. Despite being a part of the “new 
attitude” of psychiatry, Dr. Howell wants to keep his distance, to stay on the other side of the 
wall. He cannot risk listening to these women’s stories, as that would bring him too close: he 
would be brought into relationship with immense anguish, and he would have to believe them. 
To appease guilt and to deflect from engaging with patients authentically, Dr. Howell 
promises patients they will be going home soon (21). The promise of going home is cruel; it 
seems like a patronizing way to silence patients’ questions. These patients have no home to 




mostly because the psychiatric care system does not believe in recovery or in the patients being 
able to live meaningful lives. Istina says after her first “assessment” that her personality is 
“condemned like a slum dwelling” (12). This suggests that even her personality is uninhabitable, 
and she is homeless, existentially, both inside and out. ECT and lobotomy promise to bulldoze 
the “slum dwellings” that all the patients inhabit, much like city developers who demolished the 
homes of the poor to make room for market-based constructions. Condemned to be erased like 
the neighbourhoods she grew up in, Istina speaks about this as a symbolic death: although it 
might not be the end of life, it is the end of meaning. Homeless both physically and existentially, 
utterly starved for attention and meaning, they find meaning in the meager mundane interactions 
they receive. Even in the banality of a greeting they sway; they will romance a “hello” because 
they have been deprived of dialogic recognition. “But when you are sick you find yourself a new 
field of perception where you make a harvest of interpretations which then provides you with 
your daily bread, your only food” (23). This is an example of what sensory deprivation does to 
the brain: when you are so desperate for contact, you will live in the world of imagination to 
compensate for a horrible reality. Istina compares the nurses to poisonous insects and snakes, 
highlighting the sounds of metaphorical deceit. The doctor makes small-talk asking patients if 
they were settling in. The logic of “settling in” inside an asylum is jarring on many levels. The 
word “settled” conjures the colonizing effects of brain-washing, strategic erasure to be able to 
inculcate a new message, and to disempower the colonized from making-meaning or speaking 
for themselves. Patients must submit to a new way of life, one that does not disrupt the new 
economy of care: 
‘Settling in?’ the doctor would inquire from time to time, as a passing breeze from 




preparing for hibernation. The act of ‘settling in’ was surrounded with approval: 
‘the sooner you settle the sooner you will be allowed home was the ruling logic. 
(34) 
The nurse berates a patient having emotional difficulties by saying, “If you can’t adapt to living 
in a mental hospital how do you expect to live “out there” in the world?” (34). To settle in and 
adapt, Istina must hide. She must suppress her existence. To preserve her safety and selfhood, 
Istina hides in the linen cupboards to listen and to cry. This tactic will protect her from being 
“written up for ECT” (26). To be seen crying would result in punishment, so she hides. From this 
secret place, where she can express herself in peace, without the fear of being reprimanded, she 
also closely listens to the TB patients, those who are utterly hopeless. The TB patients are tucked 
away from sight, therefore the linen closet on their floor is the safest place to hide. The TB ward 
is also the most depressing ward, where patients look like ghosts—barely alive. When they die, 
their “bodies are hastily and antiseptically dispatched to the mortuary”(26). The mortuary has no 
name and it is hidden behind the laundry facility. Patient names are not written on graves; their 
bodies are disposed of, burned and never mourned. Even in death they are dehumanized and 
erased, made to take up less space and obey orders: 
If the mortuary were built in proportion, to really house the dead, its size would 
swallow the greenhouse and the laundry and the boiler house and the Big Kitchen, 
perhaps the entire hospital. But it is small, unobtrusive, and begs that patients 
conform to the rule of loneliness by dying one at a time. (27) 
This remark exposes the asylum as a place of death, not of healing, and not of recovery. It is 
where people go to die forgotten and dismissed. Istina feels as though she is listening to the dead. 




PTSD from the First World War (although, at the time PTSD did not exist within medical 
language, shell shock was the closest term and it was only reserved for soldiers, not war victims 
or witnesses). She speaks in a hoarse whisper about the “enemy in her room” (26). She is stuck 
in a memory loop from decades earlier. The nurses dismiss her repetitive whispers as they 
change her bedsheets. But to Istina, her story, told like a broken record, must be received and 
heard. Istina observes and hears how Margaret desperately wants to tell someone, anyone who 
will listen. She still sees the enemy in her room, and believes he is there waiting to hurt her. 
Isolated in a room with no sun for years, trapped in the trauma of her memory/imagination, 
Margaret embodies a liminal space between the dead and the living. Istina thinks that she appears 
to be dead, and she is described as translucent as a ghost. Listening to Margaret requires Istina to 
suspend logic, and welcome an imaginative relation, as Castoriadis suggests: “listening requires 
an initial suspension of a socially prescribed logic. What we hear is not a transparent 
representation of an unconscious entity but a movement of signs through which a subject makes 
meaning for herself” (129). Istina must renounce the certainty of understanding, she must 
welcome what cannot be known about Margaret, how the parts of her that speak are, 
unconsciously and strategically, concealing the larger story. Fittingly, Istina comes to this 
realization while hiding from nurses on duty: 
The linen cupboard is my favourite hiding place. It is scrubbed every morning by 
the TB nurse and the floor looks like the deck from a ship. From here I listen to 
Margaret who has TB and whose hoarse whisper tells continually of the First 
World War. She pleads with anyone who passes in the corridor to help her evict 




The linen closet, where time stops, is a microcosm of safety and controlled listening. It is a place 
where Istina can feel grounded, undisturbed, and where she can remember. It is a place where 
she can imagine and dream and weep and engage with her trauma of ECT. It is where she can 
find herself, ground herself, listen to her own bodily rhythms and breath: 
I know that the linen room was very often my sanctuary. I looked through its little 
dusty window upon the lower park and the lawns and trees and the distant blue 
strip of sea like sticky paper pasted edge to edge with the sky (...) I wept and 
wondered and dreamed the abiding dream of most mental patients—The World 
Outside, Freedom; and foretasted too vividly the occasions most feared—electric 
shock treatment, being shut in a single room at night (…) (30) 
The function of the linen closet is to help Istina learn how to listen to her own thoughts without 
judgement. It is a safe place to listen to herself and to others. During her stay in the asylum, 
Istina learns to repress her feelings; she learns to listen to authority and to do as she is told. 
Getting better means getting quieter and quieter. 
 
In addition to her fear of freedom represented by the linen cabinet, we encounter an 
ambivalent image of the sun. It illustrates both the hope and hopelessness of one day getting out 
into the world. Later in the scene, Istina observes how the sun makes its way through the “rusted 
netted window” (26), suggesting that a new way of seeing things emerges. Some ray of hope 
shines into a dark mind. Yet there remains a spatial hopelessness. The space in which these 
women are held is not conducive to seeing things in a different light. The space depresses as it 
oppresses and forbids sunlight. The sun is later illustrated as menacing (30), threatening to melt 
the road to success (a highway of glass which in itself would be a precarious route). Istina has 




when shafts of light manoeuvre their way through the rusted wire netting of the window to shine 
and set the motes dancing on the wall (26). As Frame describes: 
(the sun) rose higher in the sky its tassels dropping with flame threatening every 
moment to melt the precarious highway of glass. And the people: giant 
patchworks of colour with limbs missing and parts of their mind snipped off to fit 
them into the outline of the free pattern. (30) 
Minds snipped to fashion people into productive and happy workers on a precarious highway of 
glass is an unsettling image. Despite this modern attitude of “new psychiatry”, Istina has seen 
and heard too much to trust doctors’ promises of returning home or a returning sun. It was 
always winter, and Istina spent her time eavesdropping on the punishing plans of the ward staff: 
“But I was attacked increasingly by disquiet; I had seen, as it were, the sliding panels, overheard 
the sinister conversation” (66). Overhearing the “sinister conversation” (66) leaves Istina 
paralyzed. She is unable to settle into herself because the threat of punishment is always looming 
in the background. Trust is impossible, thus hindering her chances of recovery. 
Janet Frame’s unconventional use of grammar highlights the discrepancy between voice, 
memory and time. She symbolizes “memory erasure” with her psychedelic prose that skips 
through time compared to the rigid grammar of the institution that manages patients’ experience 
of time. Frame’s writing mimics transition without recollection, paragraphs end suddenly and 
start in abrupt new time and location. Time is a major concern for Istina, with “asylum time” 
punctured by cognitive lapses and strict routines that stutter in between her recollected story. 
Istina and other patients are constantly waking up in another time/space, in strange unworldly 
dimensions, illustrated by the perpetual and uncanny confusion about the seasons. In the Time of 




aspect to narrating what one remembers and what is (120). To make this concept come alive, 
Janet Frame’s unconventional use of grammar disrupts the time of the asylum. In this sense, I 
call her prose psychedelic in that it induces a trick of perception, a sort of linguistic alchemy that 
shifts reality towards something more promising: an unconventional expression that subverts the 
limitations of being imprisoned in a time one does not remember or feel connected to. Time, like 
memory, cannot be measured or captured by a constant. The asylum is conducive to erasure, 
alienation and confusion precisely because it is as rigid as grammar. It is a language that will not 
bend to basic needs. Through her loss of subjectivity, she transforms her language. Istina stops 
punctuating her sentences, stops signaling time. Her writing drifts into free-form, and the past- 
present-future are all forever being lost at sea, like a dreamlike oceanic experience. Time just 
washes over her. Frame’s unconventional grammar and lack of punctuation signal a free flow, a 
stream of consciousness in her writing/voice. Istina speaks directly to the collapse of time and 
memory: 
There is no past present or future. Using tenses to divide time is like making chalk 
marks on water. I do not know if my experiences at Cliffhaven happened years 
ago, are happening now, or lie in wait for me in what is called the future. (29) 
Again, themes of being displaced in time/space due to memory erasure relate to feelings of 
homelessness and selflessness. We see how memory erasure affects one’s ability to know 
oneself, to find oneself, and to measure one’s existence (or improvement) in time-based 
chronology (29). It disrupts one’s internal grammar, one’s ability to make sense of their lives and 
to articulate what happened to them coherently. There is no progress, no sense of moving 
towards something new and hopeful. Repetition of not knowing what time it is, what day, what 




unknowable horizon (29) like the distant blue strip of sea, or the “Outside World” that the 
patients cannot imagine. 
The unknowable horizon of the outside world, beyond the asylum walls, is probably the 
most obvious limitation these patients face. They are also confronted with the impossible dream 
of ever experiencing love, for oneself and for another. As ECT has damaged Istina’s brain, she is 
unable to get out of “the dream” she is permanently hallucinating or stuck in the “Unreality” (4). 
“Love” is a crab with a rainbow shell and pincers that walked sideways getting nowhere, which 
symbolizes how inaccessible and impossible it is to hold onto. 
In spite of this ongoing hopelessness, Istina becomes a beacon of light and warning, 
mobilizing sound and listening to protect the other patients from harm. Her listening skills are 
survival skills, and she listens to warn others of upcoming danger. Those who have been subdued 
into a vegetative and medicated state no longer have anxiety as a healthy drive to preserve the 
ego. Istina’s reclamation of cognition and power are animated with sonic metaphors: the sound 
of thunder and the image of lightning. When Istina finally makes it to Ward 7, the privileged 
ward, where the most “sane” reside, she listens to the differences. This is the ward of fashionable 
madness, the artistic kind.  They do not speak about their symptoms; rather they are nostalgic 
and dreamy. Istina recounts the erasure of patient’s lives outside of the asylum: “I heard no one 
talking of their families or their nervous breakdowns and its symptoms; it was obvious that 
eccentricity was either not realized or else accepted, as the way of life in the ward, and certainly 
not discussed” (45). Sounds and listening measure safety and freedom and Istina hears the 
difference between spaces within the asylum: in this ward, the patients are allowed to visit the 




Unfortunately, her time in Ward 7 is short lived. She is soon transferred to Ward 4 and 
then back to Ward 2 for being disobedient. She describes Ward 2 as sucking the life out of her, 
eroding every bit of her will. This kind of existential erosion is depicted by rotting meat in the 
sun, carnivorous flies stealing the last of her oxygen, the natural process of decay. The 
environment is not one in which a being can survive. In Ward 2 she is denied pants, and at this 
point, she decides to speak up: “I wanted the peeled layers of human dignity to be restored, as in 
one of those trick films where the motion moves backwards, so that I could see beneath the 
surface” (79). She starts to “make a fuss” (79) to demand her rights, at the very least a pair of 
pants that fit. She also begins to stand up for others who cannot speak, who are in straitjackets or 
are mute. Istina decides to be their voice. Speaking and animating sound is just as important as 
listening and receiving sound, and is crucial for emancipation: 
I was shocked once to find myself without pants. I made a fuss. I was becoming 
adept at making a fuss, at arguing and trying to stand up for my rights and the 
rights of other patients whom I felt the responsibility of protecting. I complained 
loudly, “I’ve got no pants!” I thought of Ward 7, its brightness and kindness and 
the gently melancholy patients talking of their aches and pains and not being able 
to sleep and suffering all the sweet irritations of consciousness; talking too of 
home and relatives and plans for the future; everything seeming so tidy and 
certain and safe. (81) 
The humiliation of not having pants and having to put up a fight for basic dignity leads Istina to 
imagine a blanket of snow muffling patients’ voices. This sound-image quite powerfully 
illustrates the effect of silencing and the way in which it accumulates over time until one is 




lives” (81) and “if a tomorrow ever came it would not hear us” (81), she illustrates the endless 
cycle of Foucault’s notion that madness cannot speak. Tomorrow is the possibility to be heard, 
but tomorrow does not exist for someone who is buried alive. She feels like the entire world has 
“given up” on her and her cohort: 
And the days passed packing and piling themselves together like sheets of 
absorbent material, deadening the sound of our lives, even to ourselves, so that 
perhaps if a tomorrow ever came it would not hear us; its new days would bury us 
in its own name; we would be like people entombed when the rescuers, walking 
about in the dark waving lanterns and calling to us, eventually give up because no 
one answers them; sometimes they dig, and find the victim dead. … So time was 
falling upon us, like snow muffling our cries and our lives, who would melt it for 
us. (82) 
The only way to escape winter, the impending death and doom, is to be heard. Diane Ackerman 
in A Natural History of the Senses describes how “absurdity” (in Arabic) means not being able to 
hear (175). She goes on, “To lose your sense of hearing, a crucial thread dissolves, and you lose 
track of life’s logic” (175). To be heard and to hear thickens the sensory stew of our lives, and 
we depend on them to help us interpret, communicate with and express the world around us. 
Biologically, hearing “bridges the ancient barrier between air and water, taking the soundwaves, 
translating them into fluid waves and then into electrical impulses” (Ackerman 177). This 
transformative act is a form of radical hope that Istina holds onto. Being heard would melt the 
snow and break down the communicative barriers Istina faces. Listening with compassion would 
create a relation that could give the patients hope of recovery. It could restore a therapeutic bond 




listens to the environmental sounds instead of the sounds of the asylum. To vanquish the sinister 
whispers that plan to give her shock therapy as punishment, she imagines listening to the ocean 
tides falling on a beach. The sound of an engine shunting and tides falling upon the beach, as if a 
private ferry were in operation with the bodies being taken from shore to shore (84). But her 
imagination can only go so far. Her fear of lobotomy, to be turned into a strange mute animal, 
grows every day: 
I could no longer control my fear; it persisted and grew stronger and day after day 
I made myself a nuisance by asking, asking if they were planning to give me ECT 
or to do anything terrible to me, to bury me alive in a tunnel in the earth so that no 
how long I called for help no one would hear me, to remove part of my brain and 
turn me into a strange animal who had to be led about with a leather collar and 
chain wearing a striped dress. (86) 
Convinced she will be murdered with electricity or leucotomy, she is distressed from the abuse 
and patronizing treatment. She grows violent. She attacks the nurses. Her anger consumes her in 
a negative way to the point of desiring suicide. Istina attempts suicide by “stealing tablets” (180). 
She writes a letter to Death. The nurse-nuns catch her, and she is resuscitated against her will: 
I wrote to death: Dear Death, I said formalizing our relationship (…) Then a 
stomach pump, black coffee, before I slept, screaming and screaming at Sister 
Bridge (…) then sleep in seclusion. (180) 
 
While in seclusion, she is denied reading materials so Istina recites poems to herself to cope with 
the boredom (183). Poetry reminds her of her mother, it soothes her anxiety and brings her back 
to herself. In a sense, her suicide attempt can be understood as an expression, a way to speak and 




her as she is: “I knew they were hiding the truth from me, refusing to tell me the fearful plans 
they were making. And I had to know” (86). Out of nowhere she is transferred back to Ward 7, 
which means she has recovered enough, has quieted. But she will not forget the trauma she 
experienced in Lawn Lodge; she carries it like bank-notes. To know how her resources were 
spent, and who took what within this economy of imprisonment in the guise of care: 
I do not know, I cannot remember when it happened that the nurse came to fetch 
me, saying ‘You’re being transferred to Ward Seven’, but I found myself 
wandering once again the garden with my experiences in Lawn Lodge like the 
bank-notes that you are told to put in small bags. (107) 
All of her transfers happen as if by dream or transcendence. She has no mental record, no 
timeline. She just woke up as someone new. Frame’s writing mimics this transition without 
recollection; paragraphs end suddenly and start in abrupt new times and locations. But the fear is 




The Faces in the Water: Frame’s Ethics of Listening Otherwise 
 
 
In this section, I engage with the sonic landscape of inner-listening and dialogic listening in the 
novel. The asylum soundscape is one that defined and managed madness; sound was used to 
differentiate between those thought to be sane and those seen and heard as insane. Patient sounds 
and gestures defined their otherness and the interpretations of their sounds by asylum staff as 
“other” normalises the listener (MacKinnon 77). Frame, on the other hand, subverts this dynamic 
of interpretation and urges a form of ethical listening that restores the patient’s existential 




suggest a civic responsibility towards a response, a communicative gesture of compassion that 
risks vulnerability. Being able to listen self-reflexively and dialogically is crucial for creating an 
ethical bond which troubles the authoritarian dominance of psychiatric listening in the “Season of 
Peril”. Engaging with “the face” through listening to its submerged speech underwater is a way 
to subvert the power of psychiatry that silences madness. 
“The face” is an important image in the novel. Frame uses it as a metaphor for the 
human, with the “face” symbolically warning against systemic dehumanization processes. We 
encounter “the face” as a powerful metaphor that provokes and contests this slippage, in several 
instances. One of the ways Istina attends to the alterity of the Other is through listening, without 
trying to understand, but simply holding-space for the Other to be. The first encounter with “the 
face” is when Istina, in a dream sequence prior to being hospitalized, sees patients being 
transported to Cliffhaven by train. They make eye contact. She is afraid and perplexed. Their 
faces contradict the ideology that these people are unlike her. Their faces humanize them, even if 
they are nameless and wearing prison-like smocks. The face is an image that startles, forcing her 
to engage and be in relation to the Other. It makes her question her own discomfort with madness 
and how she can take responsibility to advocate for those who cannot speak for themselves. 
I waved a small green flag in the face of the oncoming hours and they passed 
through the scarred countryside to their destination and as the faces peered from 
the window at me. I saw they were the faces awaiting shock treatment. There was 
Miss Caddick, Caddie, they called her, bickering and suspicious, not knowing that 
she would soon die and her body sneaked out the back to the mortuary. And there 
was my own face starring from the carriageful of the nicknamed people in their 




This dream sequence of faces foreshadows Istina’s eventual arrival at Cliffhaven and memory 
erasure by ECT. Seeing her own face superimposed onto the patient faces who are awaiting 
shock treatment symbolizes her similar fate. Her memory skips from past-present-future, and is 
off-track, from ECT like the “tracks of time merged and with a head-on collision of hours a fire 
broke out blackening the vegetation” (13). This is an example of how Frame flattens time/space, 
weaving future knowledge into recollection. As the passage illustrates, she sees her reflection 
superimposed onto the faces of the asylum inmates as a foreshadowing of her future fate of 
ECT’s memory erasure. Istina sees the face of Miss Caddick, as it was before her death, and 
knows she will soon die and her body will be erased from time. The asylum remembers no 
one. Frame finds affinity in the lost patients, those who no longer have the means to speak in 
coherent grammar or gestures, those whose names have been replaced with Ward nicknames, 
whose memories are erased by the perpetual winter. 
Encountering the face is to encounter one’s own vulnerability which is something that 
psychiatry in this novel refuses to do. Earlier in the novel we see the face “fixed into smiles,” 
unable to weep. Encountering vulnerability through the Other’s ungraspable alterity is a 
mechanism to build compassion within psychiatry. In line with Emmanuel Levinas’s views in 
Totality and Infinity, the singularity of the face directs our attention to the universal that we can 
never escape; we are forever indebted and responsible before the infinity of the Other. This 
relationship to the face (the Other) connects us back to the whole, the unknowable infinite 
complexity of the universal that we must remain open to receiving through a “quiet listening, 
vigilant against its own interference, cautious of its own interference, careful not to disturb” (21). 
Frame centralizes a lesson in permanence: Istina is now ideologically and culturally 




she is indistinct, becoming a permanent citizen. All throughout the novel, pre-asylum, she felt 
homeless and out of place, but now she is a citizen of a place she does not identify with. She has 
been shaped to fit into it, or “broken into” it, like a wild mare given the thickest bit: “I was in the 
crazy world, separated now by more than locked doors and barred windows from people who 
called themselves sane (90). Frame in this instance is inverting the word “crazy” to symbolize 
how social conventions and constructed norms create insane conditions for beings to adjust to, 
which results in madness. The institution upholds “sanism” in completely insane ways, thus 
reinforcing the artificial binary between sane/insane: but so does everyday society. Institutional 
“sanity” is produced through elaborate discursive formations that obscure its very existence as a 
political tool. The “people who call themselves sane” (90) are sane because they have not been 
marked with the stigma of madness. Sanity, by this technological logic, is described by the 
absence of madness. In contrast, Philips attempts to describe sanity in a more robust manner, by 
getting at its ethical possibility. For Philips, a more useful understanding of sanity would be to 
interpret it as the ethical responsibility and courage to ensure the world is a good place to live for 
everyone who inhabits it. Sanity would prioritize caring relationships that uphold compassion 
and dialogical difference. Philips writes, “For the deeply sane, whatever sanity might be, it is a 
container for madness, not a denier of it” (180). By recognizing madness as a symptom of being 
alive in the world, we can reconnect to the ethical gesture of sanity. Sanity is not found in the 
brain like a tumor, described with absolutes, nor is it a gene we are born with. Rather, it is a state 
of being for each other and with each other. It describes what we are made of, instead of what we 
lack. 
Sanity in fact, is a verb, and for Philips it should prevent humiliation (199). To engage 




world” she is referring to the asylum, but it can symbolize Western colonial society at large, 
because the codes of the asylum are merely exaggerated social norms found in everyday civilian 
contexts. On the contrary, sanism, the discursive idea that to be “sane” is to be without madness, 
is everywhere and goes unnoticed, thus reproducing “normalcy” from both inside/outside the 
asylum. 
Another instance where Frame uses “the face” to symbolize the need for ethical 
engagement with the Other is when Brenda, the leucotomy pianist, sees her face in the dayroom 
piano. The reflection is a trigger to a past self that was on a path of fame and prestige; now lost 
and living in an asylum, Brenda has little dignity left. We first encounter Brenda when Istina is 
transferred to Ward 4. She is reacquainted with Brenda after years of not seeing her, in Ward 2 
(the troubled ward). At first, Istina notices the “change” in Brenda, reflects on how she had once 
been a brilliant pianist and now Istina “tries not to weep” (129) at the sight of her condition. 
Brenda recognizes Istina and recognizes the piano in the dayroom. She sees her reflection in the 
piano, as if “it had begun to pay her compliments. It shone ebony; she could see her face in it, 
even the shadowy hint of her dark moustache” (129). Despite being completely disoriented by 
the leucotomy and unable to speak coherently, Brenda still can see herself “in the piano”. A part 
of her will always remain instinctively a pianist, and this is the portion of her psyche that can still 
speak through the language of music. 
As MacKinnon describes, while music was used as medicine in many asylums, it was 
also used as an “aesthetic restraint” (93). Patients were not encouraged to play their desired 
music or to express themselves creatively, rather they had to play “appropriate music” (94). 
Frame also describes this phenomenon. By popular request, Brenda begins to play “Always 




Song to Remember (1945) was popular at the time. The song itself is a metaphor for the patient’s 
dream of one day being free, of one day experiencing a state of contentment and inner peace. But 
reaching the end of the rainbow, where happiness exists, seems impossible. The narrator in the 
song questions if they are a failure for not reaching happiness or if the world is to blame for their 
troubles. The song reflects Brenda`s situation: listening to Brenda play makes Istina 
uncomfortable and she feels guilty for having not saved her from Ward 2, for not having done 
enough to prevent this tragic loss of talent and selfhood. Before Brenda can finish playing the 
song the nurse quietly interrupts to put a stop to the music because it seems to be upsetting the 
other patients: 
At first Brenda played lovingly, remembering every note, although her sense of 
time seemed to have suffered (…) Listening to her, one experiences a deep 
uneasiness as of having avoided an urgent responsibility, like someone who 
walking at night along the banks stream, catches a glimpse in the water of a white 
face or a moving limb and turns quickly away, refusing to help or to search for 
help (…) we all see the faces in the water. We smother our memory of them, even 
our belief in their reality, and become calm people of the world; we can never 
forget them nor help them. (131) 
This passage captures the essence of the novel “faces in the water”: there is an ethical 
responsibility towards the human beings trapped in the asylum, but it is unfulfilled. At the time 
of Istina’s confinement, there was very little advocacy for patients and “recovery” was not yet a 
concept in popular consciousness: these ideas came later, around the time Frame was writing the 
novel. Here, Istina reflects on hopelessness and guilt. The water symbolizes a dream-like past, 




recurrence. The faces are forever drowning. In myth, water is inchoate and potential; it is where 
we all come from and where we all return. There is a sense of dissolving of self/other an eternal 
return to an archaic, preverbal world of silence. Individual identity is undifferentiated from the 
collective. 
Brenda's encounter with her own face is intertwined with Istina's encounter with her guilt, 
which is heavy, silent and unmovable. Istina’s guilt is triggered by listening to Brenda’s inability 
to play the piano as she once did. In this guilt, Istina fears being submerged into oblivion along 
with Brenda. Sharon Todd in Learning from the Other believes that guilt can be a gesture 
towards taking responsibility for one’s actions in creating an ethical and socially just world. 
Istina’s guilt and silence could be read as an ethical possibility. As Lévinas puts it, thinking is an 
un-articulable “groping to which one does not even know how to give verbal form” (21). The 
relationship is silent and open. Thus, in order to meet the Other, one must believe in Infinity, 
which for Lévinas means a non-synthesizable ethical relation. Infinity from this standpoint is 
against totality, for it is not complete within itself but seeks endlessly to serve what is beyond 
itself. Infinity advocates for a togetherness of being face-to-face that does not collapse both faces 
into a unit but maintains the relation between the two. I see Infinity as silence, for it cannot 
contain a definable sound, it remains open towards endless possibilities. Yet we fear such 
boundless relations, we want to map out limits, delineate the expansion of the universe, function 
soundly within the laws of representation and being-in-the-world. Istina does not want to merge 
with the faces in the water, nor does she want to become like Brenda. This desire for separation 
and boundary is entirely understandable; it is bound to her survival instinct: “sometimes by a 




“Seeing our own face” suggests revealing our unconscious bias through self-reflexivity. 
Unconscious bias refers to the automatic associations that our brains make about another 
individual based on an incomplete story. Learned stereotypes and essentialized notions of 
normalcy, as well as deeply rooted cultural, social and environmental factors all feed this 
incomplete story about the Other (Banaji and Greenwald). Uprooting unconscious biases is 
inherently unsettling, as Frame depicts. The differences that separate us, discursively, are usually 
seen as vertical instead of horizontal. Frame’s statement submerges us into relation with the 
Other and subverts the idea that we are separate from those we imprison in asylums. As we 
plunge deeper into the water of our unconscious bias, we learn how to engage with “the face”, 
how to listen beyond trying to know, and how to let go of the stories that keep us safely separate. 
Realizing she is trapped, a prisoner in her body estranged from her art and skill, Brenda becomes 
a stranger to herself, and the torture of remembering what she was once capable of but no longer 
able to do is too much to handle emotionally. She is full of rage and anger. The treatment robbed 
her of her sense of timing/time. Robbed of her artistic abilities and talents, she has nowhere to go 
but to destroy the piano, to rage against it, to assert what she has lost. Therefore, in the midst of 
playing, Brenda suddenly stops, “clearly struck by the irrevocability of her situation, and begins 
to rage and scream and thump violently upon the keys” (131). In this moment, she is then 
reprimanded for overreacting and told to never again play piano because “it always ends up like 
this” (131). What the nurses do not realize is that “it always ends up like this” because they 
always misinterpret Brenda’s anger as violence instead of as a cry for help. They do not listen to 





Disciplinary responses to Brenda's reckoning with her own selfhood (her “face”) deepen 
when we apply critical feminist lens. Women’s anger is often pathologized as “psychotic”. Even 
today, there are very few outlets for women’s rage. Judy Chamberlin, a psychiatric survivor and 
activist from the 1980s-1990s, said at the National Alternatives Conference in 1994 that 
psychiatric therapies are often a form of social control because they try to resolve women’s anger 
instead of attending to it as a “real expression of suffering” (ShrinkWrap 1994 audio recording). 
Women’s anger, according to Chamberlin, is not “a symptom to be drugged, shocked or 
 
sterilized away” (ShrinkWrap 1994 audio recording). Thus, trying to resolve or cure is a form of 
silencing, especially if it damages the patients’ ability to perform tasks and skills that were 
important to them. This kind of treatment is, according to Chamberlin, paternalistic and does not 
meaningfully engage with the intelligence, coherence and nuance of women’s anger. Even if 
their anger is often an expression of trauma or abuse from their past, women do not necessarily 
need a psychiatric system to be involved in their recovery. Being angry and confident in that 
anger is a source of women’s empowerment, and it should not be diminished by a system that 
calls it “abnormal behavior” or a “mood disorder,” or, at the time of Frame’s novel, 
“disobedience”: 
Anger is a source of our power (…) we will not allow anyone, psychiatrist or 
feminist therapist, try to convince us that we are sick because we are enraged, 
because we refuse to calm down and adjust to a reality that defines us as 
inferior. (Don Weitz Fond Box 25 ShrinkWrap 1994 audio recording) 
Brenda's narrative background situates gendered psy discipline in social context. Upon a closer 
read, we come to understand Brenda was a victim of verbal and physical abuse from her brother. 




debilitated her and ruined any possibility of exiting the hospital and having a successful music 
career. This was not an uncommon reality for a lot of the women found in the asylum against 
their consent. “Recovery” would mean she could be supported in playing piano, in continuing 
her relationship with music-making. But sadly, Brenda is another patient who was 
misdiagnosed—whose only reason for being incarcerated was because she was an intelligent, 
talented and out-spoken woman who is angry at the world for trying to limit her potential. 
 
Compelled by the haunting “faces in the water”, Istina feels like it is her duty to protect 
others from harm. She feels responsible for their survival in the cruel and contradictory care of 
the asylum, and she wants to shield the other patients from the verbal abuse freely dispensed like 
medication. The nurses do not mind treating the patients like sub-human specimens; they do not 
see their existence or sovereignty. They believe them to be too braindead to understand the 
abuse. Madness cannot speak because the caregivers do not believe that those who are labelled 
mad can understand what they are saying, assuming they are too dumb to comprehend speech. 
Istina knows the patients. She listens to their stories, understands the logic of their incoherent, 
highly metaphorical speech, and compassionately listens when no one else will: 
And it distressed me when the nurse, to excuse words that to an ordinary person 
would be hurting and cruel, said, ‘She doesn’t know any better. She doesn’t know 
what I am saying. Can’t you understand that these people to all intents and 
purposes are dead? (90) 
The nurse’s rhetorical question: “Can’t you understand these people to all intents and purposes 
are dead?”, says more than she intends, revealing the asylum’s tacit agreement in the symbolic 
erasure of patients. They are known as ghosts before they are even dead. Dominant discursive 




represent.. In Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida explains how the ghost is produced by the 
incarnation of ideology, which is ingrained, incorporated and negated by the subject. The only 
way to overcome the haunting of ideology, or the construction of a fixed concept ingrained 
within the self, is to be open to it, to welcome its ghost as a way to think with traces beyond the 
trace. We need to learn to live with ghosts, to be unsettled and pushed along the borders of 
madness: “He should learn to live by learning not how to make conversation with the ghost—but 
how to talk with him/her, how to let them speak or how to give them back speech, even if it is 
oneself, even if they do not exist—even if they are no longer or not yet” (25). On the other hand, 
Jacques Derrida claims that we must be open to this kind of madness in ourselves, because 
reason alone is not enough to think with ghosts. Madness is thus a way to open ourselves up to 
the ghost: “There is someone mad enough to hope to unlock the possibility of such address” 
(14). Witnessing the ghost interpellates it and calls it into a speaking relation, which is often 
obscured by traditional forms of scholarship and knowledge production. 
Janet Frame’s ethic of listening is compassionate towards ghosts of the living. However, 
though the novel portrays a grim asylum atmosphere, not all the nurses are without compassion. 
Those that once longed to care give up because of the inhumane management of the asylum. The 
nurses burn out due to long hours and understaffed wards. The working conditions are not sane 
or conducive for care, with no investment in recovery. Istina listens to the patients that everyone 
else has given up on—all the patients who have turned to ghosts, spectres of the asylum. Louise, 
a Holocaust survivor with intense traumatic flashbacks, has paranoid thoughts about her 
intestines. “Miles and miles of intestines” (93), she repeats incessantly. To get her to stop, to 




I did not talk to Louise; I listened to her.I guess that Louise was living a horror 
story more alarming than any found in science-fiction paperbacks. I felt sorry for 
Louise; she had a story to tell and they were disinclined to listen to her. (93-94) 
After the lobotomy, Istina notices that Louise has lost her beautiful dark curly hair, once a part of 
her identity, a distinguishing characteristic. Istina recounts, “After her operation Louise became 
more docile” (94). The affective scope of communication is thus silenced, the psychiatric patient 
is restrained, and the treatment is given almost as punishment. The patient as a “person” is 
forgotten and erased from the equation; their body is emptied of all emotion, will, and soul. 
Frame is searching for the human in the mechanistic world of the asylum, through the sonic 
panopticon, she finds “the face” of the Other and welcomes its full alterity into existence as a 
meaning-making subject. 
 
Madness as a “New Kind of Music” 
 
 
Faces in the Water, rather than objectifying the Mad, can be read as describing the pathos of 
madness through the figurative language of music and sound. As Frame describes, madness 
becomes a “new kind of music” (77), with rhythm and harmony not generally understood by 
traditional composition or medicine. Of course, Frame’s words are always metaphors for 
something else: they do not directly describe their object, and yet they suggest a sense of what 
madness is. Istina begins to reclaim her voice within madness by embracing its musicality and 
song. The harmony of the institution relied heavily on the regulation of gendered sounds and 
voices (MacKinnon 101), and this form of regulation is evident in the “Season of Peril” sections 




a new kind of music, Frame is subverting what is considered “appropriate music” or “music as 
medicine” that asylums adopted to control a patient's emotional and gendered embodiment. 
The music metaphors that Frame uses to describe the language of madness arrive late in 
the novel, once Istina has become one of the “permanent citizens'' and has “settled” into the 
asylum. Frame builds upon Shoshanna Felman’s figuration of madness as an ambivalent meeting 
place of reason and irrationality, where the two polarities interact and activate an ability to 
witness incompleteness in a text (50). For Frame, madness creates a new reasoning system, a sort 
of body knowledge or phenomenological way of knowing. Attending to the rhythms of madness 
is attending to one’s emotions in the most honest way possible, a way of inserting the body into 
thought/rationality. In Frame’s reclaiming of madness, long before it was fashionable to do so, 
she heals the body/mind divide to allow madness to speak: 
I belonged now to the ranging mass of people and the dead lying, like rests in the 
music, upon the ground. I knew the mad language which created with words, 
without using reason, has a new shape of reason; as the blind fashion from touch 
an effective shape of the sight denied them. (91) 
Most of the patients that Frame describes in the novel do not have a voice that is taken seriously 
or engaged. They must sing the songs they are told to sing as a performative cure or musical 
restraint (Frame 91). However, the patients sing as a subversive tactic, which disturbs the asylum 
constraints and silencing forces. Singing can serve as a way for the patients to break free from 
the limitations of incarceration and to regain hope of freedom. Song empowers their vibrational 
power to exist, while making the asylum staff uncomfortable and resistant: 
They sang with a gusto which seemed to disturb the minister standing soberly and 




They sang fervently (…) The men’s voices prolonged and powerful if sometimes 
out of 
tune, often showed unwillingness to abandon a satisfying last note, keeping the 
sympathetic organist. (91) 
 
Music is depicted as mnemonically generative and emancipatory for patients in the ward, 
triggering both communal and personal memory of a time when they were free. Frame positions 
music and sound as a way to reclaim a sense of self, community and home for patients in the 
ward. Istina’s memory of her mother’s songs helps her get through the day, helps her remember 
that she is part of a community. 
I remember the idyllic songs my mother use to compose about this northern 
harbor that she had never seen…And the sight of the mud flats made me 
homesick for all the times I had stood on beaches when the tide was out and the 
shadows of the clouds moved across the Herringbone patterns on the sand, and I 
dug with my toes for clams and cockles. (90-91) 
The asylum soundscapes, the peril and noise, are soothed by re-membering sounds and songs 
from home. Her re-membering of soothing sounds, that symbolize a time when she was free and 
cared for, highlights how sound is medicine for coping with trauma. This sonic healing and deep 
listening is described as the ethical healing process of Dadirri, an Aborignal (Maori) listening 
practice that is a deeply contemplative process tied to remembering one’s community traditions 
and quiet awareness towards new forms of wisdom (Atkinson 15)14. 
 
9 Judy Atkinson in Trauma Trails: Recreating Songlines describes Dadirri as emerging from the work of Miriam 
Rose Ungumerr as “the ‘Aboriginal gift’ it has a special quality, a unique gift of the Aboriginal people. It is inner 
deep listening and quiet still awareness something like a contemplation the principles and functions of dadirri are: a 
knowledge of community; ways of relating and acting within community, a non-intrusive observation, or quiet 




The life writing of madness betrays its silence, romantic fiction, its sublime 
 
unworldliness, Frame’s writing provides an opportunity to listen to madness as a new kind of 
music instead of as a cacophonic stereotype. Madness is a literary device used to insert passion 
and outpouring into a contained rational form and have the body spill into an artistic realm 
dominated by the mind. The literary creation of madness, a trope for genius and forward-thinking 
or for great liberty and emancipation of spirit, falls short in the asylum, where it is un- 
glamourous and fear-inducing. Frame characterizes the spectacle of madness as a loss of the 
inability to speak and be heard as an existential being. The negative capability of madness, the 
side that is not considered genius, and is seldom represented because it is too close to real-life, 
would ruin our popular notions of madness as “romanticized genius” (Frame 96). Bringing 
madness back to real-life makes it something we can relate to, it bridges the gap between 
us/them and conjures the possibility of our proximity to those we deem “insane” (96). As Frame 
mentions in her autobiography, An Angel at my Table, madness is a sensory and sonic vessel for 
engaging the poetic of our everyday phenomenology: 
there is a side of madness which is seldom mentioned in fiction because it would 
damage the romantic popular idea of the insane as a person whose speech appeals 
as immediately poetic; but it is seldom the easy Opheliana recited like pages of a 
seed catalogue or the outpourings of Crazy Janes who provide, in fiction, an outlet 
for poetic abandon. (Frame, Angel at My Table 96) 
None of the patients Frame describes could be the heroines of a novel. They are too crude, too 
much of a nuisance; and in engaging with her writing of them, in listening to their stories, I learn 
about compassionate listening beyond wanting to understand, but instead as a gesture of love. 




narcissistic hope to find a secret message about ourselves in the image; as readers, perhaps we 
hope to discover a hidden aspect of our inner self. Frame reminds us that “madness as a new kind 
of music” creates opportunity for listening otherwise and subverting the status quo. Madness can 
speak as music, as an emotional composition that brings listeners closer to their own existence. 
Despite how difficult it might be to witness madness and listen to its discordant rhythm, beneath 
all the layers of psychological explanations and pathologies that might defend against its 
expression is a kernel of truth that speaks of universal needs. These are needs we all have as 
existential beings: to be loved, to be safe, to be recognized by another, yet these are needs that 
psychiatry finds difficult to address because they are nuanced and subjective. The psychiatry of 
Frame’s generation is portrayed as a cold, unloving, and violent practice, where “It was forgotten 
that (patients) possessed a prized humanity which needed care and love, that a tiny poetic 
essence could be distilled from their overflowing squalid truth” (96). Listening to madness as 
music reminds Istina that patients have passions, desires and dreams. They want to sing, dance, 
move and create. This is when spring arrives, a time of hope and rebirth: a time of singing birds 
to end the “Season of Peril” and perpetual winter. Her engagement with the new kind of music 
helps her turn toward compassion. She ends the chapter with a scene from King Lear wandering 
on the moor, linking this to the men of the ward who are lost and have no home to return to: “I’m 
listening to their humming and moaning tingle through the air (…) listening to the cry of the 
drover as he called his dogs and listening to the distant sound of the sea” (113). 
“Listening to the distant sound of the sea” reminds me that listening is a forgotten art and, 
in order to remember it, one must surrender to the vastness of the Universe to a sense of knowing 
that cannot be explained using reason. Listening allows us to transcend the limitation of 3D 




We can inhabit a different reality in listening, and this plurality loosens the discipline of music’s 
hegemonic language and creates new dimensions within its sonic landscape. As Salome Voegelin 
writes: 
(listening) allows us to challenge the status quo of certain political ideologies and 
paradigms of power (like patriarchy and white supremacy) it allows us to 
challenge the singularity of the real and articulate difference to show us how else 
things can be. (Voegelin 35) 
This process is not generating the truth of an actual reality, but rather inventing the possible. 
Listening to madness as a new kind of music allows us to discover the world that was there 
before us knowing it. The affective immersion might seem daunting at first, or even 
overwhelming, because it forces us to question the “real” and “stable” ideas we have held as true, 
and instead settle for a more fluid interpretation. Much like Merleau-Ponty’s take on 
phenomenology, perceptions are mutable and probable rather than real: “but what is not opinion, 
what each perception even if false verifies, is the willingness of each experience to the same 
world, their equal power…” (Merleau-Ponty 25). For Merleau-Ponty, possibilities are not real 
possibilities but possibilities of the perception of the real world of which they are but opinions. 
Perception, according to him, is the first text (Merleau-Ponty 24) in need of interpretation. Thus, 
adding madness to music suggests a shift in what counts as music: it requires interpretation that 
welcomes what cannot be named or understood using conventions of harmony. It requires us to 
welcome the unknown and the uncanny into our rhythmic consciousness and to listen to madness 
in a completely new way. 
In alignment with madness as a new type of music, sections of Faces in the Water flow 




dichotomous rhythm. This new kind of music is a “curse or cry” because the asylum, often 
composed as a monument of silence, is where patients are orchestrated, surveilled and silenced in 
a disciplinary fashion. However, Frame’s attention to this “new kind of music” is what elevates 
the voices we rarely hear, rising out of impoverished silence to a level of auditory power, 
amplified through her sound metaphors and imagery. Her inward sun sings for those who have 




CHAPTER 4: Sounding Madness: My sound art in response to Faces in the Water 
 
 
In this chapter, I describe the sound pieces that I made in response to my dissertation research 
and close reading of Frame’s Faces in the Water. I focus on what I have learned from Janet 
Frame about listening to engage with the history of ECT and women’s memory erasure from a 
humanistic, ethical and affective perspective. I will discuss the components of the three sound art 
pieces and their methodology, which include “real-world music”, “soundscapes”, “sound 
collage,” as well as “madness as methodology”. I also employ theoretical concepts such as 
“listening otherwise” (Levinas, Lispari, Voegelin, Todd) and “madness as a new kind of music” 
to guide my compositional methods. Through my analysis of the process of making the sound art 
pieces that respond to themes in Faces in Water, I discover how listening otherwise is central to 
meaningfully incorporating phenomenological approaches to psychiatric listening that could 
potentially hold space for madness to speak. My work builds upon Voegelin’s “sound as a verb” 
and MacKinnon’s archival analysis of asylum soundscapes, but adding the voices and sounds 
from the psychiatric survivor and mad movement. “Madness as a new kind of music” is not 
about using music as medicine: it is about creating harmonic spaces for madness to express itself 
outside of medical pathologization, treatment or governance. I want to restore madness as a 
viable language, mode of expression and way of knowing. In the title of this dissertation I use the 
concept of “sounding” to gesture at the epistemological opportunities that sound can offer 
madness, how it becomes a vehicle for expression that transcends the boundaries of mind/body 
allowing for “practical wisdom” (Henrique 10) to resonate in knowledge-production. As Julian 





Sounding also has a critical edge against the text, discourse and the formalist and 
structuralist preoccupations of much recent work in the arts and humanities that 
the philosophy of light has underpinned. While these in their time have proved 
useful against positivism and behaviouralism such reductionism no longer 
occupies the position it once did. (12) 
My engagement with sound and text is a way for me to express madness as a new kind of music 
and to liberate it from the discursive restraints of psychiatric language and empirical research 
methods. I weave Frame’s voice within my larger historical context dating back to Victorian 
medical electricity, the industrialization of the ear and the gendered regulation of women’s 
voices inside/outside the asylum. In my work of Sounding Madness, there is a double-hearing 
process where I listen to my voice inside Frame’s and form an embodied witnessing of ECT 
survivor testimonies, accounts and experiences of erasure. Through using madness as 
methodology, I move beyond sanist and sight-centric epistemologies. Frame’s voice as a mad 
writer and my voice as a mad interdisciplinary artist vibrate in different frequencies with the 
same call to action. 
After reading Faces in the Water, I felt an urge to go out and record soundscapes that 
would correspond to what I was hearing while I read the novel. While Frame’s writing is highly 
visual, my experience of reading her prose was distinctly audible. I also wanted to layer my own 
experience of loss and erasure with that of empowerment, advocacy and the strength which I had 
learned through working with the psychiatric survivor and mad movement. 
All of these soundscapes have been fused using sound collage to create both a somber 
and uplifting atmosphere: one that engages with contemplative whispers of memory and the 




sound and unsound. The sound pieces are presented in three parts and engage with the themes of 
the text: “Faces in the Water”, “The Season of Peril” and “Madness as a New Kind of Music”. 
The sound pieces are meant to trouble the “listening subject” as someone who has the 
security of understanding. Traditionally, within a diagnostic paradigm, the one who listens is the 
one who diagnoses or prescribes. As MacKinnon says, “the western psychiatric model 
determined the visual and sonic boundaries of madness” (79). In my work, I want the “listening 
subject” to question what the subject hears more deeply, beyond the desire to know with 
scientific certainty. The experience of “memory erasure” is sonically represented through various 
motifs in Frame’s novel (as mentioned in Chapter three) as well as the subversive qualities of 
“madness as a new kind of music” (Frame 77). Themes such as alienation, confinement, 
disorientation, sonic panopticon and existential loss of meaning are juxtaposed with listening 
otherwise and sound as a verb. Through collage techniques, a non-linear version of the novel is 
presented to illustrate how the past can be repeated in the present, radically, to the point of 
dislocating it, to the point of making one forget the origin of the event, thereby making the past 
malleable in the present and future. The goal is to find ways to listen beyond comprehension, out 
of an ethical turn towards uncertainty, and the possibilities that such madness opens up. In my 
sound art, we hear the unseen. Roland Barthes describes listening as a form of de-coding. 
Listening, for Barthes, is an attitude beyond a physical capability that reveals what is obscure, 
blurred or mute in order to make available to consciousness the “underside” of meaning (The 
Responsibility of Forms 252). “Evenly hovering attention” (Barthes, The Responsibility of 
Forms, 252) is how he imagines the ideal listening relation, which requires patience and an 
ability to creatively engage with what is being said beneath the sounds of language. I am also 





that there is no longer an objective “real” outside of its subjective meaning. The “real” is no 
longer merely there; it represents something for the subject. Meaning is produced by previous 
experiences. 
The sound pieces embody the theories of listening outlined in my dissertation, especially 
the ones engaged by Janet Frame in her novel Faces in the Water. One of the major features of 
the piece is how it captures the many rallies and protests that I have attended, where I have had 
opportunities to record various real-world soundscapes of psychiatric-survivor and Mad voices. 
Intersections between Mad studies/survivor epistemology and sound studies emerge to critique 
the biomedical psychiatric paradigm and regimes of truth. The ways in which ECT survivors 
have used their voices to speak out and resist the institutions that have invalidated their 
experiences embody the principles of “sound as a verb” (Voegelin 17). Taking up what 
Katherine Norman describes as “real-world” music where “candid recordings of everyday life” 
function to reflect on experience and place the composer and listener in an imaginative dialogic 
space, I listen, not to the composed sound in itself, but to the chaotic process that gives the sound 
an ethical relation and responsibility towards an unknowable Other. My sound art pieces are 
collages of everyday sounds, interruptions, and protests that break up a classical score: they lend 
a sensitive ear to a difficult composition. 
I collaborated with musicians who self-identify as mad/psychiatric survivors (like myself) 
to create a soundscape that would take up Frame’s concept of “madness as a new kind of music”. 
I conceptualize “new”, in this context, as a re-membering of ancient traditions that considered 
sound to be a re-balancing modality for the body: where everything is in a state of vibration, 
everything is frequency. For example, sound was used as a diagnostic tool in ancient Egypt and 




of universal principles of balance: as above so below (MacKinnon 93). In Frame’s case, 
“madness as a new kind of music” reclaims pre-linguistic sound, the vibrational witness of 
experience, and advocates for listening otherwise, beyond certainty and knowing. I hope to 
engage with sensory perception as a quantum phenomenon, to highlight how our brains are not 
computers or filing machines, but rather elegant universes. With greater connectivity through 
senses, we can access transgenerational memory where time and space collapse into continuums 
of patterned intelligence. 
The ear is at home in the depth and textures and timbre, recognizing the complexities of 
melody, harmony and octave transposition most readily. This is not to essentialize the sensory 
modalities but to recognize their affordances (Henriques 10). My work is also grounded in the 
legacy of mad movement organizing as a subversive voice that speaks truth to power, and I want 
to distance it from “art therapy” or “healing”. My work is an intervention into conversations 
about ethics, voice and memory for ECT survivors who do not subscribe to the “recovery 
narrative” (Woods, Hart and Spandler) and an inquiry into how we could possibly listen 
otherwise, instead of only qualifying their testimony as storytelling for the sake of healing. I 
weave Frame’s voice within a larger historical context, dating as far back as Victorian medical 
electricity (a precursor to modern ECT) and the rise of the industrialization of the ear. Women’s 
bodies have been put on display, literally and figuratively, within a genealogy of psychiatric 
recovery narratives centered on submitting and submerging one’s voice and madness to the 
greater good of “erasure as cure”. As MacKinnon explains: 
[T]he harmony of the institution relied upon the gendered regulation of both the 
asylum landscape and soundscape. The perceived medicinal and moral 




also the mental wellbeing of women explains its constant use as a medical and 
moral device for social governance. (101) 
My project enacts layers of power, from electricity to sonic vibrations, within a wider panopticon 
of systemic and institutional power. I explore the power of voice, physically and symbolically, to 
destabilize the smooth acceptance of psy-epistemology as the dominant interpretation of 
madness. As such, my work seeks to rebalance knowledge-production beyond hierarchies of 
sensory experience and categorization, as Henrique describes sonic epistemologies that “turn 
away from the hierarchy of the senses and the dominance of vision in particular towards a pattern 
of cooperation of sensory modalities in which each contributes its unique qualities for our 
negotiation through the ambient energy flux” (Henrique 10). I enable a distinct and different way 
of thinking expressed through sounding, one that welcomes madness as valued knowledge and 
critique. 
Turning experience into a coherent story is inherent to the technologies of recovery, but 
at what cost? Janet Frame’s novel is not a coherent narrative; it is highly ambivalent, as I 
discussed in Chapter three. It predates the possibility of recovery. My work returns to listen and 
engages with madness. To come at recovery from a slanted position, a nebulous and ambivalent 
stance. Sound is not something we can see, hold or touch—but we know it is there through 
listening. It resists definitive understanding to welcome an experience. 
Therefore, my sound pieces are not all necessarily about ECT or music as a treatment, or 
about whether or not ECT works. They are about whose voices are listened to within knowledge- 
production and whose get erased. My work is about the experience of re-membering one’s 
erasure and trying to come to terms with what that might mean. In the future, I hope to create an 




uncertainty. I want to create an uncanny and embodied witnessing of testimonies, accounts and 
experiences of erasure. My recording process and my reading of Faces in the Water comes alive 
against the backdrop of “brain stimulation” and “recovery narratives” produced by institutional 
discourses. For example, in a 2016 Atlantic article entitled “The Ethics of Erasing Bad 
Memories,” ECT’s memory erasure is not challenged; it is embraced. “ECT is now surprisingly 
modernized, currently used in mainstream medical treatments for schizophrenia, mania and 
catatonia. Most radically, ECT is now being used to alter and destroy memories. It is framed as a 
new miracle treatment that must be salvaged from stigma because it can save lives” (23). This 
contemporary text mobilizes the same discursive formation common in the late 1930s and 1940s, 
positioning ECT as a miracle treatment that gives hope as it quiets people (especially “hysterical 
women”). In response, my work asks: how can the grain of Janet Frame’s voice be re-covered, 
excavated, historicized and incorporated into current ECT medical discursive practices and 
knowledge-production that silences mad epistemology and critique? 
Frame’s writing in Faces in the Water introduces sound as an important means of 
knowing madness beyond the confines of silence or the incoherence of noise: it is a meaningful 
expression. My goal in using sound to lift Frame’s story off the page is to promote listening 
otherwise to madness as a new kind of music and to interrupt the false harmony of psychiatric 
institutional recovery narratives. This is an ethical form of listening to madness, one that is not 




Sound Collage and Madness as Methodology 
 
Since I do not seek to produce conclusions or theories of certainty, my process employs art-based 
and “lived experience” methods, including narrative inquiry, auto/ethnography, collage, archives, 
and “madness as methodology,” to both deepen and open up theories of listening beyond 
diagnostics. My dissertation thus emerged out of a creative analytic practice where I sought to 
develop new ways of producing analysis that are mad and subvert certainty and rationality. By 
using sound collage in addition to traditional methods of analysis, I hope to capture what cannot 
be said or written, but to listen to a language beyond words and images. I do not seek to produce 
a representation of ECT’s “memory erasure” as documented in Frame’s writing, but rather to 
engage with it sonically and subversively. I hope to open up the possibilities of ethical 
communication that are non-linear and indirect. In order to do such research, I need to use artistic 
and mad methods. As Carolyn Ellis writes in The ethnographic I, artistic research enables 
transformative inquiry: 
Artistic research speaks of a continuous, self-reflexive and recursive movement, 
questioning the situation and determining a position with regard to the 
configuration of space and analysis. (Ellis 177) 
To capture the narrative nuances in my sound recordings that jump through time/space, I also use 
a mode of inquiry specific to sound called “conduction” that corresponds to madness as 
methodology. In his methodological essay “How to be Influenced”, Micheal Jarret writes about 
the railroad’s influence on music and electronic culture as “conduction.” Conduction “jumps the 
tracks of logic” and helps inquiry act as a conduit for reasoning from thing to thing that 
replicates and mutates relations. Kodwo Eshun writes about how conduction happens when 




(Eshun 45), which relates to the process of madness as methodology and collage. Jumping the 
tracks of logic in his book Madness as Methodology, Ken Gale emphasizes how inquiry and 
research methods need to embrace a non-linear approach to fully grasp the layers of experience 
that are not immediately understandable through traditional observational scientific methods: 
Engage in context not in a linear, developmental manner, page by page, but rather 
in an indeterminate and free-spirited way driven by experimental inquiries and 
impulsive curiosities, moving from one plateau to another. (2) 
This kind of embodied methodology is not a didactic exposition, but a subtle way of writing as 
an experiment, not in a traditional academic way (thesis + evidence + analysis = conclusion) but 
rather as an emerging dialogic process that channels ancestral knowledge the kind of knowledge 
that has not been written down but that haunts, and is known through the experience and 
movement of writing as creative inquiry, as a way to end up somewhere you never thought you 
would go, or that such a place even existed. Madness as methodology is a way of life, a way of 
knowing and a way of ethical making-meaning. The ethics involved in madness as methodology 
is one that accepts responsibility for what cannot be understood with conventional scientific 
methods and requires a fearless leap of faith into the unknown. I welcome this leap because it 
allows my artistic process to be fluid and emergent instead of rigid and formulaic. 
The conception of sound collage emerged during the early modernist era and continues 
today, as sound artists are using similar theories to explore unsaid traces and the uneasy sounds 
of history. Keeping this uneasy relation in mind, when Andre Breton, the father of Surrealism, 
claimed that the incessant murmur of the unconscious could not be recorded through automatic 
writing but through the audiotape, he set a precedent for artists to write sounds differently. This 




investigates how sound is written about, and how the act of listening is recorded through her 
writing, which she calls “textual phonography.” As such, she records her process of listening 
which “produces another sound. The sound in the imagination of the reader is not the sound 
heard but the sound generated in her action of perception of reading about sound” (Voegelin 25). 
As much as writing is a soundscape composition (Frame), writing is also a form of listening that 
speaks. This collaged interface between writing sound and recording sound is at play in my work 
as well. Sound collage creates a context for communication to exceed a need for comprehension 
or certainty, enabling a relationship (one that does not fit into the limits of language) to exist 
otherwise. In the 1950s, William S. Burroughs demonstrated this concept by reconfiguring 
audiotape and writing across its metallic particles to insert language into sound with shock (Kahn 
15). By writing language onto sound, instead of letting sound convey linguistic meaning, 
Burroughs utilized principles of collage (displacing objects from familiar contexts and making 
them fit into a new strange space to create a new frame of reference). Such techniques have been 
revived in sound art, “where the epistemological process of interconnectivity is indeterminate 
and resistant to synergy” (Garoian 92). 
Collage, when defined as an art practice, is the act of gluing together. It is a method of 
taking pieces from a former self and putting them back together in a new way. Collage is, in fact, 
a “recovery”: a way to salvage and reuse. Perhaps, from this standpoint, collage is a radical way 
of coping with loss. This gesture is similar to “radical hope,” as defined by Jonathan Lear, the 
epistemological task of creating new fields of possibility when one’s concept for understanding 
what is possible has collapsed (89). Collage also aligns nicely with principles of sounding, as it 




Sounding in a complex set of relationships is invariably expressed on several 
different registers at the same time. Most often these registers are considered 
separately, isolated from each other, as with mechanical and social process, or 
technological or psychological levels of analysis. The conceptual force of 
sounding is to refuse such dichotomies. (Henrique 4) 
The conceptual synergy between sounding and collage helped my artistic process to be one that 
was grounded in an embodied and emergent practice, instead of a hypothetical or purely 
analytical exercise. 
This counter-method is not so much about establishing a systematic method as it is about 
breaking methodology open in “an attempt to show what it can do” (Gale 2). Madness as method 
is that energizing force that drives deviance, delire and digression. It encourages incessant flow 
and flourishing that brings new life to practices of world making that is full of surprises and 
always offers new challenges. By combining "madness as method” with “sound as a verb,” I 
hope to move beyond merely discussing representation, instead making the structures 
underpinning them come alive to bear witness and take responsibility. I do not pretend that I will 
solve medical violence or psychiatric epistemic dominance, but I can suggest ways of listening 
otherwise to uproot unconscious bias and centuries of authority, even if just for an instant: 
We already live in permanent states of transition, hybridization and nomadic 
mobility in emancipated, post-feminist, multi-ethnic societies with high degrees 
of technological mediation which, however, have not ensured justice for all, or 
resolved enduring patterns of inequities. These are neither simple nor linear 
events, but rather multi-layered and internally contradictory social phenomena. 




tech advances and neo-primitivism which defy the logic of the excluded middle. 
We therefore need great methodological creativity to cope with these challenges. 
(Gale 15) 
My project is not so much about reclaiming madness, but recuperating and creating within it. I 
take up a double-hearing of sound where it is both a physical vibration with frequencies audible 
to the human ear and the notion of “being sound.” Madness as a method is an energizing force 
that drives deviance, delire and digression. It encourages incessant flow and flourishing that 
brings new life to practices of world making that is full of surprises and always offers new 
challenges. As a result, I hope to disrupt the rational/irrational divide embedded in romanticized 
notions of madness working through what Michel Foucault describes as the historical moment 
that made us forget how to be guided by what we might know as madness (75) and the silences 
between. The immersive nature of listening is what I am trying to recreate in this first piece of 
“faces in the water”. I create an intimate space to the invisible yet always/already present. 
Underwater, the truth is said in a submerged, unconscious way. What comes to the surface in 
distortion? A face that reminds you of your response-ability. A voice that calls you to attention, 
intrigued and full of unanswered questions. The voice of the silent drowning face in Frame’s 
novel is interdimensional, flowing through different generations. As I read Frame’s words, I am 
reminded of the voices that are obscured in the medical and psychiatric journal articles that 
revive the promise of ECT without listening to the “grain of the voice” in survivor literature like 
Frame’s. My project seeks to think about ways that we can listen to voices we find difficult, 
disruptive or challenging, whether these voices seem to come from inside or outside ourselves. I 










What we call sound is an onrushing, cresting, and withdrawing wave of air molecules that 
begins with the movement of any object, however large or small, and it ripples out in all 
directions. In The World is Sound, Joachim-Ernst Berendt builds a theory that the very possibility 
of consciousness depends on sound. Applying interdisciplinary theories of musicology, 
philosophy, psychology and spirituality, Berendt reveals that the universe is measured in 
harmonic processes: at the root of all physical reality, there is music and rhythm, a play of 
patterned frequencies. He writes, “Our eyes only scan surfaces. Our ears, however, immerse 
themselves deeply into the spheres they investigate by hearing” (7). Berendt goes on to note how 
once we learn how to hear again and engage in forms of deep listening, we will be more aligned 
with ethical possibilities that honor the planet in a balanced and sustainable way. 
Similarly, in psychoanalysis, Guy Rosalato and Didier Anzieu foreground sound as an 
essential part of subjectivity: through the “sonorous envelope” and the “acoustic mirror” of the 
maternal voice (Rosalato and Anzieu qtd. in Schwarz 25). Sound allows the human subject to 
remember pre-linguistic meaning, to re-enter an auditory comfort zone, a “womb-like sonorous 
space that envelopes the subject and allows it to shape itself against an exterior” (Rosalto and 
Anzieu qtd. in Schwarz 34). Returning to this state of pre-Oedipal consciousness creates space 
for endless imagination and possibility, where there is no hardened form or meaning. Music (or 
organized sound), according to David Schwarz in “Listening Subjects: Semiotics, 




symbolic experiences that “the musical representation is a sort of threshold crossing and 
produces listening subjects” (Schwarz 34). In many ways, sound’s presence/absence creates 
subjectivity: “We are born in and of sound, before ears we hear through the skin” (Pettman 1). 
Sound, unlike vision, is an inescapable primordial sense that transcends normative sensory 
ability, as Dominic Pettman elaborates: 
Vibrations are the interface between the experience of an ear that functions as 
designed and one that does not, since no one not even the profoundly deaf can 
escape the sonic feeling of sound waves. (2) 
Western culture is dominated by the less intimate and more critical eye. But in fact, the ears 
witness more than the eyes, as Pettman explains: We “cannot close our ears” (2); they are always 
open. Even without ears, we can always feel sonic waves with our skin. Sound penetrates our 
bodies entirely, and it is what captures our embodied knowledge. Pettman maps out the sonic 
geometry of early psychoanalytic relations, how the infant comes to know themselves through 
sound prior to the Lacanian mirror stage (3). This precursory knowledge is essential to listening 
otherwise—as a way to return to our pre-linguistic sonic selves. The undifferentiated soup of 
sensory experience, where we merely exist with our surroundings, as one, is where we can begin 
to listen otherwise (Pettman 4). In listening, our infant self vocalizes: “We are sonic creatures, 
but historically we have difficulty recognizing that fact” (Pettman 4). The dominance of the less 
intimate and more critical ocular sense reigns over knowledge production and has for centuries. 
Western medicine’s “medical gaze” is positioned as the objective mechanism to “know” the 
patient. As I discussed in previous chapters, the medical gaze is central to the foundational 
epistemologies that govern scientific and psychiatric praxis. Listening, from a medical 




I am interested in the “listening subject,” particularly how it is formed within psychiatry 
as a diagnostic tool immersed in objective reality, compared to Frame’s notion of listening, 
which liberates the listening subject to embrace madness as a “new kind of music” or a re- 
membering of ancient wisdom. Listening otherwise is a way to engage with madness as 
subversive subjectivity. I take up Frame’s idea that “madness is a new kind of music” that might 
change how we listen to those we do not understand and form different kinds of subjectivities. 
How can we let go of understanding as the goal and let listening hold space for the unknown and 
the possible? The ephemeral and dynamic character of sound makes it a great tool to disrupt the 
stability of knowledge and it can help us navigate the world of the unseen, yet felt. Sonic 
embodiment is a way of knowing that Henrique describes as “our own subjectivity that needs to 
be recognized and appreciated rather than sacrificed on the altar of object science” (4). The 
embodied knowledge that sound provides us with can help us develop listening skills to welcome 
madness as epistemology and valued insight. Thinking through sound is a way to unlock a 
subversive wisdom to help us dismantle systems of power as Henrique elaborates upon: 
Sound is always a dynamic event, forever incomplete and continually in a state of 
change. Thus thinking through sound offers a way to voice criticisms of the status 
quo and raise questions, in the way that images are often used to settle them. In 
the mechanics of auditory propagation noise is necessarily a disturbance, it 
disrupts and can be used as a destructive weapon. (Henrique 5) 
The disruptive energy of sound is a source of political power, when thinking through the audio 
archives that I was immersed in during my research, the voices of psychiatric survivors and mad 
activists emphasized similar themes as the characters in Frame’s novel, and through my sound 




The inherent assumptions within language that “to hear” is to “be sane” is one that I hope 
to deconstruct with Janet Frame’s concept of “madness as a new kind of music” and “listening 
otherwise (Ackerman 175). These linguistic positions intrinsically link hearing with logic, with 
being able to think and reason with clarity; hence the phrase being of “sound mind” (Ackerman 
175). Listening beyond needing to know with certainty means we are listening with our entire 
bodies, our embodied memories and transgenerational senses. We are no longer listening in a 
linear or structured way that expects a resolution to the story. Madness resists a unified 
coherence, and it resists homogenous meaning. It remains open-ended. Moreover, these links 
between hearing and sanity fail to understand how the body does not just hear with its ears; we 
hear with our skin through vibrations. In this sense, sound is powerful in crossing 
epistemological boundaries, “since no one, not even the profoundly deaf can escape the sonic 
feeling of sound waves” (Pettman 2). Sound calls us to attention, allowing us to be transformed, 
to submit to its power. Sound is weightless, invisible, carried in wavelengths: it travels through 
time and space with great subtlety, effect and possibility. It conjures both intimacy and distance. 
Sounding is a way for practical wisdom to resound in knowledge-production. To trouble 
empirical evidence and traditional scientific research methods, sounding is a process not an 
object or a representation, it transcends thought towards feeling: 
This intrinsic meaning of sounding is often independent of conscious attention, as 
with prosody of the actual utterance, that is, tone of voice. Thus the idea of 
sounding serves to draw attention to a rather different object of enquiry than the 
conventional ones of text or image. In practice it is not object at all, but a process 





By reframing what counts as evidence and how that evidence is gathered, sound and sounding 
can be a creative intervention into knowledge production. Sounding inspired me to disrupt the 
psy industrial complex and the recovery narrative economy that promote an un-nuanced version 
of patient experience as always/already aligned with clinical goals, diluted, depoliticized and 
distanced from activist voices (psychiatric survivor movement or mad movement). This 
storytelling economy, based solely in the medical models idea of recovery, creates what I call a 
false harmony that suppresses and erases other ways of sounding one’s truth. 
Notions of “purity” continue to be assigned to research methods that distance the 
researcher from the research. Research operates in the context of “evidence-based” medicine 
where the roots of evidence are fundamentally flawed. This has resulted in an emphasis on 
technical expertise and the use of individualistic frameworks which not only obscure people’s 
social–material world in our understanding of people’s experiences, behaviours and distress: it 
also marginalizes the lived experience and knowledge of those deemed “mad” or “mentally ill.” 
Clinical trials remain the highest form of investigation within mainstream health care, yet many 
studies have proven their pharmaceutical promotional bias and reliance on a faulty diagnostic 
framework that generalizes experience in ways that are not helpful to the individual seeking help. 
As I mentioned in Chapter Two, psychiatry is a science that deals with perception and attempts 
to understand it based on a scale of “normalcy” that is flawed at best, as it often pays mere lip 
service to the social determinants of health. Diagnostic forms of listening, focused on finding a 
genetic or biological basis to mental illness, often contradict the complexities of experiences by 
people who are experiencing madness or altered states of consciousness. As Faulkner writes, “In 
reality, few people fall easily into one diagnostic category without complicating features, 




(RCTs) are the most difficult to validate because it is almost “impossible to identify people with 
the exact same diagnosis, findings cannot be generalized beyond the trial and treatment outcomes 
cannot be effectively measured” (Faulkner 503). 
Frame’s voice as a mad writer and my voice as an interdisciplinary mad artist vibrate 
with different frequencies, yet they resound with the same call to action: breaking the Truth of 
empirical science and history in half. To be clear, my sound pieces are not post-truth but 
polyvocal truth. These narratives permit us to call into question the conclusiveness of ECT 
narratives produced by psychiatric hegemonies of knowledge-production. They provoke an 
encounter with memory traces and voices that do not fit nicely into a “master narrative” or trope 
of miracle treatment or cure. Both the voices captured by Frame and the soundscapes she 
describes challenge normative historical and contemporary psychiatric ECT practice. My sound 
art presents a limit-case that cannot be solved but must be attended to. Frame reclaims her voice 
through representing voicelessness. By writing soundscapes of madness cannot speak and 
madness as a new kind of music, she calls attention to sound, to being heard, but more 
importantly to listening as a transgressive act. Her autobiography is a work of memory against 
erasure, against the cure of silence. Those who are hearing voices in her novel are never hearing 
their own, yet Frame offers a way in to listen towards possibility. 
Sounding madness is a way to listen otherwise; it is a way to question the scientific 
imperative within psychiatry and to offer different modalities for welcoming testimonies and 




Piece 1: Faces in the Water 
 
The first sound art piece deals with concepts of self-reflexivity within psychiatric listening and 
asks what psychiatric listening can learn from sound-art. In keeping with the title Faces in the 
Water, this piece will include a pool of water with a broken mirror at the bottom that audience 
members will gaze into. Their gesture of gazing will trigger a motion sensor that will play the 
sound piece on surrounding speakers. The piece is comprised of underwater soundscape 
recordings of a lake in the middle of February (I recorded in North Bay 2014). The recordings 
have sounds of ice breaking and the sounds of footsteps walking through snow: sounds which are 
featured prominently in the novel when the narrator, Istina, reflects on the persistence of winter. 
My soundwalk recordings focus on listening to the natural environment and to the human voice. 
This sound piece aims to expose our ears to sounds that we rarely pay attention to, just like the 
voices of those who were trapped and drowning in social stigma throughout Frame’s Faces in 
the Water. In addition, I recorded my voice reading passages of the novel. Bringing it to life, 
conjuring Istina’s voice as it spoke to my own lived experience of the psychiatric system, I was 
hoping to reflect on how Istina’s voice resonates within my own and within generations of 
women who have undergone non-consensual ECT and have claimed “memory erasure”. Istina’s 
voice is a reflection of Frame’s voice and a reflection of my voice reflecting upon the voices of 
others. The act of recording defies and subverts erasure, yet the process remains unfinished and 
full of incomplete meaning: it requires an audience to engage with it and to reflect upon it. Such 
reflexive and inter-subjective techniques have been integrated into sound art practices where the 
“epistemological process in which interconnectivity is indeterminate and resistant to synergy” 
(Garoian 92). Such resistant interconnectivity has led to what Katharine Norman describes as 




not to make sense of sound, but rather to re-think one’s relationship to sound. She says that: 
“listening is entirely up to us” which shifts the composition process from a bidirectional 
transmission towards a participatory design that emerges as the listener participates in a self- 
reflexive way. Even as listeners, whether consciously or unconsciously, insist upon making 
meaning out of disjointed and fragmented sounds, the point is not whether the narrative makes 
sense in a linear way, but whether it resonates and moves the listener towards something new; a 
new way of thinking and feeling about an old concept. 
This first piece “Faces in the Water” is also where sound breaks the “mirror stage” of 
psychoanalytic conditioning, reminding us that we are always/already in the aural phase of 
potentiality before sight and language. A womb like sensation that is open and vulnerable. In this 
state, we receive, we listen intimately. This is a form of “inter-listening” (Lispari 159) an all- 
encompassing envelope of “interaction, interdependency, interrelation, intersubjectivity, as well 
as an acknowledgement of the attunement, attentiveness and alterity always/already nested in our 
processes of communication” (159). The ethical potential in attuning one’s listening reflexively 
to an unknowable Other beyond the veil of linear meaning, means that one can let go of didactic 
understanding. This attunement is an opportunity and offering, not a directive. It is meant to play 
with the idea of listening as a way of seeing oneself in the mirror of relation. Listening is an 
orientation towards the Other—an orientation of “attention and giving to others” (Lipari 197). 
Listening expresses vulnerability and the “enactment of responsibility” of welcoming the Other 
by creating a dwelling space to receive their alterity and to let it resonate (Lipari 198). 
This is meant to provoke uneasiness and frustration to some extent, but also to 
overwhelm meaning with polyvocal possibilities. As Pettman says, “the aural streams in which 




heartbeat that pulsed through our first nine months…the voice of the other-the other whose 
attention we desire remains a highly charged and intangible object” (Pettman 26). I want to 
recreate this womb-like intimacy as a dwelling space, but to make it strange and uncanny. The 
voice of the Other that calls us to attention is not necessarily an easy encounter, but rather, it is a 
haunting sensation. In Frame’s words, describing the sensation of listening to Brenda in the ward 
who attempts to play piano after receiving ECT, it is an uneasy experience in responsibility: 
Listening to her, one experiences a deep uneasiness as if having avoided an urgent 
responsibility, like someone who walking at night along the banks stream, catches 
a glimpse in the water of a white face or a moving limb and turns quickly away, 
refusing to help or search for help. (…) We all see the faces in the water. We 
smother our memory of them, even our belief in their reality and become calm 
people of the world; we can neither forget nor help them. (…) Sometimes by a 
trick of circumstance or dream or a hostile neighbourhood of light we see our own 
face. (131) 
In Chapter Three, I describe the significance of this scene for which the book is named after; as 
the encounter with the Other who is trapped between worlds, whose voice is drowned out and 
erased from history. This moment of hauntological encounter triggers a sense of urgency to 
remember and to speak out against those who have submerged the face and voice of the Other. 
Frame’s description of this weighted reflection is something I wanted to portray in my sound 
piece. I wanted to have my voice as a reflection off the water of imagination. Merely listening to 
diagnose or understand, as often happens in the medical field, forgets the ethical possibilities of 
listening beyond knowing. Lipari says that listening “must entail a deep sense of welcome for the 




Sound breaks the false mirrors, the false selves and the power of those “subpersonality” 
voices in our consciousness: the internal critic, the anxious worrying, the perfectionist etc. It 
destabilizes the weight of these false narratives, of the stories and voices that harden us instead 
of opening us up towards infinity (Levinas). After all, “the voice is very far ahead from the face” 
(Deleuze and Guattari). We come to realize that we are not alone, but bound to a deep cellular 
and aural connection to all that exists and transcends time. The time of memory sounding in 
waves that are in perpetual motion, locating the divisions of past, present and future is 
impossible. They are all ebbing and flowing into one another, the composition of our 
subjectivity is thus never without ancestral reflection: 
everything has already been lived and relived a thousand times by those who have 
disappeared but whom we carry in the very fibers of our being just as we also 
carry in the thousands of beings who will live after us. The only question which 
incessantly poses itself is why all of these innumerable particles floating in each 
of us, certain ones come to the surface rather than others. (Scott 238) 
In this piece, I explore what comes to surface: anxiety, fear, uncertainty and guilt. My voice 
speaking Istina’s voice, is holding onto layers of feeling that cannot speak truth to power in a 
linear or direct way. Sharon Todd in Learning from the Other talks about the ethical potential of 
seemingly negative emotions like guilt, that awaken a sense of urgency within the individual to 
enact change. Todd stresses the importance of listening to “that which is not easy” (131). I 
consider how listening otherwise requires an ability to attend to what may seem silent or absent. 
From this stance, ethical communication is not solely based on the content of what is said but as 
Levinas puts it “the nearness and orientation we bring to the Other” (130). This piece tries to 




silence, Susan Sontag describes it as a practice that keeps things open, thereby never ceasing to 
imply sound in silence (11). By creating a context to receive the Other in alterity as infinitely 
unknowable, I attempt to demonstrate a form of listening that attends to the rupture of meaning 
and that “says more than what is being said” (Todd 121). Building upon Frame’s narrative, my 
dissertation and sound art considers how the act of listening to devastated sites (both 
internal/external) recognizes “place as witness.” Listening to “place as witness” means that one 
must give up knowing the truth as a totality; instead it creates a context for asking more 
questions and opening up the site to new ways of engaging ethically with trauma. 
The goal of this piece is to highlight how we might be able to hear ourselves in the Other 
and to recognize our responsibility towards them. 
 
 
Piece 2: Season of Peril 
 
The second sound piece illustrates the “mad movement” of psychiatric survival, through a 
“Season of Peril” and vocalizing that experience politically to incite system change. I use sound 
archives of city panel discussions led by psychiatric survivors, as well as soundscape field 
recordings of protests that I participated in over the course of the last decade. I imagine the 
installation piece will include shadows moving throughout the room to the rhythm of voices. 
This will create a hauntological effect, how the values and principles of the past echo in the 
present towards the future: a re-membering of the shadow and spirit of psychiatric survivor 
protests. This piece is a heavy collage of multiple jarring sonic elements. There are four sections 
to this sound collage: city hall, radio show, psychic reading and protest. The major question that 
I ask in this piece is whether sound collage can recover memories under erasure? As Bachelard 




My sonic construction is made up of incongruent polyvocal soundscapes that span 
decades of historical contexts and events. Parts of my life are woven into the wind and into 
protest. The piece opens with a wind storm collaged over Bonnie Burstow’s voice discussing the 
“perils” of ECT in a 1983 Toronto city panel. She opens with saying “no memory whatsoever of 
anything that happened prior to her shock treatment (…) an entire past wiped out” her voice is 
meshed over rhythmic humming that flows with the wind. There is a storm going on in the 
metaphorical background that mirrors so much of Frame’s literary soundscapes. Wind is an 
important sound for Frame especially in the “Season of Peril” section of the novel where she 
says: “and it was always our Season of Peril: electricity the peril of wind sings to the wires on a 
grey day” (11). Her electric wind song is full of fear and worry about what she might lose. She is 
worried about losing her memory and voice as a writer. According to Schafer our “human voice” 
is merely borrowed from the wind: “we could not express ourselves vocally without the wind we 
first inhale from the atmosphere” (Pettman 70 qtd. Schafer). Much like Frame’s emphasis on the 
vox mundi in her novel, the “Season of Peril” is where Istina reclaims her voice through the 
voice of nature: the only way to escape the horrors of the “Season of Peril” is to be heard. 
Soundscape is a way of listening to the world. The collective voice. The testimonial voice. The 
gendered voice. 
Coming into political consciousness and into the public sphere. No longer intimate, it is public 
and it is amplified through a megaphone and microphone. 
Frame’s literary soundscapes are the key to unlock a deeper critique of persistent and 
powerful discourses operant within the psy medical industrial complex that privilege certain 
voices and ways of being over others, to deconstruct and denaturalize the authority of medical 
epistemologies and voices. In this sense, her literary soundscapes enact the social and political 




“Season of Peril,” I bring them in conversation with the soundscapes that surrounded 
my involvement in the Mad Pride movement in Toronto. 
Soundscape is traditionally understood as the auditory version of the landscape15 
(Schafer). A soundscape contains keynote sounds which distinguish an environment and 
background ambient sound (Schafer). Unlike acoustics, this approach deals with the transfer of 
information rather than energy and considers what sound means to the individual (Schafer). For 
example, the emotional response to a soundscape shows how a person feels towards that 
environment. The approach has been used within urban environments by asking how the 
perception of sound can be used to improve the experience and build a richer picture of the 
individual’s response to space: 
[S]oundscape composition is located within a continuum of possibilities, each 
with it own practice of mapping or representing the world (…) the evolving 
nature of the listeners’ relationship to acoustic space can be compared to 
developments in soundscape composition. (Schafer 1) 
My soundscape composition is taking the “real-world” music that Katherine Norman describes 
and blends it with Salome Voegelin’s “sound as a verb” (17). I am not interested in the semantic 
debates over what constitutes a soundscape, or how the term should not exist at all (Tim Ingold). 
The point is that the sounds are related to the world, found in the world and distort that world 




10 Tim Ingold’s critique of soundscape in “Against Soundscape” posits that sound should be the auditory equivalent 
of light instead of being understood as the equivalent of sight (leading to concepts such as soundscape). He claims 
that the concept soundscape is incoherent. By his logic, distinguishing soundscape from landscape is false because 
the “environment that we experience, know and move around in is not sliced up along the lines of the sensory 
pathway by which we enter into it. The world we perceive is the same world, whatever path we take, and each of us 
perceives it as an undivided centre of activity and awareness.” For Ingold, a landscape could be audible and thus 




cultures, sound is a material object: sound is as material as stones and aids in the construction of 
meaningful space. Thus, the ontological characteristics of sound depend on culture. One of the 
limitations to ethnographic research on cultural meanings of soundscape is that anthropologists 
cannot presume to know what people are hearing. The ear and what is physically heard does not 
constitute the auditory realm that people perceive or occupy within their imaginations. Voegelin 
subverts Tim Ingold’s argument in “Against Soundscapes” by framing soundscape as a 
positionality within the ethical possibility of listening. She says that Ingold’s framing of 
soundscape as a “medium” is inaccurate: soundscapes are a reality and materiality. They 
participate in the construction of reality. As Voegelin says: 
Ingold suggests that the landscape is only visible once we have rendered it visible 
by techniques such as painting and photography. The landscape can only be 
audible when played back within an environment that deprives us of stimuli, such 
as a darkened room. (Voegelin 11) 
Voegelin studies soundscape “not to transport us elsewhere but to understand the here and 
now”(11). She is interested in the relationship between the soundscape and the landscape instead 
of arguing over the semantic power of one over the other. This relationship is ethical in nature 
and serves to understand mutable and plural worlds that lurk beneath the surface of our perceived 
reality. This is a new kind of semantic inhabiting, a temporal and reciprocal bind that “actualizes 
the world”, but not through categorical definition or truth, rather it is through sublime doubt or 
uncertainty that one comes into “being”. The “mysterious unfolding of things of which I do not 
know what they are” is how Voegelin articulates the ethical power that listening can have on 
epistemology and phenomenology. How do we know what we know, if not through an encounter 




the lifeworld of the soundscape as an alternative world that we visit and come back from with a 
heightened awareness: 
The unseen worlds of the soundscape produced by this listening mapping stand 
not as opposed to the reality of the soundscape but pluralizes its conception and 
thus they need to be taken into account in the construction of its actuality. 
(Voegelin 48) 
My response is to apply gentle methods on hard issues, centering listening otherwise as an 
ethical gesture and the role of soundscapes in rethinking how we listen to mad people, beyond 
market-based priorities and biomedical cures towards rebuilding peoples’ quality of life and 
resilience. Soundscapes can help engage in difficult histories, to re-member, to work-through and 
to locate listening as central to micro and macro forms of recovery outside of neoliberal 
constraints and power. Listening becomes a way to care for memories. In my soundscape, the 
voices of ECT are also spliced with everyday soundscapes taken from Parkdale streets, near the 
psychiatric hospital where ECT is administered, to bring the idealities of revitalization back to 
reality, back to real world sounds. There is a sonic patterning in my work between the 
personal/the political, the natural/the built. In this pattern, within the noise pollution and chaos of 
Parkdale’s gentrification/redevelopment process, I weave concepts of madness cannot speak 
(Foucault, History of Madness xxviii) with “sonic nuance cannot be heard” (Voegelin 48) to 
grapple with the limit case of memory erasure. The voices of individuals stand out amongst 
crowds of protesters, the thunder and rain crash against the sounds of jackhammers breaking 
ground and electric saws cutting beams. Gospel voices resound in the wake of a funeral and 




soundscapes asks how I might listen to memory as if it were a heartbeat that speaks in emotional 
landscapes. 
The significance of recording ECT protests in Parkdale is key. Parkdale is where the Mad 
Pride movement began; where madness was reclaimed as a site of power, as a voice, as a new 
way of communicating beyond linear concepts and the fiction of sanity. Holding a placard that 
reads: “Memory is Sacred”, in 2009 I attend a rally in Parkdale entitled “Stop Shocking Our 
Mothers and Grandmothers”. I record the rally. I listen to the voices of other survivors who took 
to the street, who marched to City Hall, who organized rallies and panel discussions, who would 
not be silenced until the city heard them. Many were advocating for housing and poverty 
reduction, as well as for improvements in the social determinants of health. Listening to radical 
activist and psychotherapist Dr. Bonnie Burstow speak from her megaphone, boldly stating: 
“ECT destroys what is essentially human”, it makes me wonder about the ethics of erasure and 
what it means existentially. Thinking back to the “Memory is Sacred” placard, relegating 
“memory” to the sacred makes it untouchable, restricted, and therefore unproductive for the 
work of mourning. Freud taught us that the work of mourning, much like memory, requires it to 
be shareable, and uttered in testimony. If the roots of autobiographical fiction are in severing, 
shocking and forgetting past traditions, how can this genre become a form of ethical recovery in 
contemporary life writing by psychiatric survivors? Thus, a non-linear version of the story is 
presented to illustrate how the past can be repeated in the present, radically, to the point of 
dislocating it, to the point of making one forget the origin of the event, thereby making the past 
malleable in the present and future (re-memberable). The goal is to find ways to listen beyond 
comprehension—but rather out of an ethical turn towards uncertainty, and the possibilities that 




On first thought, electroconvulsive therapy and Parkdale’s gentrification may not seem to 
have anything in common. They both deal with entirely different landscapes: the brain and the 
neighbourhood. However, a closer look reveals how they share a metaphorical link: the promise 
to erase and revitalize. Parkdale is the site where the metaphorical link between these two 
processes comes to life. On one hand, it is the site of experimental urban planning in the name of 
slum clearance, and on the other it is home to the psychiatric hospital where ECT is performed 
and where ex-patients, from the asylum era, currently live in boarding homes. The rhetoric of 
“bad memories” functions just like “bad neighbourhoods” in that it serves to justify their erasure. 
As Janet Frame wrote in Faces in the Water: “my personality was condemned like a slum 
dwelling” (86). Frame’s metaphor of her personality being like a slum illustrates how 
psychiatry’s mechanisms for assessment lean in a similar direction as a city planner evaluating 
the value of property: neither is listening in a dialogic fashion; they engage to diagnose flaws. 
They espouse getting rid of painful memories like bulldozing eyesore buildings or by evicting 
those who reduce the property value. Listening to the city as if it were a person who has survived 
a traumatic past, a past that needs to be attended to, heard and believed today, in the present 
tense, is a way that I have navigated and engaged with the irony of using extreme measures (ex. 
electroshock or eviction) to help someone in distress. What does it mean to recover from mental 
health crisis or trauma, when recovery is centered on deletion? Recovery, thus, becomes a 
sophisticated form of repression or a new way of covering over a persistent wound. With 
“memory erasure” (Andre 6), the person is no longer an active-participant in their recovery 
process, becoming a passive, voiceless observer. Evelyn Scogin recounts in her post-ECT 
memoir Descent: “this type of loss is much more and not simply because a memory is gone. It’s 




not only whole periods of time but also erases all feelings and sensations, all connections of 
anyone or anything. For me it felt and continues to feel as if I never existed for that period-of- 
time.” (132). Memory erasure in this iteration is immensely destructive; it takes away the tools 
that people use to construct or reconstruct their subjectivity. 
“How does one speak from a place of erasure?” was the central question that I struggled 
to answer in my work with ECT survivors’ memoirs. They all told their life stories from the 
limit-case of not knowing who they once were, or feeling like a stranger to themselves, but they 
also spoke from a place of agency and resistance. I was namely working with women who did 
not consent to ECT, but had been coerced into accepting the treatment as a last resort. Before 
creating the soundscape piece of ECT survivors/Mad Pride activists living in Parkdale under the 
pressures of gentrification, I thought of doing a documentary style piece, where I would 
interview people who had ECT and ask about their experiences of memory loss or erasure. After 
speaking to my aunt about her experience with ECT, I realized that a linear oral history could not 
encompass the nuance between forgetting, memory-loss and what Linda Andre defines as, 
“memory erasure”. There is an ethical implication for considering how one narrates a life re- 
routed by shock. As such, I could not simply interview people; I needed to be immersed in their 
soundscapes for their voices to resonate beyond loss and erasure—for my listening to change. 
There was so much information in the sounds around them, in the places they lived; I wanted to 
be surrounded by those sounds. To listen to context. R Murray Schafer, a Canadian composer 
who introduced the concept of “the soundscape” to music theory, argued that one could discern 
the social conditions or the wellness of a place by accessing the quality of sound. The soundness 
of place and being, for Schafer, were interconnected. This led me to think; why not engage with 




In a similar vein, Dr. Mindy Thompson Fullilove, a public health psychiatrist from New 
York studied the impact of urban renewal projects and their erasure and displacement of mainly 
poor Black communities from city maps. Her term “root shock” refers to the psychology of place 
and the traumatic collective loss that “slum clearance” has on individuals. She argues that this 
form of memory erasure is collective in nature, and causes pain that cannot be pigeonholed into a 
diagnostic category but rather it must be understood as a communicative expression about 
endurance in the face of bitter defeat. Likewise, my soundscape engages with stories of suffering 
from song, to funeral procession, to the rage of protesters in a thunderstorm, to city panel 
discussions—there is collective grief in Parkdale that resounds in every aspect of life. 
When Foucault talks about how madness cannot speak, he means madness cannot be 
understood or listened to beyond the need to categorize its speech into illnesses in need of cures. 
Recently, medical journalists have made the claim that ECT is coming back, newly revamped, as 
a “miracle cure” for severe treatment resistant cases of depression and PTSD, able to free people 
from the prison of their “bad memories”. From 2013 to 2016, Time Magazine, Nature and the 
Atlantic all ran articles about the same ground-breaking study by Marjin Kroes, from Radboud 
University in the Netherlands, confirming ECT’s ability to “erase bad memories”. In these 
articles, electroconvulsive therapy is framed as a cure for post-traumatic-stress disorder, claiming 
that it “successfully impaired reconsolidation of episodic memories (...) that is to say, memories 
were partially and in some cases almost entirely erased (Delistraty). The emerging possibility of 
deleting “bad” memories demands us to ask: what exactly are bad memories? To qualify 
something as “bad”, suggests it is deviant, unwanted and undesirable. There is not much arguing 
with the moral and punitive rhetoric surrounding the term “bad”. Trauma, on the other hand, is 




and learns to live with it, depends on a lot of factors beyond the brain. Memories construct and 
reconstruct traumatic events, but are they necessarily “bad”? Dr. Arthur Caplan, an ECT 
advocate, believes so when he says: “bad memories can make us prisoners to ourselves”, 
denoting that these memories will aggressively inhibit our lives, constrict our movement and 
destroy our freedom. Invoking the metaphor of imprisonment, Caplan is not listening to the 
countless testimonies of ECT-survivors who have said the contrary; how ECT did not delete the 
right memories and left them feeling disoriented and confused. As recorded in my soundscape, 
Dr. Bonnie Burstow, says: “An entire past is wiped out. We make sense of our present and we 
make plans for our future in terms of our past. When the past is taken, the person cannot function 
as a meaning-making human being” (PSAT Don Weitz Fond “Shock Treatment City Forum, 
1983 audio recording). 
That new way of listening otherwise might be through “sound as a verb”. Voegelin, 
building upon Heidegger’s work, defines sound as a verb that “sounds” reality and makes the 
listener aware of how what they “hear” may not be what is “sounded” (17). She says: “sound is 
 
the thing thinking, a contingent materiality that is not captured as a noun but runs as a verb” (17). 
Thus, listening can transcend the fixture of representational “Truth”—this listening does not 
recognize; it listens not for what a sound represents, but hears what it might generate. The ethics 
of listening, thus, is a contingent negotiation that requires participation and imagination. As she 
describes: “Listening makes all possibilities actual as generative actualities: generative truth that 
produce their own reality” (Voegin 83). Listening not as mastery or “understanding”, and not as 
a finite process—but as an opening, an uncertainty. This kind of listening would challenge 




Working with soundscapes of the Mad Pride movement both present and past, I center 
listening to silence, or what has been silenced through dominant representations, as an ethical 
turn necessary for history to become praxis for re-authoring towards justice in the living present. 
What I hope to accomplish in my soundscape was a method in listening otherwise, beyond the 
diagnostic dyad or patient/doctor or developer/resident, would be to hold space for the 
unknowable and attend to what has been uprooted and erased through violent disruptive 
processes.The fluidity of listening otherwise affords a communicative exchange that resists 
hermeneutic dominance, or as Schafer puts it “sound imperialism” (91). Listening, in this sense, 
makes possible ethical engagements with marginalized individuals who are silenced within the 
confines of biomedical institutions and language—it becomes a way to encourage their speech to 
resound in meaningful ways toward building narrative community outside of psychiatric labels 
and patient management. 
 
 
Piece 3: Madness as a new kind of music 
 
I watched from the special table, as from a seat in a concert hall, the raging mass 
of people performing their violent orchestration of unreason that seemed like a 
new kind of music of curse and cry with the undertones of silence flowing 
through the quiet ones, the curled-up, immovable and nameless; and the 
movement was a ballet, and the choreography was Insanity; and the whole room 
seemed like a microfilm of atoms in prison dress revolving and voyaging, if that 
were possible, in search of their lost nucleus. (77) 
The third piece “madness as a new kind of music” takes up the above quote from Frame’s novel 




like the other pieces, but in a more chaotic and symbolic way. I worked with two mad musicians 
to create an electrical soundscape that would bring to life the sonic metaphors in the novel: 
namely the ones where Istina is witnessing a surge in power in the patients around her, and how 
she stays “safe” by hiding and listening from a linen closet (26). Sound as intimate power and 
sound as social power collide in this piece, which is a sort of accumulation of the two previous 
pieces I discussed: “Faces in the Water” and “Season of Peril”. “Madness as a New Kind of 
Music” creates a context for sound as a verb to subvert the epistemological underpinnings of 
madness cannot speak. I hope it can bring listeners closer to the symbolic abyss, to confront their 
fear and misunderstanding of madness. But more than that, I hope to create a context for 
questioning power on multiple layers, from the electrical, sonic, subjective and social. Bringing 
to life a section of the novel where patients subvert the institutional power of the asylum through 
their bodies and voices in a new kind of music that speaks of transcendence and freedom, I want 
to showcase how these actions are productive and important for navigating this history of 
memory erasure. 
We used a range of experimental methods to make this piece. Firstly, all of the vocals 
were recorded using blindfolds to allow us to let go and fully immerse ourselves in the 
experience of the song. We were also trying to symbolize the emotional blindfoldedness 
experienced in the psychiatric ward, how painful it is to be facing deep emotions without the 
ability to express them or be received by others. One musician said how they always felt 
emotionally blindfolded trying to find a way through unrecognizable feelings. We wanted to 
release all imprint and memory of our experiences with psychiatry and just flow with our 
immediate unbridled senses. The voices in this piece are severe and intense. They are difficult to 




present in Frame’s writing: fear, uncertainty, disorientation, hopelessness. In a way, we were 
trying to confront the abyss of madness, of going to the other side, where we were no longer sure 
who we were, and what was real. We wanted to create a sonic embodiment of madness. We 
tapped on the microphones to create a heartbeat, and to conjure a sense of haunting. We used 
major intervals to create a distorted sense of “happiness” to gesture to psychiatric treatments that 
promise miracle cures but only provide an artificial chemically induced uplift. This piece begins 
with disorientation and transitions to an expansive opening. There is a pause, where one might 
think the song is over, but it moves to a more tranquil and hopeful sound. I equate this transition 
to a sun rise after a long dark night. The noise dies down and the sky parts with light shining 
through. This transition is important, we were trying to symbolize how things have to get better. 
After surviving so much trauma and isolation we have to survive a new day, we reclaim our 
voices through sound. 
In this piece, we created a sonic world where listeners can welcome shock subversively 
through sound, not as a “new way of quieting people” (Frame 9) or a form of erasure, but as an 
opportunity to find a new “nucleus” of power from which to speak, listen and move differently. 
Outside of the imperatives of rational meaning, the voice that we hear in the piece is submerged, 
distorted yet powerful and strategic. It is the nucleus that Frame is talking about in the scene I 
quoted earlier: “and the whole room seemed like a microfilm of atoms in prison dress revolving 
and voyaging, if that were possible, in search of their lost nucleus” (77). This creates an uncanny 
disorientation, similar to the feelings we have while reading Frame’s narrative. It requires us to 
listen in a different way beyond an orderly or predictable rationality, towards a collective sense 
of madness as unsynthesizable knowledge. I trouble the “listening subject” in this piece by 
narrating Frame’s narrator, from a distance. Unlike the shock of ECT that is a new way of 




shifts how we listen. It is not to understand but to join the dance and to let go. This “new music” 
is shocking and unsettling, it welcomes the audience into an abyss of chaotic sounds that end up 
swallowing my voice or “the listening subject”. The illusion of a composed subject is an illusion 
that keeps us sane, it keeps us from entering the chaotic dance of meaning-making form a place 
of erasure. The patients that Istina describes are disoriented, lost, confined and alienated from 
the social world. They cannot speak, yet they make music and dance. The shock of witnessing 
and listening to such a scene is what I was hoping to create with these abstract electronic sounds. 
These are unsound sounds and they intersect with Mad Pride rhetoric to move beyond voice, 
towards gesture and movement. Frame’s writing uncouples language from reason and ventures 
freely into sound as it is experienced rather than described. As such, this sound piece mimics this 
sentiment and transports listeners into a different dimension of the “real”. Beyond a 
documentation of real-life music found in sonic ethnography, this new kind of music isn't really 
music in a harmonic sense, but rather in a performative sense. It gestures towards the liberation 
of sanity’s illusions, to free the subject from sanist language and thought.  
Unlike the “Season of Peril” sound piece, the sounds in this piece are musically 
produced using guitars, keyboards, microphones and sound editing software. I read the relevant 
passage from the novel that outlines the theme while the musicians created a soundscape 
around my voice like a body of water. There are no environmental or organic soundscapes in 





I am hoping that it can create a context for audience members to listen in a way that questions the 
“real” and “stable” narratives we have of being in the world. Music is a language which 
communicates embodied experience. We listen with our bodies to its language. Madness speaks 
in this piece through the absence of a coherent and linear composition centered on harmony. 
Instead, it is a jarring, jagged and haunted piece. The use of echoes and distant screaming 
highlight this feeling. The central emotion is one of frustrated expression: “like pure emotions 
music surges and sighs, rampages or grows quiet and in that sense it behaves so much like our 
emotions that it so often seems to symbolize them, to communicate them and to free us from the 
elaborate inaccuracies of words” (Ackerman 206). 
As seen in the novel, the scene where Istina notices the patients’ revolt with music in the 
asylum cafeteria, this frustrated expression is finally released at the end of the piece. The droning 
voice that is interrupted with static holds the electrical violence of ECT. It is meant to symbolize 
how the voice changes under its frequency. This voice is difficult to listen to because it is 
damaged by distortion and it hides in cavernous tones. This suggests that madness cannot speak 
in repressive environments. It highlights what remains hidden or repressed through ideology and 
epistemic violence. Muffled and confused, it emerges to be listened to otherwise. We are 
required to understand the relationship between listening and speaking differently: “locating 
responsibility not only on those who are marginalized but also on the conventions and 
institutional practices that determine who and what can be heard” (Baylosis 3). 
 
As a new kind of music, madness lands elsewhere in this piece. It arrives in an expansive 
open field. One that is elevated with higher tones and brighter sounds. No longer weighted by 
social constraints. It is sonically liberated, and ends on a hopeful note. I imagine this piece would 




include objects in the installation or simply have a dark room that gradually becomes brighter as 
the sound piece comes to an end. This is still in development. 
My focus on experimental form and research-creation is intended to challenge master- 
narratives that shape grammar and gait. I am grappling with what cannot be said, represented, 
remembered or heard. My emphasis on the energetics of experience breaks the traditional music 
score and the false harmony of psychiatric listening protocols. By channeling spirits of dissent 
(Frame, psychiatric survivors and mad activists/artists) hauntologically, I bring the past/future 




CONCLUSION: Future Possibilities for Sounding Madness and Listening Otherwise 
 
“Poetry isn’t revolution but a way of knowing why it must come.” (Rich 224) 
Adrienne Rich sums up why art, in all forms, matters in helping us create a livable future for all, 
especially those who are not understood, welcomed or cared for in socio-economic and political 
landscapes of austerity that are built on strategic exclusion. My project employed “sound as a 
verb” (Voegelin 17) for voicing the limitations of care within the psychiatric industrial complex 
and for legitimizing the trauma that has been named “groundless” (Fink 17) by ECT supporters 
and clinical administrators who have excluded the testimonies of survivors from their analysis. 
My work is grounded in the emancipatory potential of listening and collaborations with historical 
and contemporary survivor testimony. Janet Frame is the only author in the ECT-canon to 
prioritize sound as a literary device. As I read her autobiographical novel Faces in the Water and 
her life writing trilogy An Angel at my Table, I wanted to transform her writing into a score to 
sound “madness as a new kind of music” (77) to find the “lost nucleus,” the most sonorous 
syllable, of the survivor/mad movement. My intentions were to attempt reparation for the 
epistemic violence of erasure through listening otherwise (Levians, Lispari, Voegelin, Todd). 
My dissertation and sound art do not advocate for art as therapy but rather as a disruption 
of an epistemological hegemony. Thinking-through how madness might speak moving forward, 
my conclusion reflects upon current states of psychiatric listening, through engagement and 
through contemporary ECT practices reflected in “recovery narratives” deployed by institutions. 
These are coerced “recovery narratives” much different than the coercion we encounter in Faces 
in the Water. These narratives remain staged and controlled by the psychiatric industrial 
complex to promote a particular kind of recovery; one that reflects neoliberal values of being a 
productive member of society who is calm, self-sufficient, engaged and responsible for 




emotions according to biomedical standards that define what it means to be well. The “journey” 
of recovery in these narratives is plotted with the intent to erase madness as a viable and livable 
state of being. 
My sound art “madness as a new kind of music” welcomes the dissident, unsound, 
haunted voices of those who seek justice and reparation for the coercive pathologization of their 
anger, trauma and passion. Not only do I employ Frame’s powerful poetic and sonic language in 
breaking silence, I am trying to represent erasure in a way that doesn’t reduce it to spectacle or 
empty performance. I want people to think about how they are listening to the pieces I created, 
instead of the specific content (words, speech, voices, soundscapes, music). The way people 
listen matters as much as the sound art itself. Let’s rethink how silence can be an opportunity to 
bring the future into the present as a new kind of music that expresses what cannot be expressed 
in linear or rational language/thought. My work as a sound artist, poet, and academic is to attend 
to histories of erasure, those whose voices have been taken out of the story. I consider how to 
bring them back in. I am pushing for an engagement with history towards a livable future where 
we can listen, re-member and collaborate to create new social harmonies where people can 
express madness and be listened to without pathologization, prescription or coercive treatment. 
My goal has been to represent truths that have been left unsaid or what has been erased from 
history (noting how even in our best efforts to memorialize or remember in institutional 
settings/format it often falls short of creating real change). 
This work manifests my historical, artistic and theoretical journey. Mapping the 
contradictory layers and history of ECT within early medical electricity and tracing the 
genealogies of shock in survivor texts was not something I expected to discover when I set out to 




coerced into receiving a treatment that ultimately cost them their memory. I wanted to listen to 
Janet Frame. I wanted to listen to my aunt. I believed my aunt when she said, they didn’t erase 
the right memories because I trusted her ability to express what happened to her in the ward, and 
what went wrong. I wanted to listen to generations of psychiatric survivor activism. To embrace 
madness as a new kind of music, I experimented with mad musicians to uncouple formal 
harmony from a fluid self-reflexive process of creation. I wanted to listen in a way that would 
allow madness to speak. 
Listening is a bridge to another world, one where we care for our memories of erasure 
through the mad possibilities of sound. I am not suggesting that my work will ethically solve the 
problems that psychiatry has with listening to madness, as Salome Voegelin says: “listening will 
not automatically get us to a better world or even a better philosophy. Sound does not hold a 
superior ethical position” (Voegelin). But sound can show us the world in its invisibility: the 
unseen movements beneath its visual organization that allows us to see its mechanism its 
dynamic and structure and the investment of its agency which might be dark and forbidding. My 
analysis of Janet Frame’s life-writing and novel Faces in the Water illuminates how listening is 
an ethical gesture to welcome madness as a new kind of music. Frame’s writing is full of textual 
phonography, full of sound metaphors and moments of listening otherwise. Her sound poetics 
move her text into realms of perception that re-member (put it back together in a new way) an 
event, and re-open experience in ways that do not cover-over its emotional voice but, rather, 
attempt to utter its story of distress in other words. Through collaborating with Frame’s writing, I 
used sound to liberate listening practices away from diagnostic imperatives towards dialogic 




vibrations of poetic voice, I was able to rediscover the possibilities of the voice as a site of 
memory, imagination and music. 
My sound art rethinks the place of listening within Mad Studies and psychiatry, to 
problematize the over-emphasis on voice/engagement and argue for an incorporation of listening 
otherwise into the fold of advocacy. For example, the “Season of Peril” sound piece was 
centered on generations of ECT survivor/Mad Pride voices, from past to present. Madness as a 
new kind of music de-centers voice as a knowable subject. As Cherry Baylosis explains: 
the emphasis on giving voice has coincided with many initiatives within the field 
of mental health that engage with C/S/X perspectives. Yet sadly, many initiatives 
that offer space only partially and selectively hear the narratives told by Mad 
people invited to speak. (2) 
This theme of “giving voice” to patients is rampant in engagement scenarios run by mental 
health institutions as I have outlined in the postscript, but it is also a key feature in Frame’s 
writing where she questions the genuine intent of the doctors who make their rounds to meet 
patients and “listen” to their ideas or concerns. Ultimately, my project questions what happens to 
the Mad activist’s voice when it is engaged and listened to by the psychiatric industrial complex. 
As Jijian Voronka states in Troubling Inclusion, “these systems of power now incorporate such 
narratives not as critiques but as commodities to benefit organizational interests and solidify 
mental health truths” (Vokonka, Troubling Inclusion 33). 
Frame’s work interrupts the smooth harmony of the contemporary ECT popular 
discursive practices deployed by psychiatry to convince us that erasure can be a cure for trauma. 
As best as I could, when composing the sound art pieces, I tried to align with Frame’s theory of 




my work, to create a sort of hauntological soundscape of voices that transcend time/space. In 
doing so, I wanted to attend to the mainstream History of ECT that discredits and trivializes 
women’s survivor narratives as “gothic horror” (Endler 64). This form of epistemic violence and 
humiliation is why Frame decided to veil her life writing within fiction, that way readers would 
receive her message and absorb it with an open mind. With fiction, her words could travel 
further, resound more deeply and be, ultimately, believed. Being believed is what Frame and her 
characters were seeking in Faces in the Water. 
Studying the long history of medical electricity discourse, the ebbs and flows of its public 
reception and support, made me realize how little we know about consciousness, trauma and its 
complexity. I explore the contradictory relationship between Frame’s development of “voice” 
and agency, her misdiagnosis of schizophrenia and how her creative process of listening and 
writing leads towards the compassionate integration of madness within selfhood. I call this 
process, in Frame’s case as in the women who survived ECT’s memory erasure and chose to 
represent it through fragmented autobiography, “re-membering erasure”. Erasure is thus 
subverted from being a site of suffering and emptiness to being a site full of creative and radical 
potential for transformation. 
Finally, once I delved deeper into the main concepts of Faces in the Water, which I 
identify as Time, Memory and Selfhood, I found that listening otherwise could open up a space 
for madness to speak. I elaborated how these themes in Frame’s novel are woven in rich 
symbolic dynamics of natural rhythm and artificial mechanism (the sounds of nature combined 
with the sounds of the institution). Listening to one’s inner landscape, as well as one’s 
surrounding environment, is the compass that Frame uses to find meaning, direction and 




the novel are: Does orchestrated “memory erasure” help us survive, or does it re-traumatize and 
disorient? Does memory fail because it must? Is erasure an experience of being lost in 
time/space, or is it the experience of being displaced without the necessary skills or knowledge to 
get home? How can the traumatic experiences of patients be attended to compassionately and 
meaningfully while confined within institutions? And finally, is erasure compassionate? Still, I 
do not have answers to these questions, but I hope to explore them further in my artistic practice 
and sound installations. Future iterations of my sound art and engagement will involve 
interactive and immersive listening to madness as a new kind of music. 
My hope is that the psychiatry curriculum, pedagogy and practice could include and 
collaborate with madness liberation and listening otherwise. I hope that mad epistemologies and 
diverse interpretations of mental distress, not just engagement with patients as “experts”, can be 
used in a collaborative way to push the status quo towards meaningful change, for mad 
epistemology to be valued within psychiatric institutions. I long to see psychiatry embrace 
artistic modalities, not to encourage empathy, but to encourage reckoning with difficult histories, 
to encourage reparation for past harm and enact justice for psychiatric patients and survivors 
today. By changing how they conceptualize mental health recovery beyond the alleviation of 
symptoms, but towards a full articulation of one’s difference, agency, right to exist and speak as 
mad. How can psychiatry learn to listen otherwise? I wonder what that kind of “space” would do 
to genuinely transform the way psychiatry engages with mental suffering and distress in 
institutions. 
The patient engagement enterprise was not created by patients and it is a form of false 
listening. As Jennifer Johannesen says, “it is unclear what the patient demands are” (2). The 




practices but conceal how even when given a platform to speak, madness cannot speak because it 
is regulated and controlled. The ecosystem and landscape of “patient engagement” and 
psychiatric listening as a compassionate mechanism is one that serves to validate the institution, 
not to empower critique or change. Simultaneously, the “fantasy fold” (Hall 244) created by the 
“voice of lived experience” becomes an authentic fetish-object used in PR campaigns to justify 
psychiatric dominance. The ahistorical, uncritical, self-absorbed navel-gazing subject does not 
have anything to say but borrowed soundbites from the institution that manages its cadence. In 
this instance, there is no difference between Foucault’s madness cannot speak and the voice of 
lived experience as it is managed under the spectre of “patient engagement frameworks” that 
serve institutional agendas of “ethical domination” (Voronka). Yet experiential knowledge is 
important and should balance any empirical study. 
“Listening” within the contemporary mental health system is diluted by clinical outcomes 
and the engagement enterprise because it is still held captive by the scientific paradigm that 
seeks to manage patients. Paradoxically, patient engagement is a form of silencing that looks like 
empowerment. Thus, even if the extreme form of silencing and memory erasure described in 
Frame’s experience seems outdated and impossible today, there is still an optics of sanitizing 
madness to the point of silence. 
The embodied and sensory aspects of memory elucidate its importance for uncovering 
traumatic pasts and re-imagining possible futures beyond the constraints of scientific objectivity 
or the genre formalities of autobiography. My choice of form and focus on Janet Frame was to 
enact my analysis of her life writing through sounding and re-membering. I turn away from the 
hierarchy of the reductionist, empirical and objective research approach to disrupt how it settles 




academic ecosystems to repair the epistemic violence of erasure. I want madness to be heard and 
to be loved. Sounding Madness is a request to create a receptive context for madness to exist, 
speak and reverberate as a valid way of knowing and perceiving the world. I re-member the 
voices of memory erasure and mad epistemology and ground them in our current mental health 
system. I honour mad epistemology as a power and electric current that is guiding towards what 




POSTSCRIPT: Critique as an Act of Love 
 
I want to share a quote that both haunts and motivates me, a quote that follows me inside and 
outside institutional spaces. It comes from a conversation I had a long time ago, while trying to 
understand this business we call “patient engagement” and I tried to figure out where listening 
came into play. I share this quote, partly because I find myself constantly thinking of the 
irreconcilable ethical issues it brings up, and my responsibility to listen dialogically, across 
generations of discrimination and activism, and attend, here, today to what it might possibly 
mean: to “engage”. With it, I hope to provoke different kinds of conversations about 
engagement. And perhaps to haunt and motivate others. “Critique is an act of love. But 
engagement is a process of neutralization, it strips the social and political critique from the 
activist’s voice” (conversation with colleague). 
This quote simultaneously reignites and extinguishes my faith in the ethics of 
engagement. If engagement is to be ethical, it must be critical, it must risk undoing what it 
builds. It must doubt what it thinks it knows about others, those it seeks to engage, who are not 
always involved in defining its boundaries. 
My understanding of “critique is an act of love” is that the attentiveness necessary for 
critique is the same that can be found in love. And when I say love, I am thinking of Luce 
Irigaray’s definition of love as a “respect for the other whom I will never become” (I love to you 
77). This non-violent, non-possessive love allows for movement between difference, and allows 
for self-reflexive risks. It’s not about empathy, or feeling good about oneself. That’s when we 
create these fairytales of engagement that end happily ever after, that end on a neutral tone. So if 
engagement is a process of achieving neutrality, of sanitizing critical voices into a false harmony, 




Both love and critique can be unsettling, since both require us to unearth our 
assumptions, to reflect on our biases, to let go of what we think we know. Kathryn Church has 
said that engagement is not about representation, it is about entering an “unsettling relation” 
(Forbidden Narratives 73) that enables change and that allows us to make-meaning. We must be 
willing to harness this transformative potential to grow and learn despite how difficult and 
humbling it might be. But if engagement is a process of neutralization, of settling-in and being at 
ease with ourselves, then there is no room for critique, no room for change, and no room for 
love. 
When thinking about the ethical possibilities of engagement within mainstream 
institutions, I am reminded of bell hooks’ reflection on language and what happens when we 
borrow language that isn’t ours, but to borrow nonetheless to be heard: “Often when the radical 
voice speaks about domination we are speaking to those who dominate. Their presence changes 
the direction and shape of our words” (hooks 28). I often think about how my words have 
changed since working within an institution. I think about the language of “passing”, the 
language of sanist professionalism that I have adopted in order to get into grad school, write a 
dissertation and fit into mainstream corporate settings. It’s a language of silence, of holding my 
tongue, of sanitizing my radicalism. 
So, it’s important to distinguish that “engagement” branded and managed by institutions 
is not liberation, nor is it a substitute for social justice movements. Yet the language and 
discourse of contemporary engagement is full of social justice emancipatory language, allegory 
and allusion. Borrowed language to neutralize critique urging us to join this new “movement” 
without any accountability or commitment to the communities who have been speaking out 




concerned about the co-optation, and subsequent depoliticising, of ideas and practices that 
emerged through survivor/Mad Pride liberation movements by psychiatry and formal psychiatric 
services who do “patient engagement”. Branding this form of engagement in “social change” 
rhetoric is not only philosophically problematic and unethical, it damages our potential to 
collectively mobilize for tangible, material change. 
History is never linear, in many ways the struggles of the past that we thought we over 
and done with, are still with us today. Unless we seek institutional reparation for past harm, 
engagement will always be one sided and represent the agenda of the dominant epistemology. 
This form of tokenistic engagement is well entrenched in the “patient engagement enterprise”, a 
concept elucidated by Jennifer Johannesen in her talk: “The Trouble with Patient and Public 
Involvement”. She says that patient engagement will always/already neutralize ‘truth to power’ 
precisely because it is unethical and should therefore, not be done. 
The patient engagement enterprise was not created for activists. On the contrary, 
institutions don’t open their doors to protest, they don’t appreciate when people 
speak truth to power, they don’t want to be held to account. (3) 
By neutralizing the power imbalances still embedded in the system, many of these engagement 
frameworks that were not informed by critical analysis or theory sustain a myth that engagement 
or co/production is an unbiased, ahistorical solution to a complex, poly/vocal history of which 
many voices/perspectives are missing. I struggle with being complicit within the engagement 





The dialectical tension between then/now or between activism/engagement, also 
illustrates the inside/outside concept that politicized people with lived experience are not inside 
the system’s leadership or staff; they are always clients, service-users or people who exist 
outside of “knowledge-production”/epistemology and have nothing in common with those who 
work on the inside. Neither of these mythologies help us come together to attempt reparation and 
work collaboratively, in fact they perpetuate arbitrary divisive thinking and praxis. 
If we treat engagement like customer service instead of like human rights advocacy, we 
will do market research just like companies and we will file complaints and desires into dead-end 
mechanisms, into archival graves and reports that never see the light of day. The social justice 
and liberation rhetoric that surrounds engagement, borrowed from decades of activism that 
precede government mandates and policies, dilutes the subversive grain of activists/advocates 
voices. The activist or advocate is now branded as a “change-maker”, and “engaged patient” and 
told that they must co-produce with institutions and give up their “radical” values. The voice that 
is angry, tired and unwell that refuses to be managed by neutral benevolence, is slowly being 
drowned out in the false harmony of patient engagement. Rather than adopting a defensive 
stance, remembering and attending to past institutional and systemic harm is part of taking 
responsibility and remaining accountable; it creates opportunities for moving towards ethics. 
Therefore, could ethical engagement be a commitment to critique as an act of love, to 
listening to madness speak truth-to-power, to finally admitting our complicity in reproducing the 
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